e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第51章
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ors had been shopping the pany for some time and were clearly determined to sell。 If KKR went away； Arcata would likely find another buyer； though of course； the price might be lower。
我们还必须扪心自问若是KKR真的失败会如何，在这点我们觉得还好，Arcata的董事会与经营阶层已经在外兜售好一段时间了，显示该公司却有决心要出售，如果KKR跑掉，Arcata一定还会再找新的买主，当然届时的价格可能会差一点。
Finally； we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth。 Your Chairman； who can tell an elm from an oak； had no trouble with that one： He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot。
最后我们还必须问自己，那块红木林的价值到底有多少？坦白说我虽然个人连榆树跟橡木都分不出来，但对于这个问题我的处理方式倒很简单，反正就是介于零到一大笔钱之间就对了。
We started buying Arcata stock； then around 33。50； on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400；000 shares； or 5％ of the pany。 The initial announcement said that the 37。00 would be paid in January； 1982。 Therefore； if everything had gone perfectly； we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40％ … not counting the redwood claim； which would have been frosting。
后来我们开始从九月开始以每股33。5元买进Arcata股票，八个礼拜之内总共买进40万股，约占该公司5％的股权，隔年一月第一次对外公布股东每股可以拿到37元，换算年投资报酬约为40％，这还不包含可以的红木林赔偿损失。
All did not go perfectly。 In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit。 Nevertheless； a definitive agreement was signed on January 4。 Encouraged； we raised our stake； buying at around 38。00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655；000 shares； or over 7％ of the pany。 Our willingness to pay up … even though the closing had been postponed … reflected our leaning toward whole lot？rather than ero？for the redwoods。
然而过程中不太顺利，到了12月宣布交易可能会延后，尽管如果1月铁定会签约，受到这项鼓励，我们决定再加码以38元每股至65。5万股，约7％的股权，我们的努力终于获得回报，虽然有点拖延，但结果却相当令人满意。
Then； on February 25 the lenders said they were taking aecond look？at financing terms ？in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata outlook。？ The stockholders？meeting was postponed again； to April。 An Arcata spokesman said he id not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled。？When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances； their minds flash to the old saying： he lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation。？
接着在2月25日融资银行说有鉴于房地产景气不佳，连带对Arcata的前景可能有所疑虑，故有关融资条件可能还要再谈，股东临时会也因此再度延期到四月举行，同时Arcata公司发言人表示他不认为购并案已触礁，但是当套利客听到这种重申时，脑中便闪过一句老话︰他说谎的方式就好象是即将面临汇率崩盘的财政部长一样。
On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn work； first cutting its offer to 33。50； then two days later raising it to 35。00。 On March 15； however； the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group offer of 37。50 plus one…half of any redwood recovery。 The shareholders okayed the deal； and the 37。50 was paid on June 4。
3月12日KKR宣布先前的约定无效，并将报价砍至33。5美元一股，两天后再调高至35美元，然而到了3月15日董事会拒绝了这项提议，并接受另一家集团37。5美元外加红木林一半的收益，股东会迅速通过这项交易，并于6月4日收到现金。
We received 24。6 million versus our cost of 22。9 million； our average holding period was close to six months。 Considering the trouble this transaction encountered； our 15％ annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim … was more than satisfactory。
总计我们花了近六个月的时间，投资2；290万美元，最后收回2；460万美元，但若是加计这项交易中间所经历的风风雨雨，则15％的年报酬率（未包含红木林潜在收益）还算令人满意。
But the best was yet to e。 The trial judge appointed two missions； one to look at the timbervalue； the other to consider the interest rate questions。 In January 1987； the first mission said the redwoods were worth 275。7 million and the second mission remended a pounded； blended rate of return working out to about 14％。
不过好戏还在后头，承审法院指派两个委员会来解决这项纷争，一个负责认定红木林的价值，一个则负责应该适用的利率，隔年1月委员会认定红木林的价值为2。75亿美元，适用的复利率应为14％。
In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions； which meant a net amount of about 600 million would be due Arcata。 The government then appealed。 In 1988； though； before this appeal was heard； the claim was settled for 519 million。 Consequently； we received an additional 29。48 per share； or about 19。3 million。 We will get another 800；000 or so in 1989。
到了八月法官裁定这项决议，这代表政府需要再支付高达6亿美元的赔偿金，联邦政府立刻提出上诉，而就在上诉即将宣判结果时，双方以5。19亿美元达成和解，因此我们又额外收到1；930万美元，相当于每股29。48美元的大红包，之后还可以再拿到80万美元的进帐。
Berkshire arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs。 First； we participate in only a few； and usually very large； transactions each year。 Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year。 With that many irons in the fire； they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks。 This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives。 （What the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day？）
Berkshire的套利活动与其它套利客有些不同，首先相较于一般套利客一年从事好几十个案子，每年我们只参与少数通常是大型的交易案，有这么多锅子同时在煮，他们必须花很多时间在监控交易的进度与相关股票的股价变动，这并不是查理跟我想要过的生活方式，（为了致富，整天盯着计算机屏幕到底有何意义？）
Because we diversify so little； one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation。 So far； Berkshire has not had a really bad experience。 But we will … and when it happens we will report the gory details to you。
也因为我们只专注在少数几个案子，所以一个特别好或是特别差的案子，可能会大大地影响到我们一整年的套利成绩，所幸到目前为止，Berkshire还没有遇到什么惨痛的经验，一旦发生我一定会一五一十的向各位报告。
The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced。 We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates。 We just read the newspapers； think about a few of the big propositions； and go by our own sense of probabilities。
另有一点不同的是我们只参与已经公开对外宣布的案子，我们不会仅靠着谣言或是去预测可能被购并的对象，我们只看报纸，思考几项关键因素，并依照我们判断的可能性做决定。
At yearend； our only major arbitrage position was 3；342；000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of 281。8 million and a market value of 304。5 million。 In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position。 About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR； which acquired RJR； and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market。 Our pre…tax profit was a better…than…expected 64 million。
到了年底，我们剩下唯一的套利投资是334。2万股的RJR Nabisco，投资成本2。82亿美元，目前市价3。04亿美元，今年一月我们增加持股到400万股，接着在二月全部出清。有300万股是KKR决定购并RJR后，我们卖给KKR的，获利6；400万美元略高于预期。
Earlier； another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest： Jay Pritzker； who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax…oriented offer。 To quote Yogi Berra； it was deja vu all over again。？
稍早之前，另外一个竞争对手Jay Pritzker…第一波士顿集团浮现加入对RJR的竞争行列，提出以租税规划为导向的提案，套句Yogi Berra的说法：这感觉识曾相识！
During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR； our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon participation in a bidding group。 Customarily； Charlie and I； though we are directors of Salomon； are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work。 We have asked that it be that way： The information would do us no good and could； in fact； occasionally inhibit Berkshirearbitrage operations。
大部分的时间我们买进RJR相当大的限制，由于我们在也是竞争者的所罗兄公司有投资，虽然查理跟我都是所罗门的董事，但我们却与整个购并案的所有信息隔绝，而我们认为这样也好，�
