wealbk05-第9章

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altogether　insufficient　for　defraying　the　expense　of　the

sovereignty；　and　when　it　had　become　necessary　that　the　people

should；　for　their　own　security；　contribute　towards　this　expense

by　taxes　of　different　kinds；　it　seems　to　have　been　very　commonly

stipulated　that　no　present　for　the　administration　of　justice

should；　under　any　pretence；　be　accepted　either　by　the　sovereign；

or　by　his　bailiffs　and　substitutes；　the　judges。　Those　presents；

it　seems　to　have　been　supposed；　could　more　easily　be　abolished

altogether　than　effectually　regulated　and　ascertained。　Fixed

salaries　were　appointed　to　the　judges；　which　were　supposed　to

compensate　to　them　the　loss　of　whatever　might　have　been　their

share　of　the　ancient　emoluments　of　justice；　as　the　taxes　more

than　compensated　to　the　sovereign　the　loss　of　his。　Justice　was

then　said　to　be　administered　gratis。

　　　　　Justice；　however；　never　was　in　reality　administered　gratis

in　any　country。　Lawyers　and　attorneys；　at　least；　must　always　be

paid　by　the　parties；　and；　if　they　were　not；　they　would　perform

their　duty　still　worse　than　they　actually　perform　it。　The　fees

annually　paid　to　lawyers　and　attorneys　amount；　in　every　court；　to

a　much　greater　sum　than　the　salaries　of　the　judges。　The

circumstance　of　those　salaries　being　paid　by　the　crown　can

nowhere　much　diminish　the　necessary　expense　of　a　law…suit。　But　it

was　not　so　much　to　diminish　the　expense；　as　to　prevent　the

corruption　of　justice；　that　the　judges　were　prohibited　from

receiving　any　present　or　fee　from　the　parties。

　　　　　The　office　of　judge　is　in　itself　so　very　honourable　that　men

are　willing　to　accept　of　it；　though　accompanied　with　very　small

emoluments。　The　inferior　office　of　justice　of　peace；　though

attended　with　a　good　deal　of　trouble；　and　in　most　cases　with　no

emoluments　at　all；　is　an　object　of　ambition　to　the　greater　part

of　our　country　gentlemen。　The　salaries　of　all　the　different

judges；　high　and　low；　together　with　the　whole　expense　of　the

administration　and　execution　of　justice；　even　where　it　is　not

managed　with　very　good　economy；　makes；　in　any　civilised　country；

but　a　very　inconsiderable　part　of　the　whole　expense　of

government。

　　　　　The　whole　expense　of　justice；　too；　might　easily　be　defrayed

by　the　fees　of　court；　and；　without　exposing　the　administration　of

justice　to　any　real　hazard　of　corruption；　the　public　revenue

might　thus　be　discharged　from　a　certain；　though；　perhaps；　but　a

small　incumbrance。　It　is　difficult　to　regulate　the　fees　of　court

effectually　where　a　person　so　powerful　as　the　sovereign　is　to

share　in　them；　and　to　derive　any　considerable　part　of　his　revenue

from　them。　It　is　very　easy　where　the　judge　is　the　principal

person　who　can　reap　any　benefit　from　them。　The　law　can　very

easily　oblige　the　judge　to　respect　the　regulation；　though　it

might　not　always　be　able　to　make　the　sovereign　respect　it。　Where

the　fees　of　court　are　precisely　regulated　and　ascertained；　where

they　are　paid　all　at　once；　at　a　certain　period　of　every　process；

into　the　hands　of　a　cashier　or　receiver；　to　be　by　him　distributed

in　certain　known　proportions　among　the　different　judges　after　the

process　is　decided；　and　not　till　it　is　decided；　there　seems　to　be

no　more　danger　of　corruption　than　where　such　fees　are　prohibited

altogether。　Those　fees；　without　occasioning　any　considerable

increase　in　the　expense　of　a　lawsuit；　might　be　rendered　fully

sufficient　for　defraying　the　whole　expense　of　justice。　By　not

being　paid　to　the　judges　till　the　process　was　determined；　they

might　be　some　incitement　to　the　diligence　of　the　court　in

examining　and　deciding　it。　In　courts　which　consisted　of　a

considerable　number　of　judges；　by　proportioning　the　share　of　each

judge　to　the　number　of　hours　and　days　which　he　had　employed　in

examining　the　process；　either　in　the　court　or　in　a　committee　by

order　of　the　court；　those　fees　might　give　some　encouragement　to

the　diligence　of　each　particular　judge。　Public　services　are　never

better　performed　than　when　their　reward　comes　only　in　consequence

of　their　being　performed；　and　is　proportioned　to　the　diligence

employed　in　performing　them。　In　the　different　parliaments　of

France；　the　fees　of　court　（called　epices　and　vacations）

constitute　the　far　greater　part　of　the　emoluments　of　the　judges。

After　all　deductions　are　made；　the　net　salary　paid　by　the　crown

to　a　counsellor　or　judge　in　the　Parliament　of　Toulouse；　in　rank

and　dignity　the　second　parliament　of　the　kingdom；　amounts　only　to

a　hundred　and　fifty　livres；　about　six　pounds　eleven　shillings

sterling　a　year。　About　seven　years　ago　that　sum　was　in　the　same

place　the　ordinary　yearly　wages　of　a　common　footman。　The

distribution　of　those　epices；　too；　is　according　to　the　diligence

of　the　judges。　A　diligent　judge　gains　a　comfortable；　though

moderate；　revenue　by　his　office：　an　idle　one　gets　little　more

than　his　salary。　Those　Parliaments　are　perhaps；　in　many　respects；

not　very　convenient　courts　of　justice；　but　they　have　never　been

accused；　they　seem　never　even　to　have　been　suspected；　of

corruption。

　　　　　The　fees　of　court　seem　originally　to　have　been　the　principal

support　of　the　different　courts　of　justice　in　England。　Each　court

endeavoured　to　draw　to　itself　as　much　business　as　it　could；　and

was；　upon　that　account；　willing　to　take　cognisance　of　many　suits

which　were　not　originally　intended　to　fall　under　its

jurisdiction。　The　Court　of　King's　Bench；　instituted　for　the　trial

of　criminal　causes　only；　took　cognisance　of　civil　suits；　the

plaintiff　pretending　that　the　defendant；　in　not　doing　him

justice；　had　been　guilty　of　some　trespass　or　misdemeanour。　The

Court　of　Exchequer；　instituted　for　the　levying　of　the　king's

revenue；　and　for　enforcing　the　payment　of　such　debts　only　as　were

due　to　the　king；　took　cognisance　of　all　other　contract　debts；　the

plaintiff　alleging　that　he　could　not　pay　the　king　because　the

defendant　would　not　pay　him。　In　consequence　of　such　fictions　it

came；　in　many　cases；　to　depend　altogether　upon　the　parties　before

what　court　they　would　choose　to　have　their　cause　tried；　and　each

court　endeavoured；　by　superior　dispatch　and　impartiality；　to　draw

to　itself　as　many　causes　as　it　could。　The　present　admirable

constitution　of　the　courts　of　justice　in　England　was；　perhaps；

originally　in　a　great　measure　formed　by　this　emulation　which

anciently　took　place　between　their　respective　judges；　each　judge

endeavouring　to　give；　in　his　own　court；　the　speediest　and　most

effectual　remedy　which　the　law　would　admit　for　every　sort　of

injustice。　Originally　the　courts　of　law　gave　damages　only　for

breach　of　contract。　The　Court　of　Chancery；　as　a　court　of

conscience；　first　took　upon　it　to　enforce　the　specific

performance　of　agreements。　When　the　breach　of　contract　consisted

in　the　non…payment　of　money；　the　damage　sustained　could　be

compensated　in　no　other　way　than　by　ordering　payment；　which　was

equivalent　to　a　specific　performance　of　the　agreement。　In　such

cases；　therefore；　the　remedy　of　the　courts　of　law　was　sufficient。

It　was　not　so　in　others。　When　the　tenant　sued　his　lord　for　having

unjustly　outed　him　of　his　lease；　the　damages　which　he　recovered

were　by　no　means　equivalent　to　the　possession　of　the　land。　Such

causes；　therefore；　for　some　time；　went　all　to　the　Court　of

Chancery；　to　the　no　small　loss　of　the　courts　of　law。　It　was　to

draw　back　such　causes　to　themselves　that　the　courts　of　law　are

said　to　have　invented　the　artificial　and　fictitious　Writ　of

Ejectment；　the　most　effectual　remedy　for　an　unjust　outer　or

dispossession　of　land。

　　　　　A　stamp…duty　upon　the　law　proceedings　of　each　particular

court；　to　be　levied　by　that　court；　and　applied　towards　the

maintenance　of　the　judges　and　other　officers　belonging　to　it；

might；　in　the　same　manner；　afford　revenue　sufficient　for

defraying　the　expense　of　the　administration　of　justice；　without

bringing　any　burden　upon　the　general　revenue　of　the　society。　The

judges　indeed　might；　in　this　case；　be　under　the　temptation　of

multiplying