history of philosophy-第69章

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objective　form　for　consciousness　or　that　consciousness　experiences　it；　it　sees　it　as　an　objective。
Experience　thus　signifies　immediate　knowledge；　perception；　i。e。；　I　myself　must　have　and　be
something；　and　the　consciousness　of　what　I　have　and　am　is　experience。　Now　there　is　no　question
as　to　this；　that　whatever　we　know；　of　whatever　kind　it　may　be；　must　be　experienced；　that　rests　in
the　conception　of　the　thing。　It　is　absurd　to　say　that　one　knows　anything　which　is　not　in　experience。
I　undoubtedly　know　men；　for　instance；　from　experience；　without　requiring　to　have　seen　them　all；
for　I　have；　as　man；　activity　and　will；　a　consciousness　respecting　what　I　am　and　what　others　are。
The　rational　exists；　i。e。；　it　is　as　an　existent　for　consciousness；　or　this　last　experiences　it；　it　must　be
seen　and　heard；　it　must　be　there　or　have　been　there　as　a　phenomenon　in　the　world。　This
connection　of　universal　with　objective　is　however　in　the　second　place　not　the　only　form；　that　of　the
implicit　is　likewise　absolute　and　essential　…　that　is；　the　apprehension　of　what　is　experienced　or　the
abrogation　of　this　apparent　other…being　and　the　knowledge　of　the　necessity　of　the　thing　through
itself。　It　is　now　quite　a　matter　of　indifference　whether　anything　is　accepted　as　something
experienced；　as　a　succession　of　empirical　ideas；　if　one　may　so　say；　or　conceptions；　or　whether　the
succession　is　a　succession　of　thoughts；　i。e。；　implicitly　existent。

Locke　treats　of　the　various　kinds　of　these　ideas　imperfectly　and　empirically　merely。

According　to　Locke　simple　ideas　arise；　partly　from　outward；　and　partly　from　inward　experience。
For　experiences；　he　says；　are　in　the　first　place　sensations；　the　other　side　is　reflection；　the　inward
determinations　of　consciousness。（5）　From　sensation；　from　the　organs　of　sight　for　instance；　the
conceptions　of　colour；　light；　etc。；　arise；　there　further　arises　from　outward　experience　the　idea　of
impenetrability；　of　figure；　rest；　motion　and　such　like。　From　reflections　come　the　ideas　of　faith；
doubt；　judgment；　reasoning；　thinking；　willing；　etc。；　from　both　combined；　pleasure；　pain；　etc。　This　is
a　very　commonplace　account　of　the　matter。

After　Locke　has　pre…supposed　experience；　he　goes　on　to　say　that　it　is　the　understanding　which
now　discovers　and　desires　the　universal　…　the　complex　ideas。　The　Bishop　of　Worcester　made　the
objection　that　“If　the　idea　of　substance　be　grounded　upon　plain　and　evident　reason；　then　we　must
allow　an　idea　of　substance　which　comes　not　in　by　sensation　or　reflection。”　Locke　replies：
“General　ideas　come　not　into　the　mind　by　sensation　or　reflection；　but　are　the　creatures　or
inventions　of　the　understanding。　The　mind　makes　them　from　ideas　which　it　has　got　by　sensation
and　reflection。”　The　work　of　the　mind　now　consists　in　bringing　forth　from　several　simple　so…called
ideas　a　number　of　new　ones；　by　means　of　its　working　upon　this　material　through　comparing；
distinguishing　and　contrasting　it；　and　finally　through　separation　or　abstraction；　whereby　the
universal　conceptions；　such　as　space；　time；　existence；　unity　and　diversity；　capacity；　cause　and
effect；　freedom；　necessity；　take　their　rise。　“The　mind　in　respect　of　its　simple　ideas　is　wholly
passive；　and　receives　them　all　from　the　existence　and　operation　of　things；　such　as　sensation　or
reflection　offers　them；　without　being　able　to　make　any　one　idea。”　But　“the　mind　often　exercises
an　active　power　in　making　these　several　combinations。　For　it　being　once　furnished　with　simple
ideas　it　can　put　them　together　in　several　combinations。”　According　to　Locke　therefore　thought
itself　is　not　the　essence　of　the　soul；　but　one　of　its　powers　and　manifestations。　He　maintains　thought
to　be　existent　in　consciousness　as　conscious　thought；　and　thus　brings　it　forward　as　a　fact　in　his
experience；　that　we　do　not　always　think。　Experience　demonstrates　dreamless　sleep　when　the　sleep
is　profound。　Locke　quotes　the　example　of　a　man　who　remembered　no　dream　until　he　had　reached
his　twenty…fifth　year。　It　is　as　in　the　Xenien；　…　（6）

　　　　　Oft　schon　war　ich；　und　hab'　wirklich　an　gar　nichts　gedacht。

That　is　to　say；　my　object　is　not　a　thought。　But　sensuous　perception　and　recollection　are　thought；
and　thought　is　truth。（7）　Locke；　however；　places　the　reality　of　the　understanding　only　in　the　formal
activity　of　constituting　new　determinations　from　the　simple　conceptions　received　by　means　of
perception；　through　their　comparison　and　the　combination　of　several　into　one；　it　is　the
apprehension　of　the　abstract　sensations　which　are　contained　in　the　objects。　Locke　likewise
distinguishes　（Bk。　11。　chap。　xi。　§　15…17）　between　pure　and　mixed　modes。　Pure　modes　are　simple
determinations　such　as　power；　number；　infinitude；　in　such　expressions　as　causality　we　reach；　on
the　other　hand；　a　mixed　mode。

Locke　now　explains　in　detail　the　manner　in　which　the　mind；　from　the　simple　ideas　of　experience；
reaches　more　complex　ideas；　but　this　derivation　of　general　determinations　from　concrete
perception　is　most　unmeaning；　trivial；　tiresome　and　diffuse；　it　is　entirely　formal；　an　empty　tautology。
For　instance　we　form　the　general　conception　of　space　from　the　perception　of　the　distance　of
bodies　by　means　of　sight　and　feeling。（8）　Or　in　other　words；　we　perceive　a　definite　space；　abstract
from　it；　and　then　we　have　the　conception　of　space　generally；　the　perception　of　distances　gives　us
conceptions　of　space。　This　however　is　no　deduction；　but　only　a　setting　aside　of　other
determinations；　since　distance　itself　is　really　space；　mind　thus　determines　space　from　space。
Similarly　we　reach　the　notion　of　time　through　the　unbroken　succession　of　conceptions　during　our
waking　moments；（9）　i。e；。　from　determinate　time　we　perceive　time　in　general。　Conceptions　follow
one　another　in　a　continual　succession；　if　we　set　aside　the　particular　element　that　is　present　we
thereby　receive　the　conception　of　time。　Substance　（which　Locke　does　not　accept　in　so　lofty　a
sense　as　Spinoza）；　a　complex　idea；　hence　arises　from　the　fact　that　we　often　perceive　simple　ideas
such　as　blue；　heavy；　etc。；　in　association　with　one　another。　This　association　we　represent　to
ourselves　as　something　which　so　to　speak　supports　these　simple　ideas；　or　in　which　they　exist。（10）
Locke　likewise　deduces　the　general　conception　of　power。（11）　The　determinations　of　freedom　and
necessity；　cause　and　effect；　are　then　derived　in　a　similar　way。　“In　the　notice　that　our　senses　take
of　the　constant　vicissitude　of　things；　we　cannot　but　observe；　that　several　particulars；　both　qualities
and　substance；　begin　to　exist；　and　that　they　receive　this　their　existence　from　the　due　application
and　operation　of　some　other　being。　From　this　observation　we　get　our　ideas　of　cause　and　effect；”
for　instance　when　wax　is　melted　by　the　fire。（12）　Locke　goes　on　to　say：　“Every　one；　I　think；　finds　in
himself　a　power　to　begin　or　forbear；　continue　or　put　an　end　to　several　actions　in　himself。　From　the
consideration　of　the　extent　of　this　power　of　the　mind　over　the　actions　of　the　man；　which　every　one
finds　in　himself；　arise　the　ideas　of　liberty　and　necessity。”（13）

We　may　say　that　nothing　can　be　more　superficial　than　this　derivation　of　ideas。　The　matter　itself；　the
essence；　is　not　touched　upon　at　all。　A　determination　is　brought　into　notice　which　is　contained　in　a
concrete　relationship；　hence　the　understanding　on　the　one　hand　abstracts　and　on　the　other
establishes　conclusions。　The　basis　of　this　philosophy　is　merely　to　be　found　in　the　transference　of
the　determinate　to　the　form　of　universality；　but　it　was　just　this　fundamental　essence　that　we　had　to
explain。　As　to　this　Locke　confesses　of　space；　for　example；　that　he　does　not　know　what　it　really
is。（14）　This　so…called　analysis　by　Locke　of　complex　conceptions；　and　his　so…called　explanation　of
the　same；　has；　on　account　of　its　uncommon　clearness　and　lucidity　of　expression；　found　universal
acceptance。　For　what　can　be　clearer　than　to　say　that　we　have　the　notion　of　time　because　we
perceive　time；　if　we　do　not　actually　see　it；　and　that　we　conceive　of　space　because　we　see　it？　The
French　have　accepted　this　most　readily　and　they　have　carried　it　further　still；　their　Idéologie
contains　nothing　more　nor　less。

When　Locke　starts　by　saying　that　ev