the ethics(part iv)-第6章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
made by everyone to preserve his own being。 Therefore; no one can
desire; &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXII。 No virtue can be conceived
as prior to this endeavour to preserve
one's own being。
Proof。… The effort for self…preservation is the essence of a thing
(III:vii。); therefore; if any virtue could be conceived as prior
thereto; the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as
prior to itself; which is obviously absurd。 Therefore no virtue; &c。
Q。E。D。
Corollary。… The effort for self…preservation is the first and only
foundation of virtue。 For prior to this principle nothing can be
conceived; and without it no virtue can be conceived。
Prop。 XXIII。 Man; in so far as he is
determined to a particular action
because he has inadequate ideas;
cannot be absolutely said to act in
obedience to virtue; he can only be
so described; in so far as he is
determined for the action because
he understands。
Proof。… In so far as a man is determined to an action through having
inadequate ideas; he is passive (III:i。); that is (III:Def。i。; &iii。);
he does something; which cannot be perceived solely through his essence;
that is (by IV:Def。viii。); which does not follow from his virtue。 But;
in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands; he
is active; that is; he does something; which is perceived through his
essence alone; or which adequately follows from his virtue。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXIV。 To act absolutely in obedience
to virtue is in us the same thing as to act;
to live; or to preserve one's being (these
three terms are identical in meaning) in
accordance with the dictates of reason on the
basis of seeking what is useful to one's self。
Proof。… To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but
to act according to the laws of one's own nature。 But we only act; in
so far as we understand (III:iii。) : therefore to act in obedience to
virtue is in us nothing else but to act; to live; or to preserve one's
being in obedience to reason; and that on the basis of seeking what is
useful for us (IV:xxii。Coroll。)。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXV。 No one wishes to preserve his
being for the sake of anything else。
Proof。… The endeavour; wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its
being; is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III:vii。);
from this alone; and not from the essence of anything else; it necessarily
follows (III:vi。) that everyone endeavours to preserve his being。
Moreover; this proposition is plain from IV:xxii。Coroll。; for if a man
should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else; the
last…named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue; which; by the
foregoing corollary; is absurd。 Therefore no one; &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXVI。 Whatsoever we endeavour in
obedience to reason is nothing further
than to understand; neither does the mind;
in so far as it makes use of reason; judge
anything to be useful to it; save such
things as are conducive to understanding。
Proof。… The effort for self…preservation is nothing else but the essence
of the thing in question (III:vii。); which; in so far as it exists such
as it is; is conceived to have force for continuing in existence (III:vi。)
and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (see the
Def。 of Appetite; II:ix。Note)。 But the essence of reason is nought else but
our mind; in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see the
definition in II:xl。Note:ii。) ; therefore (III:xl。) whatsoever we endeavour
in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand。 Again; since this
effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours; in so far as it reasons;
to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this effort
at understanding is (IV:xxii。Coroll。) the first and single basis of virtue;
nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior
object (IV:xxv。); on the other hand; the mind; in so far as it reasons;
will not be able to conceive any good for itself; save such things as are
conducive to understanding。
Prop。 XXVII。 We know nothing to be certainly
good or evil; save such things as really
conduce to understanding; or such as are
able to hinder us from understanding。
Proof。… The mind; in so far as it reasons; desires nothing beyond
understanding; and judges nothing to be useful to itself; save such
things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop。)。 But the
mind (II:xli。&Note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything;
except in so far as it has adequate ideas; or (what by II:xl。Note;
is the same thing) in so far as it reasons。 Therefore we know nothing
to be good or evil save such things as really conduce; &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXVIII。 The mind's highest good is
the knowledge of God; and the mind's
highest virtue is to know God。
Proof。… The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God;
that is (I:Def。vi。); than a Being absolutely infinite; and without which
(I:xv。) nothing can either be or be conceived; therefore (IV:xxvi。;
&xxvii。); the mind's highest utility or (IV:Def。i。) good is the knowledge
of God。 Again; the mind is active; only in so far as it understands; and
only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously。 The
mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand。 Now; as we have already
shown; the highest that the mind can understand is God; therefore the
highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXIX。 No individual thing; which is
entirely different from our own nature;
can help or check our power of activity; and
absolutely nothing can do us good or harm;
unless it has something in common with our nature。
Proof。… The power of every individual thing; and consequently the power of
man; whereby he exists and operates; can only be determined by an
individual thing (I:xxviii。); whose nature (II:vi。) must be understood
through the same nature as that; through which human nature is conceived。
Therefore our power of activity; however it be conceived; can be determined
and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual
thing; which has something in common with us; but not by the power of
anything; of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and
since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain
(IV:viii。); that is (III:xi。Note); which increases or diminishes; helps
or hinders; our power of activity; therefore; that which is entirely;
different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXX。 A thing cannot be bad for us
through the quality which it has in common
with our nature; but it is bad for us in so
far as it is contrary to our nature。
Proof。… We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV:viii。); that
is (by the Def。; which see in III:xi。Note); when it diminishes or checks
our power of action。 Therefore; if anything were bad for us through that
quality which it has in common with our nature; it would be able
itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature;
which (III:iv。) is absurd。 Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through
that quality which it has in common with us; but; on the other hand; in
so far as it is bad for us; that is (as we have just shown); in so far as
it can diminish or check our power of action; it is contrary to our nature。
Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXXI。 In so far as a thing