wealbk05-第13章

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what　I　apprehend　is　not　a　little　doubtful；　that　in　some　parts　of

Asia　this　department　of　the　public　police　is　very　properly

managed　by　the　executive　power；　there　is　not　the　least

probability　that；　during　the　present　state　of　things；　it　could　be

tolerably　managed　by　that　power　in　any　part　of　Europe。

　　　　　Even　those　public　works　which　are　of　such　a　nature　that　they

cannot　afford　any　revenue　for　maintaining　themselves；　but　of

which　the　conveniency　is　nearly　confined　to　some　particular　place

or　district；　are　always　better　maintained　by　a　local　or

provincial　revenue；　under　the　management　of　a　local　or　provincial

administration；　than　by　the　general　revenue　of　the　state；　of

which　the　executive　power　must　always　have　the　management。　Were

the　streets　of　London　to　be　lighted　and　paved　at　the　expense　of

the　treasury；　is　there　any　probability　that　they　would　be　so　well

lighted　and　paved　as　they　are　at　present；　or　even　at　so　small　an

expense？　The　expense；　besides；　instead　of　being　raised　by　a　local

tax　upon　the　inhabitants　of　each　particular　street；　parish；　or

district　in　London；　would；　in　this　case；　be　defrayed　out　of　the

general　revenue　of　the　state；　and　would　consequently　be　raised　by

a　tax　upon　all　the　inhabitants　of　the　kingdom；　of　whom　the

greater　part　derive　no　sort　of　benefit　from　the　lighting　and

paving　of　the　streets　of　London。

　　　　　The　abuses　which　sometimes　creep　into　the　local　and

provincial　administration　of　a　local　and　provincial　revenue；　how

enormous　soever　they　may　appear；　are　in　reality；　however；　almost

always　very　trifling　in　comparison　of　those　which　commonly　take

place　in　the　administration　and　expenditure　of　the　revenue　of　a

great　empire。　They　are；　besides；　much　more　easily　corrected。

Under　the　local　or　provincial　administration　of　the　justices　of

the　peace　in　Great　Britain；　the　six　days'　labour　which　the

country　people　are　obliged　to　give　to　the　reparation　of　the

highways　is　not　always　perhaps　very　judiciously　applied；　but　it

is　scarce　ever　exacted　with　any　circumstances　of　cruelty　or

oppression。　In　France；　under　the　administration　of　the

intendants；　the　application　is　not　always　more　judicious；　and　the

exaction　is　frequently　the　most　cruel　and　oppressive。　Such

Corvees；　as　they　are　called；　make　one　of　the　principal

instruments　of　tyranny　by　which　those　officers　chastise　any

parish　or　communaute　which　has　had　the　misfortune　to　fall　under

their　displeasure。　

　　　　　Of　the　Public　Works　and　Institutions　which　are　necessary　for

　　　　　　　　　　　　facilitating　particular　Branches　of　Commerce。　

　　　　　The　object　of　the　public　works　and　institutions　above

mentioned　is　to　facilitate　commerce　in　general。　But　in　order　to

facilitate　some　particular　branches　of　it；　particular

institutions　are　necessary；　which　again　require　a　particular　and

extraordinary　expense。

　　　　　Some　particular　branches　of　commerce；　which　are　carried　on

with　barbarous　and　uncivilised　nations；　require　extraordinary

protection。　An　ordinary　store　or　counting…house　could　give　little

security　to　the　goods　of　the　merchants　who　trade　to　the　western

coast　of　Africa。　To　defend　them　from　the　barbarous　natives；　it　is

necessary　that　the　place　where　they　are　deposited　should　be；　in

some　measure；　fortified。　The　disorders　in　the　government　of

Indostan　have　been　supposed　to　render　a　like　precaution　necessary

even　among　that　mild　and　gentle　people；　and　it　was　under　pretence

of　securing　their　persons　and　property　from　violence　that　both

the　English　and　French　East　India　Companies　were　allowed　to　erect

the　first　forts　which　they　possessed　in　that　country。　Among　other

nations；　whose　vigorous　government　will　suffer　no　strangers　to

possess　any　fortified　place　within　their　territory；　it　may　be

necessary　to　maintain　some　ambassador；　minister；　or　counsel；　who

may　both　decide；　according　to　their　own　customs；　the　differences

arising　among　his　own　countrymen；　and；　in　their　disputes　with　the

natives；　may；　by　means　of　his　public　character；　interfere　with

more　authority；　and　afford　them　a　more　powerful　protection；　than

they　could　expect　from　any　private　man。　The　interests　of　commerce

have　frequently　made　it　necessary　to　maintain　ministers　in

foreign　countries　where　the　purposes；　either　of　war　or　alliance；

would　not　have　required　any。　The　commerce　of　the　Turkey　Company

first　occasioned　the　establishment　of　an　ordinary　ambassador　at

Constantinople。　The　first　English　embassies　to　Russia　arose

altogether　from　commercial　interests。　The　constant　interference

which　those　interests　necessarily　occasioned　between　the　subjects

of　the　different　states　of　Europe；　has　probably　introduced　the

custom　of　keeping；　in　all　neighbouring　countries；　ambassadors　or

ministers　constantly　resident　even　in　the　time　of　peace。　This

custom；　unknown　to　ancient　times；　seems　not　to　be　older　than　the

end　of　the　fifteenth　or　beginning　of　the　sixteenth　century；　that

is；　than　the　time　when　commerce　first　began　to　extend　itself　to

the　greater　part　of　the　nations　of　Europe；　and　when　they　first

began　to　attend　to　its　interests。

　　　　　It　seems　not　unreasonable　that　the　extraordinary　expense

which　the　protection　of　any　particular　branch　of　commerce　may

occasion　should　be　defrayed　by　a　moderate　tax　upon　that

particular　branch；　by　a　moderate　fine；　for　example；　to　be　paid　by

the　traders　when　they　first　enter　into　it；　or；　what　is　more

equal；　by　a　particular　duty　of　so　much　per　cent　upon　the　goods

which　they　either　import　into；　or　export　out　of；　the　particular

countries　with　which　it　is　carried　on。　The　protection　of　trade　in

general；　from　pirates　and　freebooters；　is　said　to　have　given

occasion　to　the　first　institution　of　the　duties　of　customs。　But；

if　it　was　thought　reasonable　to　lay　a　general　tax　upon　trade；　in

order　to　defray　the　expense　of　protecting　trade　in　general；　it

should　seem　equally　reasonable　to　lay　a　particular　tax　upon　a

particular　branch　of　trade；　in　order　to　defray　the　extraordinary

expense　of　protecting　that　branch。

　　　　　The　protection　of　trade　in　general　has　always　been

considered　as　essential　to　the　defence　of　the　commonwealth；　and；

upon　that　account；　a　necessary　part　of　the　duty　of　the　executive

power。　The　collection　and　application　of　the　general　duties　of

customs；　therefore；　have　always　been　left　to　that　power。　But　the

protection　of　any　particular　branch　of　trade　is　a　part　of　the

general　protection　of　trade；　a　part；　therefore；　of　the　duty　of

that　power；　and　if　nations　always　acted　consistently；　the

particular　duties　levied　for　the　purposes　of　such　particular

protection　should　always　have　been　left　equally　to　its　disposal。

But　in　this　respect；　as　well　as　in　many　others；　nations　have　not

always　acted　consistently；　and　in　the　greater　part　of　the

commercial　states　of　Europe；　particular　companies　of　merchants

have　had　the　address　to　persuade　the　legislature　to　entrust　to

them　the　performance　of　this　part　of　the　duty　of　the　sovereign；

together　with　all　the　powers　which　are　necessarily　connected　with

it。

　　　　　These　companies；　though　they　may；　perhaps；　have　been　useful

for　the　first　introduction　of　some　branches　of　commerce；　by

making；　at　their　own　expense；　an　experiment　which　the　state　might

not　think　it　prudent　to　make；　have　in　the　long　run　proved；

universally；　either　burdensome　or　useless；　and　have　either

mismanaged　or　confined　the　trade。

　　　　　When　those　companies　do　not　trade　upon　a　joint　stock；　but

are　obliged　to　admit　any　person；　properly　qualified；　upon　paying

a　certain　fine；　and　agreeing　to　submit　to　the　regulations　of　the

company；　each　member　trading　upon　his　own　stock；　and　at　his　own

risk；　they　are　called　regulated　companies。　When　they　trade　upon　a

joint　stock；　each　member　sharing　in　the　common　profit　or　loss　in

proportion　to　his　share　in　this　stock；　they　are　called　joint

stock　companies。　Such　companies；　whether　regulated　or　joint

stock；　sometimes　have；　and　sometimes　have　not；　exclusive

privileges。

　　　　　Regulated　companies　resemble；　in　every　resp