history of philosophy-第76章

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philosophy。　But　as　it　is　impossible　to　understand　how　material　particles　or　immaterial　qualities　can
pass　from　one　substance　into　another；　such　a　conception　as　this　must　be　abandoned。”　If　we
accept　the　reality　of　the　many；　there　can　be　no　transition　at　all；　each　is　an　ultimate　and　absolutely
independent　entity。　“The　system　of　assistance；”　according　to　Descartes；　“is　something　quite
superfluous；　a　Deus　ex　machina；　because　continual　miracles　in　the　things　of　nature　are　assumed。”
If　we；　like　Descartes；　assume　independent　substances；　no　causal　nexus　is　conceivable；　for　this
presupposes　an　influence；　a　bearing　of　the　one　upon　the　other；　and　in　this　way　the　other　is　not　a
substance。　“Therefore　there　remains　only　harmony；　a　unity　which　is　in　itself　or　implicit。　The　monad
is　therefore　simply　shut　up　in　itself；　and　cannot　be　determined　by　another；　this　other　cannot　be　set
into　it。　It　can　neither　get　outside　itself；　nor　can　others　get　inside　it。”（8）　That　is　also　Spinoza's　way　of
regarding　matters：　each　attribute　entirely　represents　the　essence　of　God　for　itself；　extension　and
thought　have　no　influence　on　each　other。

In　the　third　place；　“however；　these　monads　must　at　the　same　time　have　certain　qualities　or
determinations　in　themselves；　inner　actions；　through　which　they　are　distinguished　from　others。
There　cannot　be　two　things　alike；　for　otherwise　they　would　not　be　two；　they　would　not　be　different
but　one　and　the　same。”（9）　Here　then　Leibnitz's　axiom　of　the　undistinguishable　comes　into　words。
What　is　not　in　itself　distinguished　is　not　distinguished。　This　may　be　taken　in　a　trivial　sense；　as　that
there　are　not　two　individuals　which　are　alike。　To　such　sensuous　things　the　maxim　has　no
application；　it　is　prima　facie　indifferent　whether　there　are　things　which　are　alike　or　not；　there　may
also　be　always　a　difference　of　space。　This　is　the　superficial　sense；　which　does　not　concern　us。　The
more　intimate　sense　is；　however；　that　each　thing　is　in　itself　something　determined；　distinguishing
itself　from　others　implicitly　or　in　itself。　Whether　two　things　are　like　or　unlike　is　only　a　comparison
which　we　make；　which　falls　within　our　ken。　But　what　we　have　further　to　consider　is　the　determined
difference　in　themselves。　The　difference　must　be　a　difference　in　themselves；　not　for　our
comparison；　for　the　subject　must　have　the　difference　as　its　own　peculiar　characteristic　or
determination；　i。e。；　the　determination　must　be　immanent　in　the　individual。　Not　only　do　we
distinguish　the　animal　by　its　claws；　but　it　distinguishes　itself　essentially　thereby；　it　defends　itself；　it
preserves　itself。　If　two　things　are　different　only　in　being　two；　then　each　of　them　is　one；　but　the　fact
of　their　being　two　does　not　constitute　a　distinction　between　them；　the　determined　difference　in　itself
is　the　principal　point。

Fourthly：　“The　determinateness　and　the　variation　thereby　established　is；　however；　an　inward
implicit　principle；　it　is　a　multiplicity　of　modification；　of　relations　to　surrounding　existences；　but　a
multiplicity　which　remains　locked　up　in　simplicity。　Determinateness　and　variation　such　as　this；
which　remains　and　goes　on　in　the　existence　itself；　is　a　perception；”　and　therefore　Leibnitz　says　all
monads　perceive　or　represent　（for　we　may　translate　perceptio　by　representation　＇Vorstellung＇）。　In
other　words；　they　are　in　themselves　universal；　for　universality　is　just　simplicity　in　multiplicity；　and
therefore　a　simplicity　which　is　at　the　same　time　change　and　motion　of　multiplicity。　This　is　a　very
important　determination；　in　substance　itself　there　is　negativity；　determinateness；　without　its
simplicity　and　its　implicitude　being　given　up。　Further；　in　it　there　is　this　idealism；　that　the　simple　is
something　in　itself　distinguished；　and　in　spite　of　its　variation；　that　it　yet　remains　one；　and　continues
in　its　simplicity。　An　instance　of　this　is　found　in　“I；”　my　spirit。　I　have　many　conceptions；　a　wealth
of　thought　is　in　me；　and　yet　I　remain　one；　notwithstanding　this　variety　of　state。　This　identity　may　be
found　in　the　fact　that　what　is　different　is　at　the　same　time　abrogated；　and　is　determined　as　one；　the
monads　are　therefore　distinguished　by　modifications　in　themselves；　but　not　by　external
determinations。　These　determinations　contained　in　the　monads　exist　in　them　in　ideal　fashion；　this
ideality　in　the　monad　is　in　itself　a　whole；　so　that　these　differences　are　only　representations　and
ideas。　This　absolute　difference　what　is　termed　the　Notion；　what　falls　asunder　in　the　mere
representation　is　held　together。　This　is　what　possesses　interest　in　Leibnitz's　philosophy。　Such
ideality　in　the　same　way　pertains　to　the　material；　which　is　also　a　multiplicity　of　monads；　therefore
the　system　of　Leibnitz　is　an　intellectual　system；　in　accordance　with　which　all　that　is　material　has
powers　of　representation　and　perception。　As　thus　representing；　the　monad；　says　Leibnitz；
possesses　activity；　for　activity　is　to　be　different；　and　yet　to　be　one；　and　this　is　the　only　true
difference。　The　monad　not　only　represents；　it　also　changes；　but　in　doing　so；　it　yet　remains　in　itself
absolutely　what　it　is。　This　variation　is　based　on　activity。　“The　activity　of　the　inner　principle；　by
means　of　which　it　passes　from　one　perception　to　another；　is　desire　（appetitus）。”　Variation　in
representation　is　desire；　and　that　constitutes　the　spontaneity　of　the　monad；　all　is　now　complete　in
itself；　and　the　category　of　influence　falls　away。　Indeed；　this　intellectuality　of　all　things　is　a　great
thought　on　the　part　of　Leibnitz：　“All　multiplicity　is　included　in　unity；”（10）　determination　is　not　a
difference　in　respect　of　something　else；　but　reflected　into　itself；　and　maintaining　itself。　This　is　one
aspect　of　things；　but　the　matter　is　not　therein　complete；　it　is　equally　the　case　that　it　is　different　in
respect　of　other　things。

Fifthly：　These　representations　and　ideas　are　not　necessarily　conscious　representations　and　ideas；
any　more　than　all　monads　as　forming　representations　are　conscious。　It　is　true　that　consciousness　is
itself　perception；　but　a　higher　grade　of　the　same；　perceptions　of　consciousness　Leibnitz　calls
apperceptions。　The　difference　between　the　merely　representing　and　the　self…conscious　monads
Leibnitz　makes　one　of　degrees　of　clearness。　The　expression　representation　has；　however；　certainly
something　awkward　about　it；　since　we　are　accustomed　to　associate　it　only　with　consciousness；
and　with　consciousness　as　such；　but　Leibnitz　admits　also　of　unconscious　representation。　When　he
then　adduces　examples　of　unconscious　representations；　he　appeals　to　the　condition　of　a　swoon　or
of　sleep；　in　which　we　are　mere　monads：　and　that　representations　without　consciousness　are
present　in　such　states　he　shows　from　the　fact　of　our　having　perceptions　immediately　after
awakening　out　of　sleep；　which　shows　that　others　must　have　been　there；　for　one　perception　arises
only　out　of　others。（11）　That　is　a　trivial　and　empirical　demonstration。

Sixthly：　These　monads　constitute　the　principle　that　exists。　Matter　is　nothing　else　than　their
passive　capability。　This　passive　capability　it　is　which　constitutes　the　obscurity　of　the
representations；　or　a　confusion　which　never　arrives　at　distinction；　or　desire；　or　activity。（12）　That　is
a　correct　definition　of　the　conception；　it　is　Being；　matter；　in　accordance　with　the　moment　of
simplicity。　This　is　implicitly　activity；　“mere　implicitness　without　actualization”　would　therefore　be　a
better　expression。　The　transition　from　obscurity　to　distinctness　Leibnitz　exemplifies　by　the　state　of
swooning。

Seventhly：　Bodies　as　bodies　are　aggregates　of　monads：　they　are　mere　heaps　which　cannot　be
termed　substances；　any　more　than　a　flock　of　sheep　can　bear　this　name。（13）　The　continuity　of　the
same　is　an　arrangement　or　extension；　but　space　is　nothing　in　itself；（14）　it　is　only　in　another；　or　a
unity　which　our　understanding　gives　to　that　aggregate。（15）

b。　Leibnitz　goes　on　to　determine　and　distinguish　more　clearly　as　the　principal　moments；　inorganic；
organic；　and　conscious　monads；　and　he　does　it　in　the　following　way。

Such　bodies　as　have　no　inner　unity；　whose　elements　are　connected　merely　by　space；　or　externally；
are　inorganic；　they　have　not　an　entelechy　o