wealbk05-第35章

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his　own　dominions；　supported　by　that　of　the　clergy　of　all　the

neighbouring　dominions。　In　such　circumstances　the　wonder　is；　not

that　he　was　sometimes　obliged　to　yield；　but　that　he　ever　was　able

to　resist。

　　　　　The　privilege　of　the　clergy　in　those　ancient　times　（which　to

us　who　live　in　the　present　times　appear　the　most　absurd）；　their

total　exemption　from　the　secular　jurisdiction；　for　example；　or

what　in　England　was　called　the　benefit　of　the　clergy；　were　the

natural　or　rather　the　necessary　consequences　of　this　state　of

things。　How　dangerous　must　it　have　been　for　the　sovereign　to

attempt　to　punish　a　clergyman　for　any　crime　whatever；　if　his　own

order　were　disposed　to　protect　him；　and　to　represent　either　the

proof　as　insufficient　for　convicting　so　holy　a　man；　or　the

punishment　as　too　severe　to　be　inflicted　upon　one　whose　person

had　been　rendered　sacred　by　religion？　The　sovereign　could；　in

such　circumstances；　do　no　better　than　leave　him　to　be　tried　by

the　ecclesiastical　courts；　who；　for　the　honour　of　their　own

order；　were　interested　to　restrain；　as　much　as　possible；　every

member　of　it　from　committing　enormous　crimes；　or　even　from　giving

occasion　to　such　gross　scandal　as　might　disgust　the　minds　of　the

people。

　　　　　In　the　state　in　which　things　were　through　the　greater　part

of　Europe　during　the　tenth；　eleventh；　twelfth；　and　thirteenth

centuries；　and　for　some　time　both　before　and　after　that　period；

the　constitution　of　the　Church　of　Rome　may　be　considered　as　the

most　formidable　combination　that　ever　was　formed　against　the

authority　and　security　of　civil　government；　as　well　as　against

the　liberty；　reason；　and　happiness　of　mankind；　which　can　flourish

only　where　civil　government　is　able　to　protect　them。　In　that

constitution　the　grossest　delusions　of　superstition　were

supported　in　such　a　manner　by　the　private　interests　of　so　great　a

number　of　people　as　put　them　out　of　all　danger　from　any　assault

of　human　reason：　because　though　human　reason　might　perhaps　have

been　able　to　unveil；　even　to　the　eyes　of　the　common　people；　some

of　the　delusions　of　superstition；　it　could　never　have　dissolved

the　ties　of　private　interest。　Had　this　constitution　been　attacked

by　no　other　enemies　but　the　feeble　efforts　of　human　reason；　it

must　have　endured　for　ever。　But　that　immense　and　well…built

fabric；　which　all　the　wisdom　and　virtue　of　man　could　never　have

shaken；　much　less　have　overturned；　was　by　the　natural　course　of

things；　first　weakened；　and　afterwards　in　part　destroyed；　and　is

now　likely；　in　the　course　of　a　few　centuries　more；　perhaps；　to

crumble　into　ruins　altogether。

　　　　　The　gradual　improvements　of　arts；　manufactures；　and

commerce；　the　same　causes　which　destroyed　the　power　of　the　great

barons；　destroyed　in　the　same　manner；　through　the　greater　part　of

Europe；　the　whole　temporal　power　of　the　clergy。　In　the　produce　of

arts；　manufactures；　and　commerce；　the　clergy；　like　the　great

barons；　found　something　for　which　they　could　exchange　their　rude

produce；　and　thereby　discovered　the　means　of　spending　their　whole

revenues　upon　their　own　persons；　without　giving　any　considerable

share　of　them　to　other　people。　Their　charity　became　gradually

less　extensive；　their　hospitality　less　liberal　or　less　profuse。

Their　retainers　became　consequently　less　numerous；　and　by　degrees

dwindled　away　altogether。　The　clergy　too；　like　the　great　barons；

wished　to　get　a　better　rent　from　their　landed　estates；　in　order

to　spend　it；　in　the　same　manner；　upon　the　gratification　of　their

own　private　vanity　and　folly。　But　this　increase　of　rent　could　be

got　only　by　granting　leases　to　their　tenants；　who　thereby　became

in　a　great　measure　independent　of　them。　The　ties　of　interest

which　bound　the　inferior　ranks　of　people　to　the　clergy　were　in

this　manner　gradually　broken　and　dissolved。　They　were　even　broken

and　dissolved　sooner　than　those　which　bound　the　same　ranks　of

people　to　the　great　barons：　because　the　benefices　of　the　church

being；　the　greater　part　of　them；　much　smaller　than　the　estates　of

the　great　barons；　the　possessor　of　each　benefice　was　much　sooner

able　to　spend　the　whole　of　its　revenue　upon　his　own　person。

During　the　greater　part　of　the　fourteenth　and　fifteenth　centuries

the　power　of　the　great　barons　was；　through　the　greater　part　of

Europe；　in　full　vigour。　But　the　temporal　power　of　the　clergy；　the

absolute　command　which　they　had　once　had　over　the　great　body　of

the　people；　was　very　much　decayed。　The　power　of　the　church　was　by

that　time　very　nearly　reduced　through　the　greater　part　of　Europe

to　what　arose　from　her　spiritual　authority；　and　even　that

spiritual　authority　was　much　weakened　when　it　ceased　to　be

supported　by　the　charity　and　hospitality　of　the　clergy。　The

inferior　ranks　of　people　no　longer　looked　upon　that　order；　as

they　had　done　before；　as　the　comforters　of　their　distress；　and

the　relievers　of　their　indigence。　On　the　contrary；　they　were

provoked　and　disgusted　by　the　vanity；　luxury；　and　expense　of　the

richer　clergy；　who　appeared　to　spend　upon　their　own　pleasures

what　had　always　before　been　regarded　as　the　patrimony　of　the

poor。

　　　　　In　this　situation　of　things；　the　sovereigns　in　the　different

states　of　Europe　endeavoured　to　recover　the　influence　which　they

had　once　had　in　the　disposal　of　the　great　benefices　of　the

church；　by　procuring　to　the　deans　and　chapters　of　each　diocese

the　restoration　of　their　ancient　right　of　electing　the　bishop；

and　to　the　monks　of　each　abbacy　that　of　electing　the　abbot。　The

re…establishing　of　this　ancient　order　was　the　object　of　several

statutes　enacted　in　England　during　the　course　of　the　fourteenth

century；　particularly　of　what　is　called　the　Statute　of　Provisors；

and　of　the　Pragmatic　Sanction　established　in　France　in　the

fifteenth　century。　In　order　to　render　the　election　valid；　it　was

necessary　that　the　sovereign　should　both　consent　to　it

beforehand；　and　afterwards　approve　of　the　person　elected；　and

though　the　election　was　still　supposed　to　be　free；　he　had；

however；　all　the　indirect　means　which　his　situation　necessarily

afforded　him　of　influencing　the　clergy　in　his　own　dominions。

Other　regulations　of　a　similar　tendency　were　established　in　other

parts　of　Europe。　But　the　power　of　the　pope　in　the　collation　of

the　great　benefices　of　the　church　seems；　before　the　Reformation；

to　have　been　nowhere　so　effectually　and　so　universally　restrained

as　in　France　and　England。　The　Concordat　afterwards；　in　the

sixteenth　century；　gave　to　the　kings　of　France　the　absolute　right

of　presenting　to　all　the　great；　or　what　are　called　the

consistorial；　benefices　of　the　Gallican　Church。

　　　　　Since　the　establishment　of　the　Pragmatic　Sanction　and　of　the

Concordat；　the　clergy　of　France　have　in　general　shown　less

respect　to　the　decrees　of　the　papal　court　than　the　clergy　of　any

other　Catholic　country。　In　all　the　disputes　which　their　sovereign

has　had　with　the　pope；　they　have　almost　constantly　taken　party

with　the　former。　This　independency　of　the　clergy　of　France　upon

the　court　of　Rome　seems　to　be　principally　founded　upon　the

Pragmatic　Sanction　and　the　Concordat。　In　the　earlier　periods　of

the　monarchy；　the　clergy　of　France　appear　to　have　been　as　much

devoted　to　the　pope　as　those　of　any　other　country。　When　Robert；

the　second　prince　of　the　Capetian　race；　was　most　unjustly

excommunicated　by　the　court　of　Rome；　his　own　servants；　it　is

said；　threw　the　victuals　which　came　from　his　table　to　the　dogs；

and　refused　to　taste　anything　themselves　which　little　been

polluted　by　the　contact　of　a　person　in　his　situation。　They　were

taught　to　do　so；　it　may　very　safely　be　presumed；　by　the　clergy　of

his　own　dominions。

　　　　　The　claim　of　collating　to　the　great　benefices　of　the　church；

a　claim　in　defence　of　which　the　court　of　Rome　had　frequently

shaken；　and　sometimes　overturned　the　thrones　of　some　of　the

greatest　sovereigns　in　Christendom；　was　in　this　manner　either

restrained　or　modified；　or　given　up　altogether；　in　many　different

parts　of　Europ