wealbk05-第42章

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greater　revenue　than　any　which　those　lands　have　ever　afforded　to

the　crown。　In　countries　where　lands；　improved　and　cultivated　very

highly；　and　yielding　at　the　time　of　sale　as　great　a　rent　as　can

easily　be　got　from　them；　commonly　sell　at　thirty　years'　purchase；

the　unimproved；　uncultivated；　and　low…rented　crown　lands　might

well　be　expected　to　sell　at　forty；　fifty；　or　sixty　years'

purchase。　The　crown　might　immediately　enjoy　the　revenue　which

this　great　price　would　redeem　from　mortgage。　In　the　course　of　a

few　years　it　would　probably　enjoy　another　revenue。　When　the　crown

lands　had　become　private　property；　they　would；　in　the　course　of　a

few　years；　become　well　improved　and　well　cultivated。　The　increase

of　their　produce　would　increase　the　population　of　the　country　by

augmenting　the　revenue　and　consumption　of　the　people。　But　the

revenue　which　the　crown　derives　from　the　duties　of　customs　and

excise　would　necessarily　increase　with　the　revenue　and

consumption　of　the　people。

　　　　　The　revenue　which；　in　any　civilised　monarchy；　the　crown

derives　from　the　crown　lands；　though　it　appears　to　cost　nothing

to　individuals；　in　reality　costs　more　to　the　society　than　perhaps

any　other　equal　revenue　which　the　crown　enjoys。　It　would；　in　all

cases；　be　for　the　interest　of　the　society　to　replace　this　revenue

to　the　crown　by　some　other　equal　revenue；　and　to　divide　the　lands

among　the　people；　which　could　not　well　be　done　better；　perhaps；

than　by　exposing　them　to　public　sale。

　　　　　Lands　for　the　purposes　of　pleasure　and　magnificence…　parks；

gardens；　public　walks；　etc。；　possessions　which　are　everywhere

considered　as　causes　of　expense；　not　as　sources　of　revenue…　seem

to　be　the　only　lands　which；　in　a　great　and　civilised　monarchy；

ought　to　belong　to　the　crown。

　　　　　Public　stock　and　public　lands；　therefore；　the　two　sources　of

revenue　which　may　peculiarly　belong　to　the　sovereign　or

commonwealth；　being　both　improper　and　insufficient　funds　for

defraying　the　necessary　expense　of　any　great　and　civilised　state；

it　remains　that　this　expense　must；　the　greater　part　of　it；　be

defrayed　by　taxes　of　one　kind　or　another；　the　people　contributing

a　part　of　their　own　private　revenue　in　order　to　make　up　a　public

revenue　to　the　sovereign　or　commonwealth。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　2

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Taxes　

　　　　　THE　private　revenue　of　individuals；　it　has　been　shown　in　the

first　book　of　this　Inquiry；　arises　ultimately　from　three

different　sources：　Rent；　Profit；　and　Wages。　Every　tax　must

finally　be　paid　from　some　one　or　other　of　those　three　different

sorts　of　revenue；　or　from　all　of　them　indifferently。　I　shall

endeavour　to　give　the　best　account　I　can；　first；　of　those　taxes

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　rent；　secondly；　of　those

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　profit；　thirdly；　of　those

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　wages；　and；　fourthly；　of

those　which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　indifferently　upon　all

those　three　different　sources　of　private　revenue。　The　particular

consideration　of　each　of　these　four　different　sorts　of　taxes　will

divide　the　second　part　of　the　present　chapter　into　four　articles；

three　of　which　will　require　several　other　subdivisions。　Many　of

those　taxes；　it　will　appear　from　the　following　review；　are　not

finally　paid　from　the　fund；　or　source　of　revenue；　upon　which　it

was　intended　they　should　fall。

　　　　　Before　I　enter　upon　the　examination　of　particular　taxes；　it

is　necessary　to　premise　the　four　following　maxims　with　regard　to

taxes　in　general。

　　　　　I。　The　subjects　of　every　state　ought　to　contribute　towards

the　support　of　the　government；　as　nearly　as　possible；　in

proportion　to　their　respective　abilities；　that　is；　in　proportion

to　the　revenue　which　they　respectively　enjoy　under　the　protection

of　the　state。　The　expense　of　government　to　the　individuals　of　a

great　nation　is　like　the　expense　of　management　to　the　joint

tenants　of　a　great　estate；　who　are　all　obliged　to　contribute　in

proportion　to　their　respective　interests　in　the　estate。　In　the

observation　or　neglect　of　this　maxim　consists　what　is　called　the

equality　or　inequality　of　taxation。　Every　tax；　it　must　be

observed　once　for　all；　which　falls　finally　upon　one　only　of　the

three　sorts　of　revenue　above　mentioned；　is　necessarily　unequal　in

so　far　as　it　does　not　affect　the　other　two。　In　the　following

examination　of　different　taxes　I　shall　seldom　take　much　further

notice　of　this　sort　of　inequality；　but　shall；　in　most　cases；

confine　my　observations　to　that　inequality　which　is　occasioned　by

a　particular　tax　falling　unequally　even　upon　that　particular　sort

of　private　revenue　which　is　affected　by　it。

　　　　　II。　The　tax　which　each　individual　is　bound　to　pay　ought　to

be　certain；　and　not　arbitrary。　The　time　of　payment；　the　manner　of

payment；　the　quantity　to　be　paid；　ought　all　to　be　clear　and　plain

to　the　contributor；　and　to　every　other　person。　Where　it　is

otherwise；　every　person　subject　to　the　tax　is　put　more　or　less　in

the　power　of　the　tax…gathered；　who　can　either　aggravate　the　tax

upon　any　obnoxious　contributor；　or　extort；　by　the　terror　of　such

aggravation；　some　present　or　perquisite　to　himself。　The

uncertainty　of　taxation　encourages　the　insolence　and　favours　the

corruption　of　an　order　of　men　who　are　naturally　unpopular；　even

where　they　are　neither　insolent　nor　corrupt。　The　certainty　of

what　each　individual　ought　to　pay　is；　in　taxation；　a　matter　of　so

great　importance　that　a　very　considerable　degree　of　inequality；

it　appears；　I　believe；　from　the　experience　of　all　nations；　is　not

near　so　great　an　evil　as　a　very　small　degree　of　uncertainty。

　　　　　III。　Every　tax　ought　to　be　levied　at　the　time；　or　in　the

manner；　in　which　it　is　most　likely　to　be　convenient　for　the

contributor　to　pay　it。　A　tax　upon　the　rent　of　land　or　of　houses；

payable　at　the　same　term　at　which　such　rents　are　usually　paid；　is

levied　at　the　time　when　it　is　most　likely　to　be　convenient　for

the　contributor　to　pay；　or；　when　he　is　most　likely　to　have

wherewithal　to　pay。　Taxes　upon　such　consumable　goods　as　are

articles　of　luxury　are　all　finally　paid　by　the　consumer；　and

generally　in　a　manner　that　is　very　convenient　for　him。　He　pays

them　by　little　and　little；　as　he　has　occasion　to　buy　the　goods。

As　he　is　at　liberty；　too；　either　to　buy；　or　not　to　buy；　as　he

pleases；　it　must　be　his　own　fault　if　he　ever　suffers　any

considerable　inconveniency　from　such　taxes。

　　　　　IV。　Every　tax　ought　to　be　so　contrived　as　both　to　take　out

and　to　keep　out　of　the　pockets　of　the　people　as　little　as

possible　over　and　above　what　it　brings　into　the　public　treasury

of　the　state。　A　tax　may　either　take　out　or　keep　out　of　the

pockets　of　the　people　a　great　deal　more　than　it　brings　into　the

public　treasury；　in　the　four　following　ways。　First；　the　levying

of　it　may　require　a　great　number　of　officers；　whose　salaries　may

eat　up　the　greater　part　of　the　produce　of　the　tax；　and　whose

perquisites　may　impose　another　additional　tax　upon　the　people。

Secondly；　it　may　obstruct　the　industry　the　people；　and　discourage

them　from　applying　to　certain　branches　of　business　which　might

give　maintenance　and　unemployment　to　great　multitudes。　While　it

obliges　the　people　to　pay；　it　may　thus　diminish；　or　perhaps

destroy；　some　of　the　funds　which　might　enable　them　more　easily　to

do　so。　Thirdly；　by　the　forfeitures　and　other　penalties　which

those　unfortunate　individuals　incur　who　attempt　unsuccessfully　to

evade　the　tax；　it　may　frequently　ruin　them；　and　thereby　put　an

end　to　the　benefit　which　the　community　might　have　received　from

the　employment　of　their　capitals。　An　injudicious　tax　offers　a

great　temptation　to　smuggling。　But　the　penalties　of　smuggling

must　rise　in　proportion　to　the　temptation。　The　law；　contrary　to

all　the　ordinary　principles　of　justice；　first　creates　the

temptation；　and　then　punishes　those　who　yield　to　it；　and　it

commonly　enhances　the　punishment；　too；　in　proportion　to　the　very

circumstance　which　ought　certa