history of philosophy-第94章

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self…possessed；　superior　persons　—　were　quite　surprised　that　he　also　made　pretensions　to
knowledge；　and　of　such　a　“dead　dog”　as　Spinoza　（ibidem；　p。　68）。　Explanations　followed　upon
this；　in　which　Jacobi　further　developed　his　philosophic　views。

Mendelssohn　is　directly　opposed　to　Jacobi；　for　Mendelssohn　took　his　stand　on　cognition；　placed
true　existence　immediately　in　thought　and　conception；　and　maintained：　“What　I　cannot　think　as　true
does　not　trouble　me　as　doubt。　A　question　which　I　do　not　understand；　I　cannot　answer；　it　is　for　me
as　good　as　no　question　at　all。〃（2）　He　continued　to　argue　on　these　same　lines。　His　proof　of　the
existence　of　God　thus　carries　with　it　this　necessity　of　thought；　viz。　that　actuality　must　plainly　be　in
thought；　and　a　thinker　must　be　pre…supposed；　or　the　possibility　of　the　actual　is　in　the　thinker。　“What
no　thinking　Being　conceives　as　possible　is　not　possible；　and　what　is　thought　by　no　thinking　creature
as　actual　cannot　be　actual　in　fact。　If　we　take　away　from　anything　whatsoever　the　conception
formed　by　a　thinking　Being　that　that　thing　is　possible　or　actual；　the　thing　itself　is　done　away　with。”
The　Notion　of　the　thing　is　thus　to　man　the　essence　of　the　same。　“No　finite　Being　can　think　the
actuality　of　a　thing　in　its　perfection　as　actual；　and　still　less　can　he　perceive　the　possibility　and
actuality　of　all　present　things。　There　must　thus　be　a　thinking　Being　or　an　understanding　which　in　the
most　perfect　way　thinks　the　content　of　all　possibilities　as　possible；　and　the　content　of　all　actualities
as　actual；　i。e。　there　must　be　an　infinite　understanding；　and　this　is　God。〃（3）　Here　on　the　one　hand
we　see　a　unity　of　thought　and　Being；　on　the　other　the　absolute　unity　as　infinite　understanding　—　the
former　is　the　self…consciousness　which　is　apprehended　as　finite　merely。　Actuality；　Being；　has　its
possibility　in　thought；　or　its　possibility　is　thought；　it　is　not　a　process　from　possibility　to　actuality；　for
the　possibility　remains　at　home　in　the　actuality。

Jacobi　maintains　against　these　demands　of　thought　—　and　this　in　one　view　is　the　chief　thought　in　his
philosophy　—　that　every　method　of　their　demonstration　leads　to　fatalism；　atheism；　and
Spinozism；（4）　and　presents　God　as　derived　and　founded　upon　something　else；　for　comprehending
Him　signifies　demonstrating　His　dependence。　Jacobi　thus　asserts　that　mediate　knowledge　consists
in　giving　a　cause　of　something　which　has　in　its　turn　a　finite　effect；　and　so　on；　so　that　a　knowledge
such　as　this　can　all　through　relate　to　the　finite　only。

Jacobi　further　states　upon　this　subject；　in　the　first　place；　that　〃Reason〃　—　later　on　when　he
distinguished　reason　and　understanding　（of　which　more　hereafter（5））；　he　altered　it　to
understanding（6）　…　〃can　never　bring　to　light　more　than　the　conditions　of　what　is　conditioned；
natural　laws　and　mechanism。　We　comprehend　a　thing　when　we　can　deduce　it　from　its　proximate
causes；”　and　not　from　the　remoter　causes；　the　most　remote　and　quite　universal　cause　is　always
God。　“Or”　we　know　the　thing　if　we　“perceive　its　immediate　conditions　as　they　come　in　due
succession。　Thus；　for　instance；　we　comprehend　a　circle　when　we　can　clearly　represent　to
ourselves　the　mechanism　of　its　origination　or　its　physical　conditions；　we　know　the　syllogistic
formul？　when　we　have　actually　come　to　know　the　laws　to　which　the　human　understanding　is
subject　in　judgment　and　conclusion；　its　physical　nature　and　its　mechanism。　For　this　reason　we　have
no　conceptions　of　qualities　as　such；　but　only　intuitions。　Even　of　our　present　existence　we　have　a
feeling　only；　but　no　conceptions。　Genuine　conceptions　we　have　merely　of　figure；　number；　position；
movement　and　the　forms　of　thought；　qualities　are　known　and　understood；　if　they　are　traced　back
to　these　and　objectively　annulled。”　This　is　undoubtedly　really　finite　knowledge；　which　is　to　give
the　determinate　conditions　of　anything　determinate；　to　demonstrate　it　as　resulting　from　another
cause；　in　such　a　way　that　each　condition　is　again　conditioned　and　finite。　Jacobi　continues：　“The
business　of　reason　is　really　progressive　union　and　connection；　and　its　speculative　business　is　union
and　connection　in　accordance　with　the　known　laws　of　necessity；　i。e。　of　identity。　Everything　that
reason　can　bring　forth　by　means　of　analysis；　combination；　judgment；　conclusion；　and
re…conception；　consists　in　nothing　but　things　of　nature”　（i。e。　finite　things）；　“and　reason　itself；　as　a
limited　existence；　belongs　to　these　things。　But　the　whole　of　nature；　the　sum　of　all　conditioned
existence；　cannot　reveal　more　to　the　investigating　understanding　than　what　is　contained　in　it；
namely；　manifold　existence；　changes；　a　succession　of　forms”　（the　conditioned）；　“and　not　an　actual
beginning”　（of　the　world）；　“nor　a　real　principle　of　any　objective　existence。〃（7）

But　Jacobi　in　the　second　place　here　accepts　reason　in　a　wider　sense　and　says：　“If　we　understand
by　reason　the　principle　of　knowledge　generally；　it　is　the　mind　from　which　the　whole　living　nature　of
man　is　constituted；　through　it　man　arises；　he　is　a　form　which　it　has　adopted。”　With　this　Jacobi's
view　of　the　attempt　to　know　the　unconditioned　is　connected。　“I　take　the　whole　human　being　and
find　that　his　consciousness　is　composed　of　two　original　conceptions；　the　conceptions　of　the
conditioned　and　the　unconditioned。　Both　are　inseparably　bound　up　with　one　another；　and　yet　in
such　a　way　that　the　conception　of　the　conditioned　presupposes　the　conception　of　the
unconditioned；　and　can　be　given　in　this　alone。　We　are　just　as　certain　of　its　existence　as　we　are　of
our　own　conditioned　existence；　or　even　more　so。　Since　our　conditioned　existence　rests　on　an
infinitude　of　mediations；　there　is　opened　up　to　our　investigation　a　vast　field　which；　for　the　sake　of
our　preservation　even；　we　are　forced　to　work　upon。”　It　would；　however；　be　quite　another　thing
to　wish　to　know　the　unconditioned　apart　from　this　practical　end。　However　Jacobi　here　remarks；
“To　try　to　discover　the　conditions　of　the　unconditioned；　to　find　a　possibility　for　absolute　necessity；
and　to　construct　this　last　in　order　to　be　able　to　comprehend　it；　is　what　we　undertake　when　we
endeavour　to　make　nature　an　existence　comprehensible　to　us；　i。e。　a　merely　natural　existence；　and
to　bring　the　mechanism　of　the　principle　of　mechanism　into　the　light　of　day。　For　if　everything　which
can　be　said　to　arise　and　be　present　in　a　way　comprehensible　to　us；　must　arise　and　be　present　in　a
conditioned　way；　we　remain；　so　long　as　we　continue　to　comprehend；　in　a　chain　of　conditioned
conditions。　Where　this　chain　breaks　off；　we　cease　to　comprehend；　and　there　the　connection　which
we　call　nature　likewise　ceases。　The　conception　of　the　possibility　of　the　outward　existence　of　nature
would　thus　be　the　conception　of　an　absolute　beginning　or　origin　of　nature；　it　would　be　the
conception　of　the　unconditioned　itself　in　so　far　as　it　is　a　conditioning　of　nature　not　naturally
connected；　i。e。　a　conditioning　of　nature　unconnected　and　unconditioned　for　us。　Now　should　a
conception　of　what　is　thus　unconditioned　and　unconnected；　and　consequently　supernatural；　be
possible；　the　unconditioned　must　cease　to　be　unconditioned；　it　must　itself　receive　conditions；　and
absolute　necessity　must　commence　to　be　possibility　in　order　that　it　may　allow　itself　to　be
constructed。〃（8）　This　is　contradictory。

Jacobi　then　passes　on　from　this　point　to　the　second　of　his　main　propositions；　“The　unconditioned
is　called　the　supernatural。　Now　since　everything　which　lies　outside　the　connection　of　what　is
conditioned；　of　what　is　naturally　mediated；　also　lies　outside　the　sphere　of　our　clear　and　certain
knowledge；　and　cannot　be　understood　through　conceptions；　the　supernatural　cannot　be　accepted
in　any　other　way　by　us　than　that　in　which　it　is　given　to　us　—　namely　as　a　fact。　It　is！　This
supernatural；　this　essence　of　all　essence；　all　tongues　join　in　proclaiming　to　be　God。〃（9）　God　as　the
universal；　the　true；　is　here　taken　in　the　sense　of　a　spiritual　generally；　in　the　sense　of　power；
wisdom；　&c。　That　God　is；　however；　is　to　Jacobi　not　absolutely　true；　for　to　knowledge　pertains　His
objective　absolute　existence；　but　He　cannot　be　said　to　be　known。　It　is　thus　merely　a　fact