wealbk05-第11章

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wear　and　tear　which　they　occasion　of　them。　It　seems　scarce

possible　to　invent　a　more　equitable　way　of　maintaining　such

works。　This　tax　or　toll　too；　though　it　is　advanced　by　the

carrier；　is　finally　paid　by　the　consumer；　to　whom　it　must　always

be　charged　in　the　price　of　the　goods。　As　the　expense　of　carriage；

however；　is　very　much　reduced　by　means　of　such　public　works；　the

goods；　notwithstanding　the　toll　come　cheaper　to　the　consumer　than

the；　could　otherwise　have　done；　their　price　not　being　so　much

raised　by　the　toll　as　it　is　lowered　by　the　cheapness　of　the

carriage。　The　person　who　finally　pays　this　tax；　therefore；　gains

by　the　application　more　than　he　loses　by　the　payment　of　it。　His

payment　is　exactly　in　proportion　to　his　gain。　It　is　in　reality　no

more　than　a　part　of　that　gain　which　he　is　obliged　to　give　up　in

order　to　get　the　rest。　It　seems　impossible　to　imagine　a　more

equitable　method　of　raising　a　tax。

　　　　　When　the　toll　upon　carriages　of　luxury　upon　coaches；

post…chaises；　etc。；　is　made　somewhat　higher　in　proportion　to

their　weight　than　upon　carriages　of　necessary　use；　such　as　carts；

waggons；　etc。；　the　indolence　and　vanity　of　the　rich　is　made　to

contribute　in　a　very　easy　manner　to　the　relief　of　the　poor；　by

rendering　cheaper　the　transportation　of　heavy　goods　to　all　the

different　parts　of　the　country。

　　　　　When　high　roads；　bridges；　canals；　etc。；　are　in　this　manner

made　and　supported　by　the　commerce　which　is　carried　on　by　means

of　them；　they　can　be　made　only　where　that　commerce　requires　them；

and　consequently　where　it　is　proper　to　make　them。　Their　expenses

too；　their　grandeur　and　magnificence；　must　be　suited　to　what　that

commerce　can　afford　to　pay。　They　must　be　made　consequently　as　it

is　proper　to　make　them。　A　magnificent　high　road　cannot　be　made

through　a　desert　country　where　there　is　little　or　no　commerce；　or

merely　because　it　happens　to　lead　to　the　country　villa　of　the

intendant　of　the　province；　or　to　that　of　some　great　lord　to　whom

the　intendant　finds　it　convenient　to　make　his　court。　A　great

bridge　cannot　be　thrown　over　a　river　at　a　place　where　nobody

passes；　or　merely　to　embellish　the　view　from　the　windows　of　a

neighbouring　palace：　things　which　sometimes　happen　in　countries

where　works　of　this　kind　are　carried　on　by　any　other　revenue　than

that　which　they　themselves　are　capable　of　affording。

　　　　　In　several　different　parts　of　Europe　the　ton　or　lock…duty

upon　a　canal　is　the　property　of　private　persons；　whose　private

interest　obliges　them　to　keep　up　the　canal。　If　it　is　not　kept　in

tolerable　order；　the　navigation　necessarily　ceases　altogether；

and　along　with　it　the　whole　profit　which　they　can　make　by　the

tolls。　If　those　tolls　were　put　under　the　management　of

commissioners；　who　had　themselves　no　interest　in　them；　they　might

be　less　attentive　to　the　maintenance　of　the　works　which　produced

them。　The　canal　of　Languedoc　cost　the　King　of　France　and　the

province　upwards　of　thirteen　millions　of　livres；　which　（at

twenty…eight　livres　the　mark　of　silver；　the　value　of　French　money

in　the　end　of　the　last　century）　amounted　to　upwards　of　nine

hundred　thousand　pounds　sterling。　When　that　great　work　was

finished；　the　most　likely　method；　it　was　found；　of　keeping　it　in

constant　repair　was　to　make　a　present　of　the　tolls　to　Riquet　the

engineer；　who　planned　and　conducted　the　work。　Those　tolls

constitute　at　present　a　very　large　estate　to　the　different

branches　of　the　family　of　that　gentleman；　who　have；　therefore；　a

great　interest　to　keep　the　work　in　constant　repair。　But　had　those

tolls　been　put　under　the　management　of　commissioners；　who　had　no

such　interest；　they　might　perhaps　have　been　dissipated　in

ornamental　and　unnecessary　expenses；　while　the　most　essential

parts　of　the　work　were　allowed　to　go　to　ruin。

　　　　　The　tolls　for　the　maintenance　of　a　high　road　cannot　with　any

safety　be　made　the　property　of　private　persons。　A　high　road；

though　entirely　neglected；　does　not　become　altogether　impassable；

though　a　canal　does。　The　proprietors　of　the　tolls　upon　a　high

road；　therefore；　might　neglect　altogether　the　repair　of　the　road；

and　yet　continue　to　levy　very　nearly　the　same　tolls。　It　is

proper；　therefore；　that　the　tolls　for　the　maintenance　of　such　a

work　should　be　put　under　the　management　of　commissioners　or

trustees。

　　　　　In　Great　Britain；　the　abuses　which　the　trustees　have

committed　in　the　management　of　those　tolls　have　in　many　cases

been　very　justly　complained　of。　At　many　turnpikes；　it　has　been

said；　the　money　levied　is　more　than　double　of　what　is　necessary

for　executing；　in　the　completest　manner；　the　work　which　is　often

executed　in　very　slovenly　manner；　and　sometimes　not　executed　at

all。　The　system　of　repairing　the　high　roads　by　tolls　of　this

kind；　it　must　be　observed；　is　not　of　very　long　standing。　We

should　not　wonder；　therefore；　if　it　has　not　yet　been　brought　to

that　degree　of　perfection　of　which　it　seems　capable。　If　mean　and

improper　persons　are　frequently　appointed　trustees；　and　if　proper

courts　of　inspection　and　account　have　not　yet　been　established

for　controlling　their　conduct；　and　for　reducing　the　tolls　to　what

is　barely　sufficient　for　executing　the　work　to　be　done　by　them；

the　recency　of　the　institution　both　accounts　and　apologizes　for

those　defects；　of　which；　by　the　wisdom　of　Parliament；　the　greater

part　may　in　due　time　be　gradually　remedied。

　　　　　The　money　levied　at　the　different　turnpikes　in　Great　Britain

is　supposed　to　exceed　so　much　what　is　necessary　for　repairing　the

roads；　that　the　savings；　which；　with　proper　economy；　might　be

made　from　it；　have　been　considered；　even　by　some　ministers；　as　a

very　great　resource　which　might　at　some　time　or　another　be

applied　to　the　exigencies　of　the　state。　Government；　it　has　been

said；　by　taking　the　management　of　the　turnpikes　into　its　own

hands；　and　by　employing　the　soldiers；　who　would　work　for　a　very

small　addition　to　their　pay；　could　keep　the　roads　in　good　order

at　a　much　less　expense　than　it　can　be　done　by　trustees；　who　have

no　other　workmen　to　employ　but　such　as　derive　their　whole

subsistence　from　their　wages。　A　great　revenue；　half　a　million

perhaps；*　it　has　been　pretended；　might　in　this　manner　be　gained

without　laying　any　new　burden　upon　the　people；　and　the　turnpike

roads　might　be　made　to　contribute　to　the　general　expense　of　the

state；　in　the　same　manner　as　the　post　office　does　at　present。　　　

*　Since　publishing　the　two　first　editions　of　this　book；　I　have

got　good　reasons　to　believe　that　all　the　turnpike　tolls　levied　in

Great　Britain　do　not　produce　a　net　revenue　that　amounts　to　half　a

million；　a　sum　which；　under　the　management　of　Government；　would

not　be　sufficient　to　keep　in　repair　five　of　the　principal　roads

in　the　kingdom。　

　　　　　That　a　considerable　revenue　might　be　gained　in　this　manner　I

have　no　doubt；　though　probably　not　near　so　much　as　the　projectors

of　this　plan　have　supposed。　The　plan　itself；　however；　seems

liable　to　several　very　important　objections。

　　　　　First；　if　the　tolls　which　are　levied　at　the　turnpikes　should

ever　be　considered　as　one　of　the　resources　for　supplying　the

exigencies　of　the　state；　they　would　certainly　be　augmented　as

those　exigencies　were　supposed　to　require。　According　to　the

policy　of　Great　Britain；　therefore；　they　would　probably　be

augmented　very　fast。　The　facility　with　which　a　great　revenue

could　be　drawn　from　them　would　probably　encourage　administration

to　recur　very　frequently　to　this　resource。　Though　it　may；

perhaps；　be　more　than　doubtful　whether　half　a　million　could　by

any　economy　be　saved　out　of　the　present　tolls；　it　can　scarce　be

doubted　but　that　a　million　might　be　saved　out　of　them　if　they

were　doubled：　and　perhaps　two　millions　if　they　were　tripled。*

This　great　revenue；　too；　might　be　levied　without　the　appointment

of　a　single　new　officer　to　collect　and　receive　it。　But　the

turnpike　tolls　being　continually　augmented　in　this　manner；

instead　of　facilitating　the　inland　commerce　of　the　country　as　at