history of philosophy-第68章

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asks　how　we　arrive　at　conceptions；　and　thus　he　apparently　has　before　him　the　same　subject　of
investigation　as　has　Locke。　But　firstly；　this　psychological　element　in　Malebranche　is　merely　the
later　development；　and　then　to　him　the　universal　or　God　is　plainly　first；　while　Locke　commences　at
once　with　individual　perceptions；　andonly　from　them　does　he　proceed　to　Notions；　to　God。　The
universal　to　Locke　is；　therefore；　merely　a　later　result；　the　work　of　our　minds；　it　is　simply　something
pertaining　to　thought；　as　subjective。　Every　man　undoubtedly　knows　that　when　his　consciousness
develops　empirically；　he　commences　from　feelings；　from　quite　concrete　conditions；　and　that　it　is
only　later　on　that　general　conceptions　come　in；　which　are　connected　with　the　concrete　of　sensation
by　being　contained　therein。　Space；　for　example；　comes　to　consciousness　later　than　the　spacial；　the
species　later　than　the　individual；　and　it　is　only　through　the　activity　of　my　consciousness　that　the
universal　is　separated　from　the　particular　of　conception；　feeling；　etc。　Feeling　undoubtedly　comes
lowest；　it　is　the　animal　mode　of　spirit；　but　in　its　capacity　as　thinking；　spirit　endeavours　to　transform
feeling　into　its　own　form。　Thus　the　course　adopted　by　Locke　is　quite　a　correct　one；　but　all　dialectic
considerations　are　utterly　and　entirely　set　aside；　since　the　universal　is　merely　analyzed　from　the
empirical　concrete。　And　in　this　matter　Kant　reproaches　Locke　with　reason；　the　individual　is　not　the
source　of　universal　conceptions；　but　the　understanding。

As　to　Locke's　further　reflections；　they　are　very　simple。　Locke　considers　how　the　understanding　is
only　consciousness；　and　in　being　so　is　something　in　consciousness；　and　he　only　recognizes　the
implicit　in　as　far　as　it　is　in　the　same。

a。　Locke's　philosophy　is　more　especially　directed　against　Descartes；　who；　like　Plato；　had　spoken
of　innate　ideas。　Locke　likewise　makes　special　examination　of　the　“inborn　impressions　（notiones
communes　in　foro　interiori　descript？）”　which　Lord　Herbert　assumes　in　his　work　De　veritate。
In　the　first　book　of　his　work　Locke　combats　the　so…called　innate　ideas；　theoretic　as　well　as
practical；　i。e。；　the　universal；　absolutely　existent　ideas　which　at　the　same　time　are　represented　as
pertaining　to　mind　in　a　natural　way。　Locke　said　that　we　arrive　first　at　that　which　we　call　idea。　By
this　he　understands　not　the　essential　determinations　of　man；　but　conceptions　which　we　have　and
which　are　present　and　exist　in　consciousness　as　such：　in　the　same　way　we　all　have　arms　and　legs
as　parts　of　our　bodies；　and　the　desire　to　eat　exists　in　everyone。　In　Locke　we　thus　have　the
conception　of　the　soul　as　of　a　contentless　tabula　rasa　which　is　by…and…by　filled　with　what　we　call
experience。（2）　The　expression　“innate　principles”　was　at　that　time　common；　and　these　innate
principles　have　sometimes　been　foolishly　spoken　of。　But　their　true　signification　is　that　they　are
implicit；　that　they　are　essential　moments　in　the　nature　of　thought；　qualities　of　a　germ；　which　do　not
yet　exist：　only　in　relation　to　this　last　there　is　an　element　of　truth　in　Locke's　conclusions。　As　diverse
conceptions　essentially　determined　they　are　only　legitimatized　by　its　being　shown　that　they　are
implied　in　the　essential　nature　of　thought；　but　as　propositions　which　hold　good　as　axioms；　and
conceptions　which　are　immediately　accepted　as　laid　down　in　definitions；　they　undoubtedly　possess
the　form　of　that　which　is　present　and　inborn。　As　they　are　regarded　they　are　bound　to　have　value　in
and　for　themselves；　but　this　is　a　mere　assertion。　From　the　other　point　of　view　the　question　of
whence　they　come　is　a　futile　one。　Mind　is　undoubtedly　determined　in　itself；　for　it　is　the　explicitly
existent　Notion；　its　development　signifies　the　coming　to　consciousness。　But　the　determinations
which　it　brings　forth　from　itself　cannot　be　called　innate；　for　this　development　must　be　occasioned
by　an　external；　and　only　on　that　does　the　activity　of　mind　react；　in　order　that　it　may　for　the　first
time　become　conscious　of　its　reality。

The　grounds　on　which　Locke　refutes　innate　ideas　are　empirical。　“There　is　nothing　more　commonly
taken　for　granted　than　that　there　are　certain　principles；　both　speculative　and　practical；　universally
agreed　upon　by　all　mankind：　which　therefore；　they　argue；　must　needs　be　constant　impressions
which　the　souls　of　men　receive　in　their　first　Beings。”　But　this　universal　consent　is　not　to　be　found。
We　may　instance　the　proposition；　“Whatsoever　is；　is；　and　It　is　impossible　for　the　same　thing　to　be
and　not　to　be；　which　of　all　others　I　think　have　the　most　allowed　title　to　innate。”　But　this
proposition　does　not　hold　good　for　the　Notion；　there　is　nothing　either　in　heaven　or　earth　which
does　not　contain　Being　and　non…Being。　Many　men；　“All　children　and　idiots；”　says　Locke；　“have
not　the　least　apprehension　of　these　propositions。”　“No　proposition　can　be　said　to　be　in　the　mind
which　it　never　yet　knew；　which　it　was　never　yet　conscious　of。　。　。　。　'Tis　usually　answered；　That　all
men　know　and　assent　to　them”　（the　propositions）　“when　they　come　to　the　use　of　reason。　。　。　。　If　it
be　meant　that　the　use　of　reason　assists　us　in　the　knowledge　of　these　maxims；　it　would　prove　them
not　to　be　innate。”　Reason　is　said　to　be　the　deriving　from　principles　already　known　unknown
truths。　How　then　should　the　application　of　reason　be　required　to　discover　supposed　innate
principles？　This　is　a　weak　objection；　for　it　assumes　that　by　innate　ideas　we　understand　those　which
man　possesses　in　consciousness　as　immediately　present。　But　development；　in　consciousness　is
something　altogether　different　from　any　inherent　determination　of　reason；　and　therefore　the
expression　innate　idea　is　undoubtedly　quite　wrong。　Innate　principles　must　be　found　“clearest　and
most　perspicuous　nearest　the　fountain；　in　children　and　illiterate　people；　who　have　received　least
impression　from　foreign　opinion。”　Locke　gives　further　reasons　of　a　similar　nature；　more　especially
employing　those　which　are　of　a　practical　kind　…　the　diversity　in　moral　judgments；　the　case　of　those
who　are　utterly　wicked　and　depraved；　devoid　of　sense　of　right　or　conscience。（3）

b。　In　the　second　book　Locke　goes　on　to　the　next　stage；　to　the　origin　of　ideas；　and　seeks　to
demonstrate　this　process　from　experience　…　this　is　the　main　object　of　his　efforts。　The　reason　that
the　positive　point　of　view　which　he　opposes　to　any　derivation　from　within；　is　so　false；　is　that　he
derives　his　conceptions　only　from　outside　and　thus　maintains　Being　for…another；　while　he　quite
neglects　the　implicit。　He　says：　“Every　man　being　conscious　to　himself；　that　he　thinks；　and　that
which　his　mind　is　applied　about；　while　thinking；　being　the　ideas　that　are　there；　'tis　past　doubt；　that
men　have　in　their　minds　several　ideas；　such　as　those　expressed　in　the　words；　whiteness；　hardness；
sweetness；　thinking；　motion；　man；　elephant；　army；　drunkenness；　and　others。”　Idea　here　signifies
both　the　ordinary　conception　and　thought；　we　understand　something　quite　different　by　the　word
idea。　“It　is　in　the　first　place　then　to　be　inquired；　how　he　comes　by　them”　（these　ideas）？　Innate
ideas　have　already　been　refuted。　“Let　us　then　suppose　the　mind　to　be；　as　we　say；　white　paper；
void　of　all　characters；　without　any　ideas；　how　comes　it　to　be　furnished？　。　。　。　To　this　I　answer　in　a
word；　from　Experience：　in　that　all　our　knowledge　is　founded。”（4）

As　to　the　question　in　point　we　must　in　the　first　place　say　that　it　is　true　that　man　commences　with
experience　if　he　desires　to　arrive　at　thought。　Everything　is　experienced；　not　merely　what　is
sensuous；　but　also　what　excites　and　stimulates　my　mind。　Consciousness　thus　undoubtedly　obtains
all　conceptions　and　Notions　from　experience　and　in　experience；　the　only　question　is　what　we
understand　by　experience。　In　a　usual　way　when　this　is　spoken　of　the　idea　of　nothing　particular　is
conveyed；　we　speak　of　it　as　of　something　quite　well　known。　But　experience　is　nothing　more　than
the　form　of　objectivity；　to　say　that　it　is　something　which　is　in　consciousness　means　that　it　has
objective　form　for　consciousness　or　that　consciousness　experiences　it；　it　sees　it　as　an　objective。
Experience　thus　signifies　immediate