wealbk05-第64章

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upon　malt　might　reduce　the　rent　and　profit　of　barley　land。

　　　　　No　tax　can　ever　reduce；　for　any　considerable　time；　the　rate

of　profit　in　any　particular　trade　which　must　always　keep　its

level　with　other　trades　in　the　neighbourhood。　The　present　duties

upon　malt；　beer；　and　ale　do　not　affect　the　profits　of　the　dealers

in　those　commodities；　who　all　get　back　the　tax　with　an　additional

profit　in　the　enhanced　price　of　their　goods。　A　tax；　indeed；　may

render　the　goods　upon　which　it　is　imposed　so　dear　as　to　diminish

the　consumption　of　them。　But　the　consumption　of　malt　is　in　malt

liquors；　and　a　tax　of　eighteen　shillings　upon　the　quarter　of　malt

could　not　well　render　those　liquors　dearer　than　the　different

taxes；　amounting　to　twenty…four　or　twenty…five　shillings；　do　at

present。　Those　liquors；　on　the　contrary；　would　probably　become

cheaper；　and　the　consumption　of　them　would　be　more　likely　to

increase　than　to　diminish。

　　　　　It　is　not　very　easy　to　understand　why　it　should　be　more

difficult　for　the　maltster　to　get　back　eighteen　shillings　in　the

advanced　price　of　his　malt　than　it　is　at　present　for　the　brewer

to　get　back　twenty…four　or　twenty…five；　sometimes　thirty；

shillings　in　that　of　his　liquor。　The　maltster；　indeed；　instead　of

a　tax　of　six　shillings；　would　be　obliged　to　advance　one　of

eighteen　shillings　upon　every　quarter　of　malt。　But　the　brewer　is

at　present　obliged　to　advance　a　tax　of　twenty…four　or

twenty…five；　sometimes　thirty；　shillings　upon　every　quarter　of

malt　which　he　brews。　It　could　not　be　more　inconvenient　for　the

maltster　to　advance　a　lighter　tax　than　it　is　at　present　for　the

brewer　to　advance　a　heavier　one。　The　maltster　doth　not　always

keep　in　his　granaries　a　stock　of　malt　which　it　will　require　a

longer　time　to　dispose　of　than　the　stock　of　beer　and　ale　which

the　brewer　frequently　keeps　in　his　cellars。　The　former；

therefore；　may　frequently　get　the　returns　of　his　money　as　soon　as

the　latter。　But　whatever　inconveniency　might　arise　to　the

maltster　from　being　obliged　to　advance　a　heavier　tax；　it　could

easily　be　remedied　by　granting　him　a　few　months'　longer　credit

than　is　at　present　commonly　given　to　the　brewer。

　　　　　Nothing　could　reduce　the　rent　and　profit　of　barley　land

which　did　not　reduce　the　demand　for　barley。　But　a　change　of

system　which　reduced　the　duties　upon　a　quarter　of　malt　brewed

into　beer　and　ale　from　twenty…four　and　twenty…five　shillings　to

eighteen　shillings　would　be　more　likely　to　increase　than　diminish

that　demand。　The　rent　and　profit　of　barley　land；　besides；　must

always　be　nearly　equal　to　those　of　other　equally　fertile　and

equally　well…cultivated　land。　If　they　were　less；　some　part　of　the

barley　land　would　soon　be　turned　to　some　other　purpose；　and　if

they　were　greater；　more　land　would　soon　be　turned　to　the　raising

of　barley。　When　the　ordinary　price　of　any　particular　produce　of

land　is　at　what　may　be　called　a　monopoly　price；　a　tax　upon　it

necessarily　reduces　the　rent　and　profit　of　the　land　which　grows

it。　A　tax　upon　the　produce　of　those　precious　vineyards　of　which

the　wine　falls　so　much　short　of　the　effectual　demand　that　its

price　is　always　above　the　natural　proportion　to　that　of　the

produce　of　other　equally　fertile　and　equally　well　cultivated　land

would　necessarily　reduce　the　rent　and　profit　of　those　vineyards。

The　price　of　the　wines　being　already　the　highest　that　could　be

got　for　the　quantity　commonly　sent　to　market；　it　could　not　be

raised　higher　without　diminishing　that　quantity；　and　the　quantity

could　not　be　diminished　without　still　greater　loss；　because　the

lands　could　not　be　turned　to　any　other　equally　valuable　produce。

The　whole　weight　of　the　tax；　therefore；　would　fall　upon　the　rent

and　profit…　properly　upon　the　rent　of　the　vineyard。　When　it　has

been　proposed　to　lay　any　new　tax　upon　sugar；　our　sugar　planters

have　frequently　complained　that　the　whole　weight　of　such　taxes

fell；　not　upon　the　consumer；　but　upon　the　producer；　they　never

having　been　able　to　raise　the　price　of　their　sugar　after　the　tax

higher　than　it　was　before。　The　price　had；　it　seems；　before　the

tax　been　a　monopoly　price；　and　the　argument　adduced　to　show　that

sugar　was　an　improper　subject　of　taxation　demonstrated；　perhaps；

that　it　was　a　proper　one；　the　gains　of　monopolists；　whenever　they

can　be　come　at；　being　certainly　of　all　subjects　the　most　proper。

But　the　ordinary　price　of　barley　has　never　been　a　monopoly　price；

and　the　rent　and　profit　of　barley　land　have　never　been　above

their　natural　proportion　to　those　of　other　equally　fertile　and

equally　well…cultivated　land。　The　different　taxes　which　have　been

imposed　upon　malt；　beer；　and　ale　have　never　lowered　the　price　of

barley；　have　never　reduced　the　rent　and　profit　of　barley　land。

The　price　of　malt　to　the　brewer　has　constantly　risen　in

proportion　to　the　taxes　imposed　upon　it；　and　those　taxes；

together　with　the　different　duties　upon　beer　and　ale；　have

constantly　either　raised　the　price；　or　what　comes　to　the　same

thing；　reduced　the　quality　of　those　commodities　to　the　consumer。

The　final　payment　of　those　taxes　has　fallen　constantly　upon　the

consumer；　and　not　upon　the　producer。

　　　　　The　only　people　likely　to　suffer　by　the　change　of　system

here　proposed　are　those　who　brew　for　their　own　private　use。　But

the　exemption　which　this　superior　rank　of　people　at　present　enjoy

from　very　heavy　taxes　which　are　paid　by　the　poor　labourer　and

artificer　is　surely　most　unjust　and　unequal；　and　ought　to　be

taken　away；　even　though　this　change　was　never　to　take　place。　It

has　probably　been　the　interest　of　this　superior　order　of　people；

however；　which　has　hitherto　prevented　a　change　of　system　that

could　not　well　fail　both　to　increase　the　revenue　and　to　relieve

the　people。

　　　　　Besides　such　duties　as　those　of　customs　and　excise　above

mentioned；　there　are　several　others　which　affect　the　price　of

goods　more　unequally　and　more　indirectly。　Of　this　kind　are　the

duties　which　in　French　are　called　Peages；　which　in　old　Saxon

times　were　called　Duties　of　Passage；　and　which　seem　to　have　been

originally　established　for　the　same　purpose　as　our　turnpike

tolls；　or　the　tolls　upon　our　canals　and　navigable　rivers；　for　the

maintenance　of　the　road　or　of　the　navigation。　Those　duties；　when

applied　to　such　purposes；　are　most　properly　imposed　according　to

the　bulk　or　weight　of　the　goods。　As　they　were　originally　local

and　provincial　duties；　applicable　to　local　and　provincial

purposes；　the　administration　of　them　was　in　most　cases　entrusted

to　the　particular　town；　parish；　or　lordship　in　which　they　were

levied；　such　communities　being　in　some　way　or　other　supposed　to

be　accountable　for　the　application。　The　sovereign；　who　is

altogether　unaccountable；　has　in　many　countries　assumed　to

himself　the　administration　of　those　duties；　and　though　he　has　in

most　cases　enhanced　very　much　the　duty；　he　has　in　many　entirely

neglected　the　application。　If　the　turnpike　tolls　of　Great　Britain

should　ever　become　one　of　the　resources　of　government；　we　may

learn；　by　the　example　of　many　other　nations；　what　would　probably

be　the　consequence。　Such　tolls　are　no　doubt　finally　paid　by　the

consumer；　but　the　consumer　is　not　taxed　in　proportion　to　his

expense　when　he　pays；　not　according　to　the　value；　but　according

to　the　bulk　or　weight　of　what　he　consumes。　When　such　duties　are

imposed；　not　according　to　the　bulk　or　weight；　but　according　to

the　supposed　value　of　the　goods；　they　become　properly　a　sort　of

inland　customs　or　excises　which　obstruct　very　much　the　most

important　of　all　branches　of　commerce；　the　interior　commerce　of

the　country。

　　　　　In　some　small　states　duties　similar　to　those　passage　duties

are　imposed　upon　goods　carried　across　the　territory；　either　by

land　or　by　water；　from　one　foreign　country　to　another。　These　are

in　some　countries　called　transit…duties。　Some　of　the　little

Italian　states　which　are　situated　upon　the　Po　and　the　rivers

which　run　into　it　derive　some　revenue　from　duties　of　this　kind

which　are　paid　a