wealbk05-第44章

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　　　　　In　the　Venetian　territory　all　the　arable　lands　which　are

given　in　lease　to　farmers　are　taxed　at　a　tenth　of　the　rent。　The

leases　are　recorded　in　a　public　register　which　is　kept　by　the

officers　of　revenue　in　each　province　or　district。　When　the

proprietor　cultivates　his　own　lands；　they　are　valued　according　to

an　equitable　estimation；　and　he　is　allowed　a　deduction　of

one…fifth　of　the　tax；　so　that　for　such　lands　he　pays　only　eight

instead　of　ten　per　cent　of　the　supposed　rent。

　　　　　A　land…tax　of　this　kind　is　certainly　more　equal　than　the

land…tax　of　England。　It　might　not；　perhaps；　be　altogether　so

certain；　and　the　assessment　of　the　tax　might　frequently　occasion

a　good　deal　more　trouble　to　the　landlord。　It　might；　too；　be　a

good　deal　more　expensive　in　the　levying。

　　　　　Such　a　system　of　administration；　however；　might　perhaps　be

contrived　as　would；　in　a　great　measure；　both　prevent　this

uncertainty　and　moderate　this　expense。

　　　　　The　landlord　and　tenant；　for　example；　might　jointly　be

obliged　to　record　their　lease　in　a　public　register。　Proper

penalties　might　be　enacted　against　concealing　or　misrepresenting

any　of　the　conditions；　and　if　part　of　those　penalties　were　to　be

paid　to　either　of　the　two　parties　who　informed　against　and

convicted　the　other　of　such　concealment　or　misrepresentation；　it

would　effectually　deter　them　from　combining　together　in　order　to

defraud　the　public　revenue。　All　the　conditions　of　the　lease　might

be　sufficiently　known　from　such　a　record。

　　　　　Some　landlords；　instead　of　raising　the　rent；　take　a　fine　for

the　renewal　of　the　lease。　This　practice　is　in　most　cases　the

expedient　of　a　spendthrift；　who　for　a　sum　of　ready　money　sells　a

future　revenue　of　much　greater　value。　It　is　in　most　cases；

therefore；　hurtful　to　the　landlords。　It　is　frequently　hurtful　to

the　tenant；　and　it　is　always　hurtful　to　the　community。　It

frequently　takes　from　the　tenant　so　great　a　part　of　his　capital；

and　thereby　diminishes　so　much　his　ability　to　cultivate　the　land；

that　he　finds　it　more　difficult　to　pay　a　small　rent　than　it　would

otherwise　have　been　to　pay　a　great　one。　Whatever　diminishes　his

ability　to　cultivate；　necessarily　keeps　down；　below　what　it　would

otherwise　have　been；　the　most　important　part　of　the　revenue　of

the　community。　By　rendering　the　tax　upon　such　fines　a　good　deal

heavier　than　upon　the　ordinary　rent；　this　hurtful　practice　might

be　discouraged；　to　the　no　small　advantage　of　all　the　different

parties　concerned；　of　the　landlord；　of　the　tenant；　of　the

sovereign；　and　of　the　whole　community。

　　　　　Some　leases　prescribe　to　the　tenant　a　certain　mode　of

cultivation　and　a　certain　succession　of　crops　during　the　whole

continuance　of　the　lease。　This　condition；　which　is　generally　the

effect　of　the　landlord's　conceit　of　his　own　superior　knowledge　（a

conceit　in　most　cases　very　ill　founded）；　ought　always　to　be

considered　as　an　additional　rent；　as　a　rent　in　service　instead　of

a　rent　in　money。　In　order　to　discourage　the　practice；　which　is

generally　a　foolish　one；　this　species　of　rent　might　be　valued

rather　high；　and　consequently　taxed　somewhat　higher　than　common

money　rents。

　　　　　Some　landlords；　instead　of　a　rent　in　money；　require　a　rent

in　kind；　in　corn；　cattle；　poultry；　wine；　oil；　etc。；　others；

again；　require　a　rent　in　service。　Such　rents　are　always　more

hurtful　to　the　tenant　than　beneficial　to　the　landlord。　They

either　take　more　or　keep　more　out　of　the　pocket　of　the　former

than　they　put　into　that　of　the　latter。　In　every　country　where

they　take　place　the　tenants　are　poor　and　beggarly；　pretty　much

according　to　the　degree　in　which　they　take　place。　By　valuing；　in

the　same　manner；　such　rents　rather　high；　and　consequently　taxing

them　somewhat　higher　than　common　money　rents；　a　practice　which　is

hurtful　to　the　whole　community　might　perhaps　be　sufficiently

discouraged。

　　　　　When　the　landlord　chose　to　occupy　himself　a　part　of　his　own

lands；　the　rent　might　be　valued　according　to　an　equitable

arbitration　of　the　farmers　and　landlords　in　the　neighbourhood；

and　a　moderate　abatement　of　the　tax　might　be　granted　to　him；　in

the　same　manner　as　in　the　Venetian　territory；　provided　the　rent

of　the　lands　which　he　occupied　did　not　exceed　a　certain　sum。　It

is　of　importance　that　the　landlord　should　be　encouraged　to

cultivate　a　part　of　his　own　land。　His　capital　is　generally

greater　than　that　of　the　tenant；　and　with　less　skill　he　can

frequently　raise　a　greater　produce。　The　landlord　can　afford　to

try　experiments；　and　is　generally　disposed　to　do　so。　His

unsuccessful　experiments　occasion　only　a　moderate　loss　to

himself。　His　successful　ones　contribute　to　the　improvement　and

better　cultivation　of　the　whole　country。　It　might　be　of

importance；　however；　that　the　abatement　of　the　tax　should

encourage　him　to　cultivate　to　a　certain　extent　only。　If　the

landlords　should；　the　greater　part　of　them；　be　tempted　to　farm

the　whole　of　their　own　lands；　the　country　（instead　of　sober　and

industrious　tenants；　who　are　bound　by　their　own　interest　to

cultivate　as　well　as　their　capital　and　skill　will　allow　them）

would　be　filled　with　idle　and　profligate　bailiffs；　whose　abusive

management　would　soon　degrade　the　cultivation　and　reduce　the

annual　produce　of　the　land；　to　the　diminution；　not　only　of　the

revenue　of　their　masters；　but　of　the　most　important　part　of　that

of　the　whole　society。

　　　　　Such　a　system　of　administration　might；　perhaps；　free　a　tax

of　this　kind　from　any　degree　of　uncertainty　which　could　occasion

either　oppression　or　inconveniency　of　the　contributor；　and　might

at　the　same　time　serve　to　introduce　into　the　common　management　of

land　such　a　plan　or　policy　as　might　contribute　a　good　deal　to　the

general　improvement　and　good　cultivation　of　the　country。

　　　　　The　expense　of　levying　a　land…tax　which　varied　with　every

variation　of　the　rent　would　no　doubt　be　somewhat　greater　than

that　of　levying　one　which　was　already　rated　according　to　a　fixed

valuation。　Some　additional　expense　would　necessarily　be　incurred

both　by　the　different　register　offices　which　it　would　be　proper

to　establish　in　the　different　districts　of　the　country；　and　by

the　different　valuations　which　might　occasionally　be　made　of　the

lands　which　the　proprietor　chose　to　occupy　himself。　The　expense

of　all　this；　however；　might　be　very　moderate；　and　much　below　what

is　incurred　in　the　levying　of　many　other　taxes　which　afford　a

very　inconsiderable　revenue　in　comparison　of　what　might　easily　be

drawn　from　a　tax　of　this　kind。

　　　　　The　discouragement　which　a　variable　land…tax　of　this　kind

might　give　to　the　improvement　of　land　seems　to　be　the　most

important　objection　which　can　be　made　to　it。　The　landlord　would

certainly　be　less　disposed　to　improve　when　the　sovereign；　who

contributed　nothing　to　the　expense；　was　to　share　in　the　profit　of

the　improvement。　Even　this　objection　might　perhaps　be　obviated　by

allowing　the　landlord；　before　he　began　his　improvement；　to

ascertain；　in　conjunction　with　the　officers　of　revenue；　the

actual　value　of　his　lands　according　to　the　equitable　arbitration

of　a　certain　number　of　landlords　and　farmers　in　the　neighborhood；

equally　chosen　by　both　parties；　and　by　rating　him　according　to

this　valuation　for　such　a　number　of　years　as　might　be　fully

sufficient　for　his　complete　indemnification。　To　draw　the

attention　of　the　sovereign　towards　the　improvement　of　the　land；

from　a　regard　to　the　increase　of　his　own　revenue；　is　one　of　the

principal　advantages　proposed　by　this　species　of　land…tax。　The

term；　therefore；　allowed　for　the　indemnification　of　the　landlord

ought　not　to　be　a　great　deal　longer　than　what　was　necessary　for

that　purpose；　lest　the　remoteness　of　the　interest　should

discourage　too　much　this　attention。　It　had　better；　however；　be

somewhat　too　long　than　in　any　respect　too　short。　No　incitement　to

the　attention　of　the　sovereign　can　ever　counterbalance　the

smallest　discouragement　to　that　of　the　landlord。　The　attention　of

the　sovereign　can　be　at　best