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股票期货突破技术分析(英文原版)-第32章

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I point this。pattern out not to proclaim that GM does。not have the problems。that have been well documented in these articles。 But I'll also note that; in my opinion; there is。absolutely。nothing that was。revealed in this。somber and extensive cover piece that has。not been thoroughly documented and discussed on numerous。occasions in numerous。other media forums。 
Calling a bottom in a troubled pany is。always。supremely difficult (I've been thus。far way too early 'read: “wrong”' in calling one for GM); as。much of the negative sentiment is。well deserved and the weak price action does。not provide the 〃contrarian contrast〃 between negative sentiment and strong technicals。that is。at work in the best of contrarian buy situations。 It is。only when the sentiment bees。over…the…top gloomy and almost inescapable in its。pervasiveness。and totally dismissive of current and potential positive developments。that one can feel somewhat safe in making the bottom call。 And I think with the arrival of this。latest GM cover story; we’re there; just as。we were in November 1992; when Time magazine’sver asked; “Can GM Survive in Today's。World?〃 
This。does。not mean that GM stock has。no additional downside。 It is。certainly possible; even if bankruptcy were not at all a concern; for the shares。to retest the recent lows in the 18 area。 And one cannot pletely rule out the worst case。 But investing is。a probability game and a game of paring potential rewards。and risks; and in GMs。case here and now。 I believe the potential upside is。well worth the risk of the potential downside。 
The Volatility Payoff 
If an options。trader takes。away just one concept from this。chapter; it would be the following: When buying options; the trader pays。for volatility but the payoff is。in directional price movement。 In other words; options are priced from a statisti…
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But Harley…Davidson call buyers。received a double benefit: They paid relatively little for their options because of the stocks。modest volatility and their payoff was。huge on the big rally in the shares。 
The point here is。that there is。a sweet spot for the option buyer—a period during which volatility is low; option prices。are cheap (due to the low volatility); and directional movement is。robust。 Steady…as…she…goes。rallies。such as。that experienced by Harley…Davidson in Figure 7。8; perversely。enough; register as。a low volatility input to the option pricing models; which then spit out low option premiums。 In such an environment; the leverage offered to option buyers。for the risk。they assume increases substantially; often skewing the risk…reward equation dramatically in their favor。 
In the Harley…Davidson example (assuming a 25 percent annual volatility); a six…month; 50…strike on…the…money call option would have been priced at about 3。50 when the shares were trading near the 50 level in June and July 2006。 Harley…Davidson proceeded to trade as。high as。75 by November 2006 (see Figure 7。8); and this。50…strike call option would have had a value of 25 (75 …50) at that time。 The call buyer thus。achieved a profit of 21。50 on a 3。50 investment; for a 611 percent gain; and the options。leverage in this。example on the 50 percent gain in the stock。was。12。3 to 1 (614 percent 50 percent)。 But if the options。on Harley…Davidson were priced at the 40 percent volatility level (parable to those of Schlumberger during this。period); this。leverage would have been significantly。reduced to about 7。5 to 1。 
Before the Storm 
But does。the fact that low volatility can turbo charge the leverage of option buyers。have significance for the stock。trader? It does。in the sense that major troughs。in volatility are often a signal of the calm before the storm; the storm being a major directional move for an asset。 
A funny thing happened in July 2006 as。crude oil futures。(CL/) were pushing through the 80 mark。amid talk。of ever…rising energy prices—the four…week。historical volatility for crude oil reached a three…year low (see Figure 7。9)。 In fact; crude oil volatility。had declined by 60 percent from its pinnacle in late 2004 and by 50 percent from its September 2005 peak。 And this。trough in volatility was。quickly followed by a 20 percent decline in crude oil prices。 

The collapse of Amaranth Advisors。(which lost half its。asset value in September 2006 as。a result of trading blowups。in the natural gas。market) was。a tough lesson on the volatility of natural gas。prices。 But in yet another instance of the calm before the storm (see Figure 7。10); by early September 2006 the 10…day historical volatility of natural gas。futures。(NG/) had declined to less。than half its。level of just a month earlier。 And natural gas。futures。then proceeded to tank to the tune of about 25 percent during the two weeks。that followed。 
But major troughs。in volatility can also be followed by。moves。to the upside; such as that which occurred with the stock。market in 1995 at the inception of a multiyear bull market。 Note in Figure 7。11 how the 3…month volatility for the S&P 500 Index (SPX) hovered at very low levels。from 1993 to 1995; with most readings。below the 10 percent mark。 The powerful bull market that began in 1995 and ended in early 2000 was。characterized by steadily rising volatility。 
Note as well that during the period from 2004 through late 2006; the market was characterized by low volatility readings。similar to those registered a decade earlier at the beginning of a multiyear bull market。 Yet what's。particularly interesting is。the nearly unanimously bearish conclusion by the investment munity regarding the implications。of these low volatility levels。 The low VIX has been professed to be an indicator of increasing investor placency; which isnsistent with a stock。market that is。fast approaching a major top。 
Troughs。in volatility often indicate an uping acceleration in directional movement。 In the examples。from the crude oil (Figure 7。9) and natural gas。(Figure 7。10) markets; this acceleration was。to the downside。 In the case of the stock。market from 1993 to 1995 (Figure 7。11); the acceleration was。to the upside。 It appears。that the odds。favor a similar resolution of the 2004…2000 low volatility 
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that leaves。them vulnerable to failure when market environments。change or when some or all of their trading criteria lose effectiveness; often from overuse by peting traders。 
One promise is。to use a screening process。to identify potentially tradable opportunities based on a set of objective criteria。 A trader then drills。down to extract much more detail on each name generated by the screen to determine which of these stocks might be tradable。 The operative concept here is。that it is。impossible to screen for all the criteria necessary to generate a trade; but without the screening process。one will fall prey to being 〃objectivity challenged” and insufficiently disciplined; and the breadth of ideas。suffers; as。well。 
What follows。is。an illustration of a screening process that used criteria based on the principles。discussed in this。chapter。 The screen is for potential buy candidates。and is。based on the general principle that stocks。with strong price action bined with evidence of skeptical or bearish sentiment have a greater…than…average likelihood of posting additional gains。 This。approach bines。the best features。of 〃trading with the trend〃 and 〃avoiding the crowded trade;〃 that is; the trade that might look。good on the chart but is。dangerous because too many players。have already mitted too much money; causing the stock to be excessively vulnerable to a reversal。 
Our screening criteria are as。follows: 
。 
Put/call open interest ratio (SOIR) is。in excess。of 1。00 (open put positions。exceed open call positions) 

。 
SOIR is。in the 75th percentile or greater of all SOIR readings。taken during the past year 

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The stock。has。outperformed the SPX by at least 10 percent during the past fifty trading days。

。 
The short…interest ratio (short interest average daily trading volume) is。above 3。00 

。 
Less。than 50 percent of analysts。rate the pany a buy 


This。screen returned 28 names; and Figure 7。12 displays。a subset of seven names。 


Investors。often fear that fo

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