new york-第4章

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appear　to　us　to　have　crept　into　the　political　creed　of　the

Republic；　purely　from　the　struggles　of　faction。　When　men　have　a

specific　and　important　purpose　in　view；　it　is　but　natural　they

should　bend　most　of　its　collateral　connections　to　the　support　of

their　own　objects。　We　conceive　that　the　Constitution　has　thus

been　largely　misinterpreted；　and　they　who　live　at　the　epoch　of

the　renowned　〃equilibrium〃　and　of　the　〃rights　of　the　people　of

the　Sovereign　States；〃　will　have　seen　memorable　examples　of　the

truth　of　this　position。



The　first　popular　error；　then；　that　we　shall　venture　to　assail；

is　that　connected　with　the　prevalent　notion　of　the　sovereignty　of

the　States。　We　do　not　believe　that　the　several　States　of　this

Union　are；　in　any　legitimate　meaning　of　the　term；　sovereign　at

all。　We　are　fully　aware　that　this　will　be　regarded　as　a　bold；　and

possibly　as　a　presuming　proposition；　but　we　shall　endeavor　to

work　it　out　with　such　means　as　we　may　have　at　command。



We　lay　down　the　following　premises　as　too　indisputable　to　need

any　arguments　to　sustain　them：　viz。；　the　authority　which　formed

the　present　Constitution　of　the　United　States　had　the　legal　power

to　do　so。　That　authority　was　in　the　Government　of　the　States；

respectively；　and　not　in　their　people　in　the　popular

signification；　but　through　their　people　in　the　political　meaning

of　the　term；　and　what　was　then　done　must　be　regarded　as　acts

connected　with　the　composition　and　nature　of　governments；　and　of

no　minor　or　different　interests　of　human　affairs。



It　being　admitted；　that　the　power　which　formed　the　government；

was　legitimate；　we　obtain　one　of　the　purest　compacts　for　the

organization　of　human　society　that　probably　ever　existed。　The

ancient　allegiance；　under　which　the　Colonies　had　grown　up　to

importance；　had　been　extinguished　by　solemn　treaty；　and　the

States　met　in　Convention；　sustained　by　all　the　law　they　had　and

backed　in　every　instance　by　institutions　that　were　more　or　less

popular。　The　history　of　the　world　cannot；　probably；　furnish

another　instance　of　the　settlement　of　the　fundamental　compact　of

a　great　nation　under　circumstances　of　so　much　obvious　justice。

This　gives　unusual　solemnity　and　authority　to　the　Constitution　of

1787；　and　invests　it　with　additional　claims　to　our　admiration　and

respect。



The　authority　which　formed　the　Constitution　admitted；　we　come

next　to　the　examination　of　its　acts。　It　is　apparent　from　the

debates　and　proceedings　of　the　Convention；　that　two　opinions

existed　in　that　body；　the　one　leaning　strongly　toward　the

concentration　of　power　in　the　hands　of　the　Federal　Government；

and　the　other　desirous　of　leaving　as　much　as　possible　with　the

respective　States。　The　principle　that　the　powers　which　are　not

directly　conceded　to　the　Union　should　remain　in　first　hands；

would　seem　never　to　have　been　denied；　and　some　years　after　the

organization　of　the　Government；　it　was　solemnly　recognized　in　an

amendment。　We　are　not　disposed；　however；　to　look　for　arguments　to

the　debates　and　discussions　of　the　Convention；　in　our　view　often

a　deceptive　and　dangerous　method　of　construing　a　law；　since　the

vote　is　very　frequently　given　on　even　conflicting　reasons。

Different　minds　arrive　at　the　same　results　by　different

processes；　and　it　is　no　unusual　thing　for　men　to　deny　each

other's　premises　while　they　accept　their　conclusions。　We　shall

look；　therefore；　solely　to　the　compact　itself；　as　the　most

certain　mode　of　ascertaining　what　was　done。



No　one　will　deny　that　all　the　great　powers　of　sovereignty　are

directly　conceded　to　the　Union。　The　right　to　make　war　and　peace；

to　coin　money；　maintain　armies　and　navies；　&c。；　&c。；　in

themselves　overshadow　most　of　the　sovereignty　of　the　States。　The

amendatory　clause　would　seem　to　annihilate　it。　By　the　provisions

of　that　clause　three　fourths　of　the　States　can　take　away　all　the

powers　and　rights　now　resting　in　the　hands　of　the　respective

States；　with　a　single　exception。　This　exception　gives　breadth　and

emphasis　to　the　efficiency　of　the　clause。　It　will　be　remembered

that　all　this　can　be　done　within　the　present　Constitution。　It　is

a　part　of　the　original　bargain。　Thus；　New　York　can　legally　be

deprived　of　the　authority　to　punish　for　theft；　to　lay　out

highways；　to　incorporate　banks；　and　all　the　ordinary　interests

over　which　she　at　present　exercises　control；　every　human　being

within　her　limits　dissenting。　Now　as　sovereignty　means　power　in

the　last　resort；　this　amendatory　clause　most　clearly　deprives　the

State　of　all　sovereign　power　thus　put　at　the　disposition　of

Conventions　of　the　several　States；　in　fact；　the　votes　of　these

Conventions；　or　that　of　the　respective　legislatures　acting　in　the

same　capacity；　is　nothing　but　the　highest　species　of　legislation

known　to　the　country；　and　no　other　mode　of　altering　the

institutions　would　be　legal。　It　follows　unavoidably；　we　repeat；

that　the　sovereignty　which　remains　in　the　several　States　must　be

looked　for　solely　in　the　exception。　What　then　is　this　exception？



It　is　a　provision　which　says；　that　no　State　may　be　deprived　of

its　equal　representation　in　the　Senate；　without　its　own　consent。

It　might　well　be　questioned　whether　this　provision　of　the

Constitution　renders　a　Senate　indispensable　to　the　Government。

But　we　are　willing　to　concede　this　point　and　admit　that　it　does。

Can　the　vote　of　a　single　State；　which　is　one　of　a　body　of　thirty；

and　which　is　bound　to　submit　to　the　decision　of　a　legal　majority；

be　deemed　a　sovereign　vote？　Assuming　that　the　whole　power　of　the

Government　of　the　United　States　were　in　the　Senate；　would　any　one

State　be　sovereign　in　such　a　condition　of　things？　We　think　not。

But　the　Senate　does　not　constitute　by　any　means　the　whole　or　the

half　of　the　authority　of　this　Government；　its　legislative　power

is　divided　with　a　popular　body；　without　the　concurrence　of　which

it　can　do　nothing；　this　dilutes　the　sovereignty　to　a　degree　that

renders　it　very　imperceptible；　if　not　very　absurd。　Nor　is　this

all。　After　a　law　is　passed　by　the　concurrence　of　the　two　houses

of　Congress　it　is　sent　to　a　perfectly　independent　tribunal　to

decide　whether　it　is　in　conformity　with　the　principles　of　the

great　national　compact；　thus　demonstrating；　as　we　assume；　that

the　sovereignty　of　this　whole　country　rests；　not　in　its　people；

not　in　its　States；　but　in　the　Government　of　the　Union。



Sovereignty；　and　that　of　the　most　absolute　character；　is

indispensable　to　the　right　of　secession：　Nay；　sovereignty；　in　the

ordinary　acceptation　of　the　meaning　of　the　term；　might　exist　in　a

State　without　this　right　of　secession。　We　doubt　if　it　would　be

held　sound　doctrine　to　maintain　that　any　single　State　had　a　right

to　secede　from　the　German　Confederation；　for　instance；　and　many

alliances；　or　mere　treaties；　are　held　to　be　sacred　and

indissoluble；　they　are　only　broken　by　an　appeal　to　violence。



Every　human　contract　may　be　said　to　possess　its　distinctive

character。　Thus；　marriage　is　to　be　distinguished　from　a

partnership　in　trade；　without　recurrence　to　any　particular　form

of　words。　Marriage；　contracted　by　any　ceremony　whatever；　is　held

to　be　a　contract　for　life。　The　same　is　true　of　governments：　in

their　nature　they　are　intended　to　be　indissoluble。　We　doubt　if

there　be　an　instance　on　record　of　a　government　that　ever　existed；

under　conditions；　expressed　or　implied；　that　the　parts　of　its

territory　might　separate　at　will。　There　are　so　many　controlling

and　obvious　reasons　why　such　a　privilege　should　not　remain　in　the

hands　of　sections　or　districts；　that　it　is　unnecessary　to　advert

to　them。　But　after　a　country　has　rounded　its　territory；

constructed　its　lines　of　defence；　established　its　system　of

custom…houses；　and　made　all　the　other　provisions　for　security；

convenience；　and　concentration；　that　are　necessary　to　the　affairs

of　a　great　nation；　it　would　seem　to　be　very　presumptuous　to

impute　to　any　particular　district　the　right　to　destroy　or

mutilate　a　system　regulated　with　so　much　c