history of philosophy-第77章

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Such　bodies　as　have　no　inner　unity；　whose　elements　are　connected　merely　by　space；　or　externally；
are　inorganic；　they　have　not　an　entelechy　or　one　monad　which　rules　over　the　rest。（16）　The
continuity　of　space　as　a　merely　external　relation　has　not　the　Notion　in　itself　of　the　likeness　of　these
monads　in　themselves。　Continuity　is　in　fact　to　be　regarded　in　them　as　an　arrangement；　a　similarity　in
themselves。　Leibnitz　therefore　defines　their　movements　as　like　one　another；　as　a　harmony　in
themselves；（17）　but　again；　this　is　as　much　as　saying　that　their　similarity　is　not　in　themselves。　In　fact
continuity　forms　the　essential　determination　of　the　inorganic；　but　it　must　at　the　same　time　not　be
taken　as　something　external　or　as　likeness；　but　as　penetrating　or　penetrated　unity；　which　has
dissolved　individuality　in　itself　like　a　fluid。　But　to　this　point　Leibnitz　does　not　attain；　because　for　him
monads　are　the　absolute　principle；　and　individuality　does　not　annul　itself。

A　higher　degree　of　Being　is　found　in　bodies　with　life　and　soul；　in　which　one　monad　has　dominion
over　the　rest。　The　body　which　is　bound　up　with　the　monad；　of　which　the　one　monad　is　the
entelechy　or　soul；　is　with　this　soul　named　a　living　creature；　an　animal。　One　such　entelechy　rules
over　the　rest；　yet　not　really；　but　formally：　the　limbs　of　this　animal；　however；　are　again　themselves
such　living　things；　each　of　which　has　in　its　turn　its　ruling　entelechy　within　it。（18）　But　ruling　is　here　an
inappropriate　expression。　To　rule　in　this　case　is　not　to　rule　over　others；　for　all　are　independent；　it　is
therefore　only　a　formal　expression。　If　Leibnitz　had　not　helped　himself　out　with　the　word　rule；　and
developed　the　idea　further；　this　dominant　monad　would　have　abrogated　the　others；　and　put　them　in
a　negative　position；　the　implicitness　of　the　other　monads；　or　the　principle　of　the　absolute　Being　of
these　points　or　individuals　would　have　disappeared。　Yet　we　shall　later　on　come　across　this　relation
of　the　individuals　to　one　another。

The　conscious　monad　distinguishes　itself　from　the　naked　（material）　monads　by　the　distinctness　of
the　representation。　But　this　is　of　course　only　an　indefinite　word；　a　formal　distinction；　it　indicates
that　consciousness　is　the　very　thing　that　constitutes　the　distinction　of　the　undistinguished；　and　that
distinction　constitutes　the　determination　of　consciousness。　Leibnitz　more　particularly　defined　the
distinction　of　man　as　that　“he　is　capable　of　the　knowledge　of　necessary　and　eternal　truths；〃　—　or
that　he　conceives　the　universal　on　the　one　hand；　and　on　the　other　what　is　connected　with　it；　the
nature　and　essence　of　self…consciousness　lies　in　the　universality　of　the　Notions。　“These　eternal
truths　rest　on　two　maxims；　the　one　is　that　of　contradiction；　the　other　is　that　of　sufficient　reason。”
The　former　of　these　is　unity　expressed　in　useless　fashion　as　a　maxim；　the　distinction　of　the
undistinguishable；　A=A；　it　is　the　definition　of　thinking；　but　not　a　maxim　which　could　contain　a　truth
as　content；　or　it　does　not　express　the　Notion　of　distinction　as　such。　The　other　important　principle
was；　on　the　other　hand：　What　is　not　distinguished　in　thought　is　not　distinguished　（p。　333）。　“The
maxim　of　the　reason　is　that　everything　has　its　reason；”（19）　—　the　particular　has　the　universal　as　its
essential　reality。　Necessary　truth　must　have　its　reason　in　itself　in　such　a　manner　that　it　is　found　by
analysis；　i。e。　through　that　very　maxim　of　identity。　For　analysis　is　the　very　favourite　plan　of　resolving
into　simple　ideas　and　principles：　a　resolution　which　annihilates　their　relation；　and　which　therefore　in
fact　forms　a　transition　into　the　opposite；　though　it　does　not　have　the　consciousness　of　the　same；
and　on　that　account　also　excludes　the　Notion；　for　every　opposite　it　lays　hold　of　only　in　its　identity。
Sufficient　reason　seems　to　be　a　pleonasm；　but　Leibnitz　understood　by　this　aims；　final　causes
（caus？　finales）；　the　difference　between　which　and　the　causal　nexus　or　the　efficient　cause　he　here
brings　under　discussion。（20）

c。　The　universal　itself；　absolute　essence；　which　with　Leibnitz　is　something　quite　different　from　the
monads；　separates　itself　also　into　two　sides；　namely　universal　Being　and　Being　as　the　unity　of
opposites。

That　universal　is　God；　as　the　cause　of　the　world；　to　the　consciousness　of　whom　the　above
principle　of　sufficient　reason　certainly　forms　the　transition。　The　existence　of　God　is　only　an
inference　from　eternal　truths；　for　these　must　as　the　laws　of　nature　have　a　universal　sufficient　reason
which　determines　itself　as　none　other　than　God。　Eternal　truth　is　therefore　the　consciousness　of　the
universal　and　absolute　in　and　for　itself；　and　this　universal　and　absolute　is　God；　who；　as　one　with
Himself；　the　monad　of　monads；　is　the　absolute　Monad。　Here　we　again　have　the　wearisome　proof
of　His　existence：　He　is　the　fountain　of　eternal　truths　and　Notions；　and　without　Him　no　potentiality
would　have　actuality；　He　has　the　prerogative　of　existing　immediately　in　His　potentiality。（21）　God　is
here　also　the　unity　of　potentiality　and　actuality；　but　in　an　uncomprehending　manner；　what　is
necessary；　but　not　comprehended；　is　transferred　to　Him。　Thus　God　is　at　first　comprehended
chiefly　as　universal；　but　already　in　the　aspect　of　the　relation　of　opposites。

As　regards　this　second　aspect；　the　absolute　relation　of　opposites；　it　occurs　in　the　first　place　in　the
form　of　absolute　opposites　of　thought；　the　good　and　the　evil。　“God　is　the　Author　of　the　world；”
says　Leibnitz；　that　refers　directly　to　evil。　It　is　round　this　relation　that　philosophy　specially　revolves；
but　to　the　unity　of　which　it　did　not　then　attain；　the　evil　in　the　world　was　not　comprehended；
because　no　advance　was　made　beyond　the　fixed　opposition。　The　result　of　Leibnitz's　Théodicée　is
an　optimism　supported　on　the　lame　and　wearisome　thought　that　God；　since　a　world　had　to　be
brought　into　existence；　chose　out　of　infinitely　many　possible　worlds　the　best　possible　—　the　most
perfect；　so　far　as　it　could　be　perfect；　considering　the　finite　element　which　it　was　to　contain。（22）
This　may　very　well　be　said　in　a　general　way；　but　this　perfection　is　no　determined　thought；　but　a
loose　popular　expression；　a　sort　of　babble　respecting　an　imaginary　or　fanciful　potentiality；　Voltaire
made　merry　over　it。　Nor　is　the　nature　of　the　finite　therein　defined。　Because　the　world；　it　is　said；　has
to　be　the　epitome　of　finite　Beings；　evil　could　not　be　separated　from　it；　since　evil　is　negation；
finitude。（23）　Reality　and　negation　remain　standing　in　opposition　to　one　another　exactly　in　the　same
way　as　before。　That　is　the　principal　conception　in　the　Théodicée。　But　something　very　like　this　can
be　said　in　every　day　life。　If　I　have　some　goods　brought　to　me　in　the　market　at　some　town；　and　say
that　they　are　certainly　not　perfect；　but　the　best　that　are　to　be　got；　this　is　quite　a　good　reason　why　I
should　content　myself　with　them。　But　comprehension　is　a　very　different　thing　from　this。　Leibnitz
says　nothing　further　than　that　the　world　is　good；　but　there　is　also　evil　in　it；　the　matter　remains　just
the　same　as　it　was　before。　“Because　it　had　to　be　finite”　is　then　a　mere　arbitrary　choice　on　the　part
of　God。　The　next　question　would　be：　Why　and　how　is　there　finitude　in　the　Absolute　and　His
decrees？　And　only　then　should　there　be　deduced　from　the　determination　of　finitude　the　evil　which
no　doubt　exists　therein。

It　is　true　that　Leibnitz　has　a　reply　to　the　above　question：　〃God　does　not　will　what　is　evil；　evil　comes
only　indirectly　into　the　results”　（blind）；　“because　oftentimes　the　greater　good　could　not　be
achieved　if　evils　were　not　present。　Therefore　they　are　means　to　a　good　end。〃　But　why　does　not
God　employ　other　means？　They　are　always　external；　not　in　and　for　themselves。　“A　moral　evil　may
not　be　regarded　as　a　means；　nor　must　we；　as　the　apostle　says；　do　evil　that　good　may　come；　yet　it
has　often　the　relation　of　a　conditio　sine　qua　non　of　the　good。　Evil　is　in　God　only　the　object　of　a
permissive　will　（voluntatis　permissiv？）；”　but　everything　that　is　wrong　would　be　such。　“God　has
therefore　among　the　objects　of　His　will　the　best　possible　as　the　ultimate　object；　but　the　good　as　a
matter　of　choice　（qualemcunque）