history of philosophy-第91章

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raised　like　a　standard　among　the　nations；　liberty　of　conviction　and　of　conscience　in　me。　They　said
to　mankind；　“In　this　sign　thou　shalt　conquer；”　for　they　had　before　their　eyes　what　had　been　done
in　the　name　of　the　cross　alone；　what　had　been　made　a　matter　of　faith　and　law　and　religion　—　they
saw　how　the　sign　of　the　cross　had　been　degraded。　For　in　the　sign　of　the　cross　lying　and　deceit　had
been　victorious；　under　this　seal　institutions　had　become　fossilised；　and　had　sunk　into　all　manner　of
degradation；　so　that　this　sign　came　to　be　represented　as　the　epitome　and　root　of　all　evil。　Thus　in
another　form　they　completed　the　Reformation　that　Luther　began。　This　concrete　had　manifold
forms；　social　instincts　in　the　practical　sphere；　laws　of　nature　in　the　theoretical。　There　is　present　the
absolute　impulse　to　find　a　compass　immanent　in　themselves；　i。e。　in　the　human　mind。　For　the　human
mind　it　is　imperative　to　have　a　fixed　point　such　as　this；　if；　indeed；　it　is　to　be　within　itself；　if　it　is　to　be
free　in　its　own　world　at　least。　But　this　striving　after　really　present　vitality　took　forms　which　as
by…paths　were　themselves　one…sided。　In　this　striving　after　unity；　which　was；　however；　concrete
unity；　the　further　varieties　of　the　content　likewise　lie。

On　the　theoretic　side　of　their　philosophy；　therefore；　the　French　proceeded　to　materialism　or
naturalism；　because　the　requirements　of　the　understanding；　as　abstract　thought；　which　from　a　firmly
fixed　principle　allows　the　most　monstrous　consequences　to　be　drawn；　drove　them　to　set　up　one
principle　as　ultimate；　and　that　a　principle　which　had　at　the　same　time　to　be　present　and　to　lie　quite
close　to　experience。　Hence　they　accept　sensation　and　matter　as　the　only　truth；　to　which　must　be
reduced　all　thought；　all　morality；　as　a　mere　modification　of　sensation。　The　unities　which　the　French
propounded　were　in　this　way　one…sided。

a。　OPPOSITION　OF　SENSATION　AND　THOUGHT。

To　this　one…sidedness　belongs　the　opposition　between　sentir　and　penser；　or　else；　if　you　like；　their
identity；　making　the　latter　only　a　result　of　the　former；　there　is　not；　however；　any　speculative
reconciliation　of　this　opposition　in　God；　such　as　we　find　in　Spinoza　and　Malebranche。　This
reduction　of　all　thought　to　sensation；　which　in　certain　respects　took　place　with　Locke；　becomes　a
widely　extended　theory。　Robinet　（De　la　Nature；　T。　I。　P。　IV。　chap。　iii。　pp。　257…259）　lights　also　on
this　opposition；　beyond　which　he　does　not　get；　that　mind　and　body　are　not　separate；　but　that　the
manner　in　which　they　are　united　is　inexplicable。　The　Système　de　la　Nature　（T。　I。　chap。　x。　p。　177）
is　marked　by　an　especially　plain　reduction　of　thought　to　sensation。　The　leading　thought　is　this：
“Abstract　thoughts　are　only　modes　in　which　our　inmost　organ　views　its　own　modifications。　The
words　goodness；　beauty；　order；　intelligence；　virtue；　&c。；　have　no　meaning　for　us　if　we　do　not　refer
and　apply　them　to　objects　which　our　senses　have　shown　to　be　capable　of　these　qualities；　or　to
modes　of　being　and　acting　which　are　known　to　us。”　Thus　even　psychology　passed　into
materialism；　as　for　instance　we　may　find　in　La　Mettrie's　work　L'homme　Machine：　All　thought　and
all　conception　have　meaning　only　if　they　are　apprehended　as　material；　matter　alone　exists。

b。　MONTESQUIEU。

Other　great　writers　have　opposed　to　the　above　the　feeling　in　the　breast；　the　instinct　of
self…preservation；　benevolent　dispositions　towards　others；　the　impulse　to　fellowship；　which　last
Puffendorf　also　made　the　foundation　of　his　system　of　law　（supra；　p。　321）。　From　this　point　of　view
much　that　is　excellent　has　been　said。　Thus　Montesquieu；　in　his　charming　book；　L'Esprit　des　Lois；
of　which　Voltaire　said　it　was　an　esprit　sur　les　lois；　regarded　the　nations　from　this　important　point
of　view；　that　their　constitution；　their　religion；　in　short；　everything　that　is　to　be　found　in　a　state；
constitutes　a　totality。

c。　HELVETIUS。

This　reduction　of　thought　to　feeling　in　the　case　of　Helvetius　takes　the　form　that　if　in　man　as　a　moral
being　a　single　principle　is　sought；　this　ought　to　be　called　self…love；　and　he　endeavoured　to
demonstrate　by　ingenious　analysis　that　whatever　we　term　virtue；　all　activity　and　law　and　right；　has
as　its　foundation　nothing　but　self…love　or　selfishness；　and　is　resolvable　thereinto。（8）　This　principle　is
one…sided；　although　the　“I　myself”　is　an　essential　moment。　What　I　will；　the　noblest；　the　holiest；　is
my　aim；　I　must　take　part　in　it；　I　must　agree　to　it；　I　must　approve　of　it。　With　all　self…sacrifice　there　is
always　conjoined　some　satisfaction；　some　finding　of　self；　this　element　of　self；　subjective　liberty；
must　always　be　present。　If　this　is　taken　in　a　one…sided　sense；　there　may　be　consequences　drawn
from　it　which　overthrow　all　that　is　sacred；　but　it　is　found　in　equal　degree　in　a　morality　as　noble　as
any　possibly　can　be。

d。　ROUSSEAU。

In　connection　with　the　practical　side　of　things　this　particular　must　also　be　noted；　that　when　the
feeling　of　right；　the　concrete　practical　mind；　and；　speaking　generally；　humanity　and　happiness　were
made　the　principle；　this　principle；　universally　conceived；　had　certainly　the　form　of　thought；　but　in
the　case　of　such　concrete　content　derived　from　our　impulse　or　inward　intuition；　even　though　that
content　were　religious；　the　thought　itself　was　not　the　content。　But　now　this　further　phase　appeared；
that　pure　thought　was　set　up　as　the　principle　and　content；　even　if　again　there　was　lacking　to　this
content　the　true　consciousness　of　its　peculiar　form　for　it　was　not　recognised　that　this　principle　was
thought。　We　see　it　emerge　in　the　sphere　of　will；　of　the　practical；　of　the　just；　and　so　apprehended
that　the　inner…most　principle　of　man；　his　unity　with　himself；　is　set　forth　as　fundamental　and　brought
into　consciousness；　so　that　man　in　himself　acquired　an　infinite　strength。　It　is　this　that　Rousseau　from
one　point　of　view　said　about　the　state。　He　investigated　its　absolute　justification；　and　inquired　as　to
its　foundation。　The　right　of　ruling　and　associating；　of　the　relation　of　order；　of　governing　and　being
governed；　he　apprehends　from　his　own　point　of　view；　so　that　it　is　made　to　rest　historically　on
power；　compulsion；　conquest；　private　property；　&c。（9）

Rousseau　makes　free…will　the　principle　of　this　justification；　and　without　reference　to　the　positive
right　of　states　he　made　answer　to　the　above　question　（chap。　iv。　p。　12）；　that　man　has　free…will；
because　“liberty　is　the　distinguishing　feature　of　man。　To　renounce　his　liberty　signifies　to　renounce
his　manhood。　Not　to　be　free　is　therefore　a　renunciation　of　a　man's　rights　as　a　human　being；　and
even　of　his　duties。”　The　slave　has　neither　rights　nor　duties。　Rousseau　therefore　says　（chap。　vi。　p。
21）：　“The　fundamental　task　is　to　find　a　form　of　association　which　will　shield　and　protect　with　the
power　of　the　whole　commonwealth　combined　the　person　and　property　of　every　one　of　its
members；　and　in　which　each　individual；　while　joining　this　association；　obeys　himself　only；　and　thus
remains　as　free　as　before。　The　solution　is　given　by　the　Social　Contract；”　this　is　the　association　of
which　each　is　a　member　by　his　own　will。　These　principles；　thus　abstractly　stated；　we　must　allow　to
be　correct；　yet　the　ambiguity　in　them　soon　begins　to　be　felt。　Man　is　free；　this　is　certainly　the
substantial　nature　of　man；　and　not　only　is　this　liberty　not　relinquished　in　the　state；　but　it　is　actually　in
the　state　that　it　is　first　realised。　The　freedom　of　nature；　the　gift　of　freedom；　is　not　anything　real；　for
the　state　is　the　first　realisation　of　freedom。

The　misunderstanding　as　to　the　universal　will　proceeds　from　this；　that　the　Notion　of　freedom　must
not　be　taken　in　the　sense　of　the　arbitrary　caprice　of　an　individual；　but　in　the　sense　of　the　rational
will；　of　the　will　in　and　for　itself。　The　universal　will　is　not　to　be　looked　on　as　compounded　of
definitively　individual　wills；　so　that　these　remain　absolute；　otherwise　the　saying　would　be　correct：
“Where　the　minority　must　obey　the　majority；　there　is　no　freedom。”　The　universal　will　must　really
be　the　rational　will；　even　if　we　are　not　conscious　of　the　fact；　the　state　is　therefore　not　an
association　which　is　decreed　by　the　arbitrary　will　of　indivi