war and the future-第40章
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〃tone〃 of the German army； to judge by its captured letters； is
even lower。 It would welcome peace in any form。 Never in the
whole history of the world has a war been so universally
unpopular as this war。
The mind of the soldier is obsessed by a vision of home…coming
for good； so vivid and alluring that it blots out nearly every
other consideration。 The visions of people at home are of plenty
instead of privation； lights up； and the cessation of a hundred
tiresome restrictions。 And it is natural therefore that a writer
rather given to guesses and forecasts should be asked very
frequently to guess how long the war has still to run。
All such forecasting is the very wildest of shooting。 There are
the chances of war to put one out； and of a war that changes far
faster than the military intelligence。 I have made various
forecasts。 At the outset I thought that military Germany would
fight at about the 1899 level； would be lavish with cavalry and
great attacks； that it would be reluctant to entrench； and that
the French and British had learnt the lesson of the Boer war
better than the Germans。 I trusted to the melodramatic instinct
of the Kaiser。 I trusted to the quickened intelligence of the
British military caste。 The first rush seemed to bear me out；
and I opened my paper day by day expecting to read of the British
and French entrenched and the Germans beating themselves to death
against wire and trenches。 In those days I wrote of the French
being over the Rhine before 1915。 But it was the Germans who
entrenched first。
Since then I have made some other attempts。 I did not prophesy
at all in 1915； so far as I can remember。 If I had I should
certainly have backed the Gallipoli attempt to win。 It was the
right thing to do； and it was done abominably。 It should have
given us Constantinople and brought Bulgaria to our side； it gave
us a tragic history of administrative indolence and negligence；
and wasted bravery and devotion。 I was very hopeful of the
western offensive in 1915； and in 1916 I counted still on our
continuing push。 I believe we were very near something like
decision this last September； but some archaic dream of doing it
with cavalry dashed these hopes。 The 〃Tanks〃 arrived to late to
do their proper work； and their method of use is being worked out
very slowly。。。。 I still believe in the western push； if only we
push it for all we are worth。 If only we push it with our
brains； with our available and still unorganised brains； if only
we realise that the art of modern war is to invent and invent and
invent。 Hitherto I have always hoped and looked for decision； a
complete victory that would enable the Allies to dictate peace。
But such an expectation is largely conditioned by these delicate
questions of adaptability that my tour of the front has made very
urgent in my mind。 A spiteful German American writer has said
that the British would rather kill twenty thousand of their men
than break one general。 Even a grain of truth in such a remark
is a very valid reasoning for lengthening one's estimate of the
duration of the war。
There can be no doubt that the Western allies are playing a
winning game upon the western front； and that this is the front
of decision now。 It is not in doubt that they are beating the
Germans and shoving them back。 The uncertain factor is the rate
at which they are shoving them back。 If they can presently get
to so rapid an advance as to bring the average rate since July
1st up to two or three miles a day； then we shall still see the
Allies dictating terms。 But if the shove drags on at its present
pace of less than a mile and four thousand prisoners a week over
the limited Somme front only； if nothing is attempted elsewhere
to increase the area of pressure； ＇*This was written originally
before the French offensive at Verdun。＇ then the intolerable
stress and boredom of the war will bring about a peace long
before the Germans are decisively crushed。 But the war；
universally detested； may go on into 1918 or 1919。 Food riots；
famine； and general disorganisation will come before 1920； if it
does。 The Allies have a winning game before them； but they seem
unable to discover and promote the military genius needed to
harvest an unquestionable victory。 In the long run this may not
be an unmixed evil。 Victory； complete and dramatic； may be
bought too dearly。 We need not triumphs out of this war but the
peace of the world。
This war is altogether unlike any previous war； and its ending；
like its development； will follow a course of its own。 For a
time people's minds ran into the old grooves； the Germans were
going /nach Paris/ and /nach London/； Lord Curzon
filled our minds with a pleasant image of the Bombay Lancers
riding down /Unter den Linden。/ But the Versailles
precedent of a council of victors dictating terms to the
vanquished is not now so evidently in men's minds。 The utmost
the Allies talk upon now is to say； 〃We must end the war on
German soil。〃 The Germans talk frankly of 〃holding out。〃 I have
guessed that the western offensive will be chiefly on German soil
by next June； it is a mere guess； and I admit it is quite
conceivable that the 〃push〃 may still be grinding out its daily
tale of wounded and prisoners in 1918 far from that goal。
None of the combatants expected such a war as this； and the
consequence is that the world at large has no idea how to get out
of it。 The war may stay with us like a schoolboy caller； because
it does not know how to go。 The Italians said as much to me。
〃Suppose we get to Innsbruck and Laibach and Trieste；〃 they said；
〃it isn't an end！〃 Lord Northcliffe； I am told； came away from
Italy with the conviction that the war would last six years。
There is the clearest evidence that nearly everyone is anxious to
get out of the war now。 Nobody at all； except perhaps a few
people who may be called to account； and a handful of greedy
profit…seekers； wants to keep it going。 Quietly perhaps and
unobtrusively； everyone I know is now trying to find the way out
of the war； and I am convinced that the same is the case in
Germany。 That is what makes the Peace…at…any…price campaign so
exasperating。 It is like being chased by clamorous geese across
a common in the direction in which you want to go。 But how are
we to get outwith any creditin such a way as to prevent a
subsequent collapse into another war as frightful？
At present three programmes are before the world of the way in
which the war can be ended。 The first of these assumes a
complete predominance of our Allies。 It has been stated in
general terms by Mr。 Asquith。 Evacuation； reparation； due
punishment of those responsible for the war； and guarantees that
nothing of the sort shall happen again。 There is as yet no
mention of the nature of these guarantees。 Just exactly what is
to happen to Poland； Austria； and the Turkish Empire does not
appear in this prospectus。 The German Chancellor is equally
elusive。 The Kaiser has stampeded the peace…at…any…price people
of Great Britain by proclaiming that Germany wants peace。 We
knew that。 But what sort of peace？ It would seem that we are
promised vaguely evacuation and reparation on the western
frontier； and in addition there are to be guaranteesbut it is
quite evident that they are altogether different guarantees from
Mr。 Asquith'sthat nothing of the sort is ever to happen again。
The programme of the British and their Allies seems to
contemplate something like a forcible disarmament and military
occupation of Belgium； the desertion of Serbia and Russia； and
the surrender to Germany of every facility for a later and more
successful German offensive in the west。 But it is clear that on
these terms as stated the war must go on to the definite defeat
of one side or the other； or a European chaos。 They are
irreconcilable sets of terms。
Yet it is hard to say how they can be modified on either side； if
the war is to be decided only between the belligerents and by
standards of national interest only； without reference to any
other considerations。 Our Allies would be insane to leave the
Hohenzollern at the
