the ethics(part iv)-第8章

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Corollary　II。…　As　every　man　seeks　most　that　which　is　useful　to　him；　so　are　



men　most　useful　one　to　another。　For　the　more　a　man　seeks　what　is　useful　to　



him　and　endeavours　to　preserve　himself；　the　more　is　he　endowed　with　virtue　



（IV：xx。）；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing　（IV：Def。viii。）；　the　more　is　he　endowed　



with　power　to　act　according　to　the　laws　of　his　own　nature；　that　is　to　live　



in　obedience　to　reason。　But　men　are　most　in　natural　harmony；　when　they　live　



in　obedience　to　reason　（by　the　last　Prop。）；　therefore　（by　the　foregoing　



Coroll。）　men　will　be　most　useful　one　to　another；　when　each　seeks　most　that　



which　is　useful　to　him。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　What　we　have　just　shown　is　attested　by　experience　so　conspicuously；　



that　it　is　in　the　mouth　of　nearly　everyone：　〃Man　is　to　man　a　God。〃　Yet　it　



rarely　happens　that　men　live　in　obedience　to　reason；　for　things　are　so　



ordered　among　them；　that　they　are　generally　envious　and　troublesome　one　to　



another。　Nevertheless　they　are　scarcely　able　to　lead　a　solitary　life；　



so　that　the　definition　of　man　as　a　social　animal　has　met　with　general　



assent；　in　fact；　men　do　derive　from　social　life　much　more　convenience　than　



injury。　Let　satirists　then　laugh　their　fill　at　human　affairs；　let　



theologians　rail；　and　let　misanthropes　praise　to　their　utmost　the　life　of　



untutored　rusticity；　let　them　heap　contempt　on　men　and　praises　on　beasts；　



when　all　is　said；　they　will　find　that　men　can　provide　for　their　wants　much　



more　easily　by　mutual　help；　and　that　only　by　uniting　their　forces　can　they　



escape　from　the　dangers　that　on　every　side　beset　them：　not　to　say　how　much　



more　excellent　and　worthy　of　our　knowledge　it　is；　to　study　the　actions　of　



men　than　the　actions　of　beasts。　But　I　will　treat　of　this　more　at　



length　elsewhere。















Prop。　XXXVI。　The　highest　good　of　those　



who　follow　virtue　is　common　to　all；　



and　therefore　all　can　equally　rejoice　



therein。







Proof。…　To　act　virtuously　is　to　act　in　obedience　with　reason　（IV：xxiv。）；　



and　whatsoever　we　endeavour　to　do　in　obedience　to　reason　is　to　understand　



（IV：xxvi。）；　therefore　（IV：xxviii。）　the　highest　good　for　those　who　follow　



after　virtue　is　to　know　God；　that　is　（II：xlvii。&Note）　a　good　which　is　



common　to　all　and　can　be　possessed。　by　all　men　equally；　in　so　far　as　they　



are　of　the　same　nature。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　Someone　may　ask　how　it　would　be；　if　the　highest　good　of　those　who　



follow　after　virtue　were　not　common　to　all？　Would　it　not　then　follow；　as　



above　（IV：xxxiv。）；　that　men　living　in　obedience　to　reason；　that　is　



（IV：xxxv。）；　men　in　so　far　as　they　agree　in　nature；　would　be　at　variance　



one　with　another？　To　such　an　inquiry；　I　make　answer；　that　it　follows　not　



accidentally　but　from　the　very　nature　of　reason；　that　main's　highest　good　



is　common　to　all；　inasmuch　as　it　is　deduced　from　the　very　essence　of　man；　



in　so　far　as　defined　by　reason；　and　that　a　man　could　neither　be；　nor　be　



conceived　without　the　power　of　taking　pleasure　in　this　highest　good。　For　



it　belongs　to　the　essence　of　the　human　mind　（II：xlvii。）；　to　have　an　



adequate　knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　infinite　essence　of　God。















Prop。　XXXVII。　The　good　which　every　man；　



who　follows　after　virtue；　desires　for　



himself　he　will　also　desire　for　other　



men；　and　so　much　the　more；　in　proportion　



as　he　has　a　greater　knowledge　of　God。







Proof。…　Men；　in　so　far　as　they　live　in　obedience　to　reason；　are　most　



useful　to　their　fellow　men　（IV：xxxv；Coroll。i。）；　therefore　（IV：xix。）；　



we　shall　in　obedience　to　reason　necessarily　endeavour　to　bring　about　that　



men　should　live　in　obedience　to　reason。　But　the　good　which　every　man；　in　



so　far　as　he　is　guided　by　reason；　or；　in　other　words；　follows　after　virtue；　



desires　for　himself；　is　to　understand　（IV：xxvi。）；　wherefore　the　good；　which　



each　follower　of　virtue　seeks　for　himself；　he　will　desire　also　for　others。　



Again；　desire；　in　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　the　mind；　is　the　very　



essence　of　the　mind　（Def。　of　the　Emotions；　i。）；　now　the　essence　of　the　



mind　consists　in　knowledge　（III：xi。）；　which　involves　the　knowledge　of　God　



（II：xlvii。）；　and　without　it　（I：xv。）；　can　neither　be；　nor　be　conceived；　



therefore；　in　proportion　as　the　mind's　essence　involves　a　greater　knowledge　



of　God；　so　also　will　be　greater　the　desire　of　the　follower　of　virtue；　that　



other　men　should　possess　that　which　he　seeks　as　good　for　himself。　Q。E。D。







Another　Proof。…　The　good；　which　a　man　desires　for　himself　and　loves；　he　



will　love　more　constantly；　if　he　sees　that　others　love　it　also　（III：xxxi。）；　



he　will　therefore　endeavour　that　others　should　love　it　also；　and　as　the　



good　in　question　is　common　to　all；　and　therefore　all　can　rejoice　therein；　



he　will　endeavour；　for　the　same　reason；　to　bring　about　that　all　should　



rejoice　therein；　and　this　he　will　do　the　more　（III：xxxvii。）；　in　proportion　



as　his　own　enjoyment　of　the　good　is　greater。







Note　1…　He　who；　guided　by　emotion　only；　endeavours　to　cause　others　to　love　



what　he　loves　himself；　and　to　make　the　rest　of　the　world　live　according　to　



his　own　fancy；　acts　solely　by　impulse；　and　is；　therefore；　hateful；　



especially；　to　those　who　take　delight　in　something　different；　and　



accordingly　study　and；　by　similar　impulse；　endeavour；　to　make　men　live　in　



accordance　with　what　pleases　themselves。　Again；　as　the　highest　good　sought　



by　men　under　the　guidance　of　emotion　is　often　such；　that　it　can　only　be　



possessed　by　a　single　individual；　it　follows　that　those　who　love　it　are　not　



consistent　in　their　intentions；　but；　while　they　delight　to　sing　its　praises；　



fear　to　be　believed。　But　he；　who　endeavours　to　lead　men　by　reason；　does　not　



act　by　impulse　but　courteously　and　kindly；　and　his　intention　is　always　



consistent。　Again；　whatsoever　we　desire　and　do；　whereof　we　are　the　cause　



in　so　far　as　we　possess　the　idea　of　God；　or　know　God；　I　set　down　to　



Religion。　The　desire　of　well…doing；　which　is　engendered　by　a　life　



according　to　reason；　I　call　piety。　Further；　the　desire；　whereby　a　



man　living　according　to　reason　is　bound　to　associate　others　with　



himself　in　friendship；　I　call　honour　（Honestas）；　by　honourable　I　mean　



that　which　is　praised　by　men　living　according　to　reason；　and　by　base　



I　mean　that　which　is　repugnant　to　the　gaining　of　friendship。　I　have　also　



shown　in　addition　what　are　the　foundations　of　a　state；　and　the　difference　



between　true　；virtue　and　infirmity　may　be　readily　gathered　from　what　I　



have　said；　namely；　that　true　virtue　is　nothing　else　but　living　in　



accordance　with　reason；　while　infirmity　is　nothing　else　but　man's　



allowing　himself　to　be　led　by　things　which　are　external　to　himself；　



and　to　be　by　them　determined　to　act　in　a　manner　demanded　by　the　general　



disposition　of　things　rather　than　by　his　own　nature　considered　solely　



in　itself。







Such　are　the　matters　which　I　engaged　to　prove　in　IV：xviii。；　whereby　it　



is　plain　that　the　law　against　the　slaughtering　of　animals　is　founded　rather　



on　vain　superstition　and　womanish　pity　than　on　sound　reason。　The　rational　



quest　of　what　is　useful　to　us　further　teaches　us　the　necessity　of　



associating　ourselves　with　our　fellow　men；　but　…　not　with　beasts；　or　things；　



whose　nature　is　different　from　our　own；　we　have　the　same　rights　in　respect　



to　them　as　they　have　in　respect　to　us。　Nay；　as　everyone's　right　is　defined　



by　his　virtue；　or　power；　men　have　far　greater　rights　over　beasts　than　



beasts　have　over　men。　Still　I　do　not　deny　that　beasts　feel：　what　I　deny　is；　



that　we　may　not　consult　our　own　advantage　and　use　them　as　we　please；　



treating　them　in　the　way　which　best　suits　us；　for　their　nature　is　not　like　



ours；　and　their　emotions　are　naturally　different　from　human　emotions　



（III：Ivii。Note）。　It　remains　for　me　to　explain　what　I　mean　by；　just　and　



unjust；　sin