timaeu-第10章

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extinguished；　passes　once　more　into　the　form　of　air；　and　once　more；

air；　when　collected　and　condensed；　produces　cloud　and　mist；　and　from

these；　when　still　more　compressed；　comes　flowing　water；　and　from　water

comes　earth　and　stones　once　more；　and　thus　generation　appears　to　be

transmitted　from　one　to　the　other　in　a　circle。　Thus；　then；　as　the

several　elements　never　present　themselves　in　the　same　form；　how　can

any　one　have　the　assurance　to　assert　positively　that　any　of　them；

whatever　it　may　be；　is　one　thing　rather　than　another？　No　one　can。

But　much　the　safest　plan　is　to　speak　of　them　as　follows：…Anything

which　we　see　to　be　continually　changing；　as；　for　example；　fire；　we

must　not　call　〃this〃　or　〃that；〃　but　rather　say　that　it　is　〃of　such　a

nature〃；　nor　let　us　speak　of　water　as　〃this〃；　but　always　as　〃such〃；

nor　must　we　imply　that　there　is　any　stability　in　any　of　those　things

which　we　indicate　by　the　use　of　the　words　〃this〃　and　〃that；〃　supposing

ourselves　to　signify　something　thereby；　for　they　are　too　volatile　to

be　detained　in　any　such　expressions　as　〃this；〃　or　〃that；〃　or　〃relative

to　this；〃　or　any　other　mode　of　speaking　which　represents　them　as

permanent。　We　ought　not　to　apply　〃this〃　to　any　of　them；　but　rather　the

word　〃such〃；　which　expresses　the　similar　principle　circulating　in　each

and　all　of　them；　for　example；　that　should　be　called　〃fire〃　which　is　of

such　a　nature　always；　and　so　of　everything　that　has　generation。　That

in　which　the　elements　severally　grow　up；　and　appear；　and　decay；　is

alone　to　be　called　by　the　name　〃this〃　or　〃that〃；　but　that　which　is

of　a　certain　nature；　hot　or　white；　or　anything　which　admits　of

opposite　equalities；　and　all　things　that　are　compounded　of　them；　ought

not　to　be　so　denominated。　Let　me　make　another　attempt　to　explain　my

meaning　more　clearly。　Suppose　a　person　to　make　all　kinds　of　figures　of

gold　and　to　be　always　transmuting　one　form　into　all　the

rest…somebody　points　to　one　of　them　and　asks　what　it　is。　By　far　the

safest　and　truest　answer　is；　That　is　gold；　and　not　to　call　the

triangle　or　any　other　figures　which　are　formed　in　the　gold　〃these；〃　as

though　they　had　existence；　since　they　are　in　process　of　change　while

he　is　making　the　assertion；　but　if　the　questioner　be　willing　to　take

the　safe　and　indefinite　expression；　〃such；〃　we　should　be　satisfied。

And　the　same　argument　applies　to　the　universal　nature　which　receives

all　bodies…that　must　be　always　called　the　same；　for；　while　receiving

all　things；　she　never　departs　at　all　from　her　own　nature；　and　never　in

any　way；　or　at　any　time；　assumes　a　form　like　that　of　any　of　the　things

which　enter　into　her；　she　is　the　natural　recipient　of　all　impressions；

and　is　stirred　and　informed　by　them；　and　appears　different　from　time

to　time　by　reason　of　them。　But　the　forms　which　enter　into　and　go　out

of　her　are　the　likenesses　of　real　existences　modelled　after　their

patterns　in　wonderful　and　inexplicable　manner；　which　we　will　hereafter

investigate。　For　the　present　we　have　only　to　conceive　of　three

natures：　first；　that　which　is　in　process　of　generation；　secondly；　that

in　which　the　generation　takes　place；　and　thirdly；　that　of　which　the

thing　generated　is　a　resemblance。　And　we　may　liken　the　receiving

principle　to　a　mother；　and　the　source　or　spring　to　a　father；　and　the

intermediate　nature　to　a　child；　and　may　remark　further；　that　if　the

model　is　to　take　every　variety　of　form；　then　the　matter　in　which　the

model　is　fashioned　will　not　be　duly　prepared；　unless　it　is　formless；

and　free　from　the　impress　of　any　of　these　shapes　which　it　is　hereafter

to　receive　from　without。　For　if　the　matter　were　like　any　of　the

supervening　forms；　then　whenever　any　opposite　or　entirely　different

nature　was　stamped　upon　its　surface；　it　would　take　the　impression

badly；　because　it　would　intrude　its　own　shape。　Wherefore；　that　which

is　to　receive　all　forms　should　have　no　form；　as　in　making　perfumes

they　first　contrive　that　the　liquid　substance　which　is　to　receive

the　scent　shall　be　as　inodorous　as　possible；　or　as　those　who　wish　to

impress　figures　on　soft　substances　do　not　allow　any　previous

impression　to　remain；　but　begin　by　making　the　surface　as　even　and

smooth　as　possible。　In　the　same　way　that　which　is　to　receive

perpetually　and　through　its　whole　extent　the　resemblances　of　all

eternal　beings　ought　to　be　devoid　of　any　particular　form。　Wherefore；

the　mother　and　receptacle　of　all　created　and　visible　and　in　any　way

sensible　things；　is　not　to　be　termed　earth；　or　air；　or　fire；　or　water；

or　any　of　their　compounds　or　any　of　the　elements　from　which　these

are　derived；　but　is　an　invisible　and　formless　being　which　receives　all

things　and　in　some　mysterious　way　partakes　of　the　intelligible；　and　is

most　incomprehensible。　In　saying　this　we　shall　not　be　far　wrong；　as

far；　however；　as　we　can　attain　to　a　knowledge　of　her　from　the　previous

considerations；　we　may　truly　say　that　fire　is　that　part　of　her

nature　which　from　time　to　time　is　inflamed；　and　water　that　which　is

moistened；　and　that　the　mother　substance　becomes　earth　and　air；　in

so　far　as　she　receives　the　impressions　of　them。

　　Let　us　consider　this　question　more　precisely。　Is　there　any

self…existent　fire？　and　do　all　those　things　which　we　call

self…existent　exist？　or　are　only　those　things　which　we　see；　or　in　some

way　perceive　through　the　bodily　organs；　truly　existent；　and　nothing

whatever　besides　them？　And　is　all　that　which；　we　call　an

intelligible　essence　nothing　at　all；　and　only　a　name？　Here　is　a

question　which　we　must　not　leave　unexamined　or　undetermined；　nor

must　we　affirm　too　confidently　that　there　can　be　no　decision；

neither　must　we　interpolate　in　our　present　long　discourse　a　digression

equally　long；　but　if　it　is　possible　to　set　forth　a　great　principle

in　a　few　words；　that　is　just　what　we　want。

　　Thus　I　state　my　view：…If　mind　and　true　opinion　are　two　distinct

classes；　then　I　say　that　there　certainly　are　these　self…existent　ideas

unperceived　by　sense；　and　apprehended　only　by　the　mind；　if；　however；

as　some　say；　true　opinion　differs　in　no　respect　from　mind；　then

everything　that　we　perceive　through　the　body　is　to　be　regarded　as　most

real　and　certain。　But　we　must　affirm　that　to　be　distinct；　for　they

have　a　distinct　origin　and　are　of　a　different　nature；　the　one　is

implanted　in　us　by　instruction；　the　other　by　persuasion；　the　one　is

always　accompanied　by　true　reason；　the　other　is　without　reason；　the

one　cannot　be　overcome　by　persuasion；　but　the　other　can：　and　lastly；

every　man　may　be　said　to　share　in　true　opinion；　but　mind　is　the

attribute　of　the　gods　and　of　very　few　men。　Wherefore　also　we　must

acknowledge　that　there　is　one　kind　of　being　which　is　always　the

same；　uncreated　and　indestructible；　never　receiving　anything　into

itself　from　without；　nor　itself　going　out　to　any　other；　but

invisible　and　imperceptible　by　any　sense；　and　of　which　the

contemplation　is　granted　to　intelligence　only。　And　there　is　another

nature　of　the　same　name　with　it；　and　like　to　it；　perceived　by　sense；

created；　always　in　motion；　becoming　in　place　and　again　vanishing　out

of　place；　which　is　apprehended　by　opinion　and　sense。　And　there　is　a

third　nature；　which　is　space；　and　is　eternal；　and　admits　not　of

destruction　and　provides　a　home　for　all　created　things；　and　is

apprehended　without　the　help　of　sense；　by　a　kind　of　spurious　reason；

and　is　hardly　real；　which　we　beholding　as　in　a　dream；　say　of　all

existence　that　it　must　of　necessity　be　in　some　place　and　occupy　a

space；　but　that　what　is　neither　in　heaven　nor　in　earth　has　no

existence。　Of　these　and　other　things　of　the　same　kind；　relating　to　the

true　and　waking　reality　of　nature；　we　have　only　this　dreamlike

sense；　and　we　are　unable　to　cast　off　sleep　and　determine　the　truth

about　them。　For　an　image；　since　the　reality；　after　which　it　is

modelled；　does　not　belong　to　it；　and　it　exists　ever　as　the　fleeting

shadow　of　some　other；　must　be　inferred　to　be　in　another　＇i。e。　in　space

＇；　grasping　existence　in　some　way　or　other；　or　it　could　not　be　at　all。

But　true　and　exact　reason；　vindicating　the　nature　of　true　being；

maintains　that　while　two　things　＇i