wealbk05-第6章

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actions；　and　to　be　at　all　times　ready　to　disturb　the　peace　of

every　citizen。　Where　the　security　of　the　magistrate；　though

supported　by　the　principal　people　of　the　country；　is　endangered

by　every　popular　discontent；　where　a　small　tumult　is　capable　of

bringing　about　in　a　few　hours　a　great　revolution；　the　whole

authority　of　government　must　be　employed　to　suppress　and　punish

every　murmur　and　complaint　against　it。　To　a　sovereign；　on　the

contrary；　who　feels　himself　supported；　not　only　by　the　natural

aristocracy　of　the　country；　but　by　a　well…regulated　standing

army；　the　rudest；　the　most　groundless；　and　the　most　licentious

remonstrances　can　give　little　disturbance。　He　can　safely　pardon

or　neglect　them；　and　his　consciousness　of　his　own　superiority

naturally　disposes　him　to　do　so。　That　degree　of　liberty　which

approaches　to　licentiousness　can　be　tolerated　only　in　countries

where　the　sovereign　is　secured　by　a　well…regulated　standing　army。

It　is　in　such　countries　only　that　the　public　safety　does　not

require　that　the　sovereign　should　be　trusted　with　any

discretionary　power　for　suppressing　even　the　impertinent

wantonness　of　this　licentious　liberty。

　　　　　The　first　duty　of　the　sovereign；　therefore；　that　of

defending　the　society　from　the　violence　and　injustice　of　other

independent　societies；　grows　gradually　more　and　more　expensive　as

the　society　advances　in　civilization。　The　military　force　of　the

society；　which　originally　cost　the　sovereign　no　expense　either　in

time　of　peace　or　in　time　of　war；　must；　in　the　progress　of

improvement；　first　be　maintained　by　him　in　time　of　war；　and

afterwards　even　in　time　of　peace。

　　　　　The　great　change　introduced　into　the　art　of　war　by　the

invention　of　firearms　has　enhanced　still　further　both　the　expense

of　exercising　and　disciplining　any　particular　number　of　soldiers

in　time　of　peace；　and　that　of　employing　them　in　time　of　war。　Both

their　arms　and　their　ammunition　are　become　more　expensive。　A

musket　is　a　more　expensive　machine　than　a　javelin　or　a　bow　and

arrows；　a　cannon　or　a　mortar　than　a　balista　or　a　catapulta。　The

powder　which　is　spent　in　a　modern　review　is　lost　irrecoverably；

and　occasions　a　very　considerable　expense。　The　javeline　and

arrows　which　were　thrown　or　shot　in　an　ancient　one　could　easily

be　picked　up　again；　and　were　besides　of　very　little　value。　The

cannon　and　the　mortar　are　not　only　much　dearer；　but　much　heavier

machines　than　the　balista　or　catapulta；　and　require　a　greater

expense；　not　only　to　prepare　them　for　the　field；　but　to　carry

them　to　it。　As　the　superiority　of　the　modern　artillery　too　over

that　of　the　ancients　is　very　great；　it　has　become　much　more

difficult；　and　consequently　much　more　expensive；　to　fortify　a

town　so　as　to　resist　even　for　a　few　weeks　the　attack　of　that

superior　artillery。　In　modern　times　many　different　causes

contribute　to　render　the　defence　of　the　society　more　expensive。

The　unavoidable　effects　of　the　natural　progress　of　improvement

have；　in　this　respect；　been　a　good　deal　enhanced　by　a　great

revolution　in　the　art　of　war；　to　which　a　mere　accident；　the

invention　of　gunpowder；　seems　to　have　given　occasion。

　　　　　In　modern　war　the　great　expense　of　firearms　gives　an　evident

advantage　to　the　nation　which　can　best　afford　that　expense；　and

consequently　to　an　opulent　and　civilised　over　a　poor　and

barbarous　nation。　In　ancient　times　the　opulent　and　civilised

found　it　difficult　to　defend　themselves　against　the　poor　and

barbarous　nations。　In　modern　times　the　poor　and　barbarous　find　it

difficult　to　defend　themselves　against　the　opulent　and　civilised。

The　invention　of　firearms；　an　invention　which　at　first　sight

appears　to　be　so　pernicious；　is　certainly　favourable　both　to　the

permanency　and　to　the　extension　of　civilization。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　2

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Expense　of　Justice　

　　　　　THE　second　duty　of　the　sovereign；　that　of　protecting；　as　far

as　possible；　every　member　of　the　society　from　the　injustice　or

oppression　of　every　other　member　of　it；　or　the　duty　of

establishing　an　exact　administration　of　justice；　requires；　too；

very　different　degrees　of　expense　in　the　different　periods　of

society。

　　　　　Among　nations　of　hunters；　as　there　is　scarce　any　property；

or　at　least　none　that　exceeds　the　value　of　two　or　three　days'

labour；　so　there　is　seldom　any　established　magistrate　or　any

regular　administration　of　justice。　Men　who　have　no　property　can

injure　one　another　only　in　their　persons　or　reputations。　But　when

one　man　kills；　wounds；　beats；　or　defames　another；　though　he　to

whom　the　injury　is　done　suffers；　he　who　does　it　receives　no

benefit。　It　is　otherwise　with　the　injuries　to　property。　The

benefit　of　the　person　who　does　the　injury　is　often　equal　to　the

loss　of　him　who　suffers　it。　Envy；　malice；　or　resentment　are　the

only　passions　which　can　prompt　one　man　to　injure　another　in　his

person　or　reputation。　But　the　greater　part　of　men　are　not　very

frequently　under　the　influence　of　those　passions；　and　the　very

worst　of　men　are　so　only　occasionally。　As　their　gratification

too；　how　agreeable　soever　it　may　be　to　certain　characters；　is　not

attended　with　any　real　or　permanent　advantage；　it　is　in　the

greater　part　of　men　commonly　restrained　by　prudential

considerations。　Men　may　live　together　in　society　with　some

tolerable　degree　of　security；　though　there　is　no　civil　magistrate

to　protect　them　from　the　injustice　of　those　passions。　But　avarice

and　ambition　in　the　rich；　in　the　poor　the　hatred　of　labour　and

the　love　of　present　ease　and　enjoyment；　are　the　passions　which

prompt　to　invade　property；　passions　much　more　steady　in　their

operation；　and　much　more　universal　in　their　influence。　Wherever

there　is　great　property　there　is　great　inequality。　For　one　very

rich　man　there　must　be　at　least　five　hundred　poor；　and　the

affluence　of　the　few　supposes　the　indigence　of　the　many。　The

affluence　of　the　rich　excites　the　indignation　of　the　poor；　who

are　often　both　driven　by　want；　and　prompted　by　envy；　to　invade

his　possessions。　It　is　only　under　the　shelter　of　the　civil

magistrate　that　the　owner　of　that　valuable　property；　which　is

acquired　by　the　labour　of　many　years；　or　perhaps　of　many

successive　generations；　can　sleep　a　single　night　in　security。　He

is　at　all　times　surrounded　by　unknown　enemies；　whom；　though　he

never　provoked；　he　can　never　appease；　and　from　whose　injustice　he

can　be　protected　only　by　the　powerful　arm　of　the　civil　magistrate

continually　held　up　to　chastise　it。　The　acquisition　of　valuable

and　extensive　property；　therefore；　necessarily　requires　the

establishment　of　civil　government。　Where　there　is　no　property；　or

at　least　none　that　exceeds　the　value　of　two　or　three　days'

labour；　civil　government　is　not　so　necessary。

　　　　　Civil　government　supposes　a　certain　subordination。　But　as

the　necessity　of　civil　government　gradually　grows　up　with　the

acquisition　of　valuable　property；　so　the　principal　causes　which

naturally　introduce　subordination　gradually　grow　up　with　the

growth　of　that　valuable　property。

　　　　　The　causes　or　circumstances　which　naturally　introduce

subordination；　or　which　naturally；　and　antecedent　to　any　civil

institution；　give　some　men　some　superiority　over　the　greater　part

of　their　brethren；　seem　to　be　four　in　number。

　　　　　The　first　of　those　causes　or　circumstances　is　the

superiority　of　personal　qualifications；　of　strength；　beauty；　and

agility　of　body；　of　wisdom　and　virtue；　of　prudence；　justice；

fortitude；　and　moderation　of　mind。　The　qualifications　of　the

body；　unless　supported　by　those　of　the　mind；　can　give　little

authority　in　any　period　of　society。　He　is　a　very　strong　man；　who；

by　mere　strength　of　body；　can　force　two　weak　ones　to　obey　him。

The　qualifications　of　the　mind　can　alone　give　a　very　great

authority。　They　are；　however；　invisible　qualities；　always

disputable；　and　generally　disputed。　No　society；　whether　barbarous

or　civilised；　has　ever　found　it　convenient　to　settle　the　rules　of

precedency　of　rank　and　subor