the ethics(part iv)-第17章

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XIX。　Again；　meretricious　love；　that　is；　the　lust　of　generation　arising　



from　bodily　beauty；　and　generally　every　sort　of　love；　which　owns　anything　



save　freedom　of　soul　as　its　cause；　readily　passes　into　hate；　unless　indeed；　



what　is　worse；　it　is　a　species　of　madness；　and　then　it　promotes　discord　



rather　than　harmony　（cf。　III：xxxi。Coroll。）。







XX。　As　concerning　marriage；　it　is　certain　that　this　is　in　harmony　with　



reason；　if　the　desire　for　physical　union　be　not　engendered　solely　by　



bodily　beauty；　but　also　by　the　desire　to　beget　children　and　to　train　them　



up　wisely；　and　moreover；　if　the　love　of　both；　to　wit；　of　the　man　and　of　



the　woman；　is　not　caused　by　bodily　beauty　only；　but　also　by　freedom　of　soul。







XXI。　Furthermore；　flattery　begets　harmony；　but　only　by　means　of　the　vile　



offence　of　slavishness　or　treachery。　None　are　more　readily　taken　with　



flattery　than　the　proud；　who　wish　to　be　first；　but　are　not。







XXII。　There　is　in　abasement　a　spurious　appearance　of　piety　and　



religion。　Although　abasement　is　the　opposite　to　pride；　yet　is　he　that　



abases　himself　most　akin　to　the　proud　（IV：lvii。Note）。







XXIII。　Shame　also　brings　about　harmony；　but　only　in　such　matters　as　cannot　



be　hid。　Further；　as　shame　is　a　species　of　pain；　it　does　not　concern　the　



exercise　of　reason。　







XXIV。　The　remaining　emotions　of　pain　towards　men　are　directly　opposed



to　justice；　equity；　honour；　piety；　and　religion；　and；　although　



indignation　seems　to　bear　a　certain　resemblance　to　equity；　yet　is　life　



but　lawless；　where　every　man　may　pass　judgment　on　another's　deeds；　and　



vindicate　his　own　or　other　men's　rights。　







XXV。　Correctness　of　conduct　（modestia）；　that　is；　the　desire　of　pleasing　



men　which　is　determined　by　reason；　is　attributable　to　piety　（as　we　said　



in　IV：xxxvii。Note。i。）。　But；　if　it　spring　from　emotion；　it　is　ambition；　



or　the　desire　whereby；　men；　under　the　false　cloak　of　piety；　generally　



stir　up　discords　and　seditions。　For　he　who　desires　to　aid　his　fellows。　



either　in　word　or　in　deed；　so　that　they　may　together　enjoy　the　highest　



good；　he；　I　say；　will　before　all　things　strive　to；　win　them　over　with　



love：　not　to　draw　them　into　admiration；　so　that　a　system　may　be　called　



after　his　name；　nor　to　give　any　cause　for　envy。　Further；　in　his　



conversation　he　will　shrink　from　talking　of　men's　faults；　and　will　be　



careful　to　speak　but　sparingly　of　human　infirmity：　but　he　will　dwell　at　



length　on　human　virtue　or　power；　and　the　way　whereby　it　may　be　perfected。　



Thus　will　men　be　stirred　not　by　fear；　nor　by　aversion；　but　only　by　the　



emotion　of　joy；　to　endeavour；　so　far　as　in　them　lies；　to　live　in　



obedience　to　reason。







XXVI。　Besides　men；　we　know　of　no　particular　thing　in　nature　in　whose　mind　



we　may　rejoice；　and　whom　we　can　associate　with　ourselves　in　friendship　or　



any　sort　of　fellowship；　therefore；　whatsoever　there　be　in　nature　besides　



man；　a　regard　for　our　advantage　does　not　call　on　us　to　preserve；　but　to　



preserve　or　destroy　according　to　its　various　capabilities；　and　to　adapt　



to　our　use　as　best　we　may。







XXVII。　The　advantage　which　we　derive　from　things　external　to　us；　besides　



the　experience　and　knowledge　which　we　acquire　from　observing　them；　and　



from　recombining　their　elements　in　different　forms；　is　principally　the　



preservation　of　the　body；　from　this　point　of　view；　those　things　are　most　



useful　which　can　so　feed　and　nourish　the　body；　that　all　its　parts　may　



rightly　fulfil　their　functions。　For；　in　proportion　as　the　body　is　capable　



of　being　affected　in　a　greater　variety　of　ways；　and　of　affecting　external　



bodies　in　a　great　number　of　ways；　so　much　the　more　is　the　mind　capable　of　



thinking　（IV：xxxviii。；　IV：xxxix。）。　But　there　seem　to　be　very　few　things　



of　this　kind　in　nature；　wherefore　for　the　due　nourishment　of　the　body　we　



must　use　many　foods　of　diverse　nature。　For　the　human　body　is　composed　of　



very　many　parts　of　different　nature；　which　stand　in　continual　need　of　



varied　nourishment；　so　that　the　whole　body　may　be　equally　capable　of　



doing　everything　that　can　follow　from　its　own　nature；　and　consequently　



that　the　mind　also　may　be　equally　capable　of　forming　many　perceptions。







XXVIII。　Now　for　providing　these　nourishments　the　strength　of　each　



individual　would　hardly　suffice；　if　men　did　not　lend　one　another　mutual　



aid。　But　money　has　furnished　us　with　a　token　for　everything：　hence　it　is　



with　the　notion　of　money；　that　the　mind　of　the　multitude　is　chiefly　



engrossed：　nay；　it　can　hardly　conceive　any　kind　of　pleasure；　which　is　not　



accompanied　with　the　idea　of　money　as　cause。







XXIX。　This　result　is　the　fault　only　of　those；　who　seek　money；　not　from　



poverty　or　to　supply　their　necessary；　wants；　but　because　they；　have　



learned　the　arts　of　gain；　wherewith　they　bring　themselves　to　great　



splendour。　Certainly　they　nourish　their　bodies；　according　to　custom；　but　



scantily；　believing　that　they　lose　as　much　of　their　wealth　as　they　spend　on　



the　preservation　of　their　body。　But　they　who　know　the　true　use　of　money；　



and　who　fix　the　measure　of　wealth　solely　with　regard　to　their　actual　needs；　



live　content　with　little。







XXX。　As；　therefore；　those　things　are　good　which　assist　the　various　parts　



of　the　body；　and　enable　them　to　perform　their　functions；　and　as　pleasure　



consists　in　an　increase　of；　or　aid　to；　man's　power；　in　so　far　as　he　is　



composed　of　mind　and　body；　it　follows　that　all　those　things　which　bring　



pleasure　are　good。　But　seeing　that　things　do　not　work　with　the　object　of　



giving　us　pleasure；　and　that　their　power　of　action　is　not　tempered　to　suit　



our　advantage；　and；　lastly；　that　pleasure　is　generally　referred　to　one　



part　of　the　body　more　than　to　the　other　parts；　therefore　most　emotions　of　



pleasure　（unless　reason　and　watchfulness　be　at　hand）；　and　consequently　the　



desires　arising　therefrom；　may　become　excessive。　Moreover　we　may　add　that　



emotion　leads　us　to　pay　most　regard　to　what　is　agreeable　in　the　present；　



nor　can　we　estimate　what　is　future　with　emotions　equally　vivid。　



（IV：xliv。Note；　and　IV：lx。Note。）







XXXI。　Superstition；　on　the　other　hand；　seems　to　account　as　good　all　that　



brings　pain；　and　as　bad　all　that　brings　pleasure。　However；　as　we　said　



above　（IV：xlv。Note）；　none　but　the　envious　take　delight　in　my　infirmity　



and　trouble。　For　the　greater　the　pleasure　whereby　we　are　affected；　the　



greater　is　the　perfection　whereto　we　pass；　and　consequently　the　more　do　



we　partake　of　the　divine　nature：　no　pleasure　can　ever　be　evil；　which　is　



regulated　by　a　true　regard　for　our　advantage。　But　contrariwise　he；　who　is　



led　by　fear　and　does　good　only　to　avoid　evil；　is　not　guided　by　reason。







Ap。XXXII。　（1）　But　human　power　is　extremely　limited；　and　is　infinitely　



surpassed　by　the　power　of　external　causes；　we　have　not；　therefore；　an　



absolute　power　of　shaping　to　our　use　those　things　which　are　without　us。　　



Nevertheless；　we　shall　bear　with　an　equal　mind　all　that　happens　to　us　



in　contravention　to　the　claims　of　our　own　advantage；　so　long　as　we　are　



conscious；　that　we　have　done　our　duty；　and　that　the　power　which　we　possess　



is　not　sufficient　to　enable　us　to　protect　ourselves　completely；　



remembering　that　we　are　a　part　of　universal　nature；　and　that　we　



follow　her　order。　If　we　have　a　clear　and　distinct　understanding　of　



this；　that　part　of　our　nature　which　is　defined　by　intelligence；　in　other　



words　the　better　part　of　ourselves；　will　assuredly　acquiesce　in　what　



befalls　us；　and　in　such　acquiescence　will　endeavour　to　persist。　For；　



in　so　far　as　we　are　intelligent　beings；　we　cannot　desire　anything　save　



that　which　is　necessary；　nor　yield　absolute　acquiescence　to　anything；　



save　to　that　which　is　true：　wherefore；　in　so　far　as　we　have　a　right　



understanding　of　these　things；　the　endeavour　of　the　better　par