lect02-第4章

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so　far　as　the　legal　rules　exactly　coincided　with　the　rules　of　the






new　Christian　code；　the　'law　of　the　letter。'　Now；　the　want　of　a






sanction　is　occasionally　one　of　the　great　difficulties　in






understanding　the　Brehon　law。　Suppose　a　man　disobeyed　the　rule　or






resisted　its　application；　what　would　happen？　The　learned　writer






of　one　of　the　modern　prefaces　prefixed　to　the　Third　Volume　of　the






Ancient　Laws　contents　that　the　administration　of　the　Brehon






system　consisted　in　references　to　arbitration；　and　I　certainly






think　myself　that；　so　far　as　the　system　is　known；　it　points　to






that　conclusion。　The　one　object　of　the　Brehons　was　to　force






disputants　to　refer　their　quarrels　to　a　Brehon；　or　to　some　person






in　authority　advised　by　a　Brehon；　and　thus　a　vast　deal　of　the　law






tends　to　run　into　the　Law　of　Distress；　which　declares　the　various






methods　by　which　a　man　can　be　compelled　through　seizure　of　his






property　to　consent　to　an　arbitration。　But　then　one　cannot　help






perpetually　feeling　that　the　compulsion　is　weak　as　compared　with






the　stringency　of　the　process　of　modern　Courts　of　Justice；　and






besides　that；　why　should　not　the　man　attempted　to　be　distrained






upon　constantly　resist　with　success？　Doubtless　the　law　provides






penalties　for　resistance；　but　where　is　the　ultimate　sanction？






Caesar　supplies　an　answer；　which　must；　I　think；　contain　a　portion






of　the　truth。　He　says　that　if　a　Celt　of　Gaul　refused　to　abide　by






a　Druid　judgment　he　was　excommunicated：　which　was　esteemed　the






heaviest　of　penalties。　Another　example　which　I　can　give　you　of






the　want　or　weakness　of　the　sanction　in　the　Brehon　law　is　a　very






remarkable　one；　and　I　shall　recur　to　it　hereafter。　If　you　have　a






legal　claim　against　a　man　of　a　certain　rank　and　you　are　desirous






of　compelling　him　to　discharge　it；　the　Senchus　Mor　tells　you　to






'fast　upon　him。'　'Notice'；　it　says；　'precedes　distress　in　the






case　of　the　inferior　grades；　except　it　be　by　persons　of






distinction　or　upon　persons　of　distinction；　fasting　precedes






distress　in　their　case'　（'Ancient　Laws　of　Ireland；'　vol。　i；　p。






113）。　The　institution　is　unquestionably　identical　with　one　widely






diffused　throughout　the　East；　which　is　called　by　the　Hindoos






'sitting　dharna'。　It　consists　in　sitting　at　your　debtor's　door






and　starving　yourself　till　he　pays。　From　the　English　point　of






view　the　practice　has　always　been　considered　barbarous　and






immoral；　and　the　Indian　Penal　Code　expressly　forbids　it。　It






suggests；　however；　the　question　　what　would　follow　if　the






creditor　simply　allowed　the　debtor　to　starve？　Undoubtedly　the






Hindoo　supposes　that　some　supernatural　penalty　would　follow；






indeed；　he　generally　gives　definiteness　to　it　by　retaining　a






Brahmin　to　starve　himself　vicariously；　and　no　Hindoo　doubts　what






would　come　of　causing　a　Brahmin's　death。　We　cannot　but　suppose






that　the　Brehon　rule　of　fasting　was　once　thought　to　have　been






enforced　in　some　similar　way。　Caesar　states　that　the　Druids






believed　in　the　immortality　and　transmigration　of　the　soul；　and






considered　it　the　key　of　their　system。　A　Druid　may　thus　very　well






have　taught　that　penal　consequences　in　another　world　would　follow






the　creditor's　death　by　starvation；　and　there　is　perhaps　a　pale






reflection　of　this　doctrine　in　the　language　of　the　Senchus　Mor：






'He　who　does　not　give　a　pledge　to　fasting　is　an　evader　of　all；　he






who　disregards　all　things　shall　not　be　paid　by　God　or　man。'　But






an　Irish　Brehon　could　scarcely　make　any　distinct　assertion　on　the






subject；　since　fasting　had　now　become　a　specific　ordinance　of　the






Christian　Church；　and　its　condition　and　spiritual　effects　were






expressly　defined　by　the　Christian　priesthood。　Theoretically；　I






should　state；　a　person　who　refused　unjustly　to　yield　to　fasting






had　his　legal　liabilities　considerably　increased；　at　least；






according　to　the　dicta　of　the　Brehon　commentators；　but　such






provisions　only　bring　us　to　the　difficulty　of　which　I　first






spoke；　and　raise　anew　the　question　of　the　exact　value　of　legal






rules　at　a　period　when　Courts　of　Justice　are　not　as　yet　armed






with　resistless　powers　of　compelling　attendance　and　submission。






　　　　If　we　are　justified　in　tracing　the　pedigree　of　the　Brehon






Code　to　a　system　enforced　by　supernatural　sanctions；　we　are　able






to　contrast　it　in　various　ways　with　other　bodies　of　law　in






respect　of　its　mode　of　development。　It　closely　resembles　the






Hindoo　law；　inasmuch　as　it　consists　of　what　was　in　all






probability　an　original　basis　of　Aryan　usage　vastly　enlarged　by　a






superstructure　of　interpretation　which　a　long　succession　of






professional　commentators　have　elected；　but　it　cannot　have　had






any　such　sacredness；　and　consequently　any　such　authority；　as　the






Brahminical　jurisprudence。　Both　the　Brahmins　and　the　Brehons






assume　that　Kings　and　Judges　will　enforce　their　law；　and






emphatically　enjoin　on　them　its　enforcement；　but；　while　the






Brahmin　could　declare　that　neglect　or　disobedience　would　be






followed　by　endless　degradation　and　torment；　the　Brehon　could






only　assert　that　the　unlearned　brother　who　pronounced　a　false






judgment　would　find　blotches　come　on　his　cheeks；　and　that　the






Chief　who　allowed　sound　usage　to　be　departed　from　would　bring　bad






weather　on　his　country。　The　development　of　the　Brehon　law　was






again　parallel　to　that　which　there　is　strong　reason　for　supposing






the　Roman　law　to　have　allowed　in　early　times。　The　writer　of　the






Preface　to　the　Third　Volume；　from　which　I　have　more　than　once






quoted；　cites　some　observations　which　I　published　several　years






ago　on　the　subject　of　the　extension　of　the　Roman　jurisprudence　by






the　agency　known　as　the　Responsa　Prudentum；　the　accumulated






answers　（or；　as　the　Brehon　phrase　is；　the　judgments）　of　many






successive　generations　of　famous　Roman　lawyers；　and　he　adopts　my






account　as　giving　the　most　probable　explanation　of　the　growth　of






the　Brehon　law。　But　in　the　Roman　State　a　test　was　always　applied






to　the　'answers　of　the　learned；'　which　was　not　applied；　or　not






systematically　applied；　to　the　judgments　of　the　Brehons。　We　never






know　the　Romans　except　as　subject　to　one　of　the　strongest　of






central　governments；　which　armed　the　law　courts　with　the　force　at






its　command。　Although　the　Roman　system　did　not　work　exactly　in






the　way　to　which　our　English　experience　has　accustomed　us；　there






can；　of　course；　be　no　doubt　that　the　ultimate　criterion　of　the






validity　of　professional　legal　opinion　at　Rome；　as　elsewhere；　was






the　action　of　Courts　of　Justice　enforcing　rights　and　duties　in






conformity　with　such　opinion。　But　in　ancient　Ireland　it　is　at






least　doubtful　whether　there　was　ever；　in　our　sense　of　the　words；






a　central　government；　it　is　also　doubtful　whether　the　public






force　at　the　command　of　any　ruler　or　rulers　was　ever






systematically　exerted　through　the　mechanism　of　Courts　of






Justice；　and　it　is　at　least　a　tenable　view　that　the　institutions






which　stood　in　the　place　of　Courts　of　Justice　only　exercised






jurisdiction　through　the　voluntary　submission　of　intending






litigants。