history of philosophy-第67章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


Philosophy　was　even　applied　to　the　manner　in　which　reflections　on　particular　objects　are　drawn
from　formal　logic　and　external　facts。






1。　Buhle：　Gesch。　d。　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　III。　Sec。　2；　pp。　430；　431。　
2。　Malebranche：　De　la　recherche　de　la　vérité　（Paris；　1736）；　T。　II。　L。　III。　Part　I。　chap。　i。　pp。　4…6；
T。　I。　L。　I。　chap。　i。　pp。　6；　7；　P。　II　chap。　ii。　pp。　66…68；　chap。　iii。　p。　72；　chap。　iv。　p。　84；　chap。　v。　p。
92；　chap。　vi。　pp。　95；　96。
3。　Malebranche：　De　la　recherche　de　la　vérité；　T。　II。　L。　III。　Part　II。　chap。　vi。　pp。　100…102。
4。　Malebranche：　De　la　recherche　de　la　vérité；　T。　II。　L。　III。　P。　II。　chap。　vi。　pp。　103…107；
109…111。




Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　I。　—　The　Metaphysics　of　the　Understanding
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B　1。　LOCKE。

When　experience　means　that　the　Notion　has　objective　actuality　for　consciousness；　it　is　indeed　a
necessary　element　in　the　totality；　but　as　this　reflection　appears　in　Locke；　signifying　as　it　does　that
we　obtain　truth　by　abstraction　from　experience　and　sensuous　perception；　it　is　utterly　false；　since；
instead　of　being　a　moment；　it　is　made　the　essence　of　the　truth。　It　is　no　doubt　true　that　against　the
hypothesis　of　the　inward　immediacy　of　the　Idea；　and　against　the　method　of　setting　it　forth　in
definitions　and　axioms；　as　also　against　absolute　substance；　the　demand　that　ideas　should　be
represented　as　results；　and　the　claims　of　individuality　and　self…consciousness；　assert　their　rights　to
recognition。　In　the　philosophy　of　Locke　and　Leibnitz；　however；　these　necessities　make　themselves
known　in　an　imperfect　manner　only；　the　one　fact　which　is　common　to　both　philosophers　is　that
they；　in　opposition　to　Spinoza　and　Malebranche；　take　for　their　principle　the　particular；　finite
determinateness　and　the　individual。　According　to　Spinoza　and　Malebranche　substance　or　the
universal　is　the　true；　the　sole　existent；　the　eternal；　that　which　is　in　and　for　itself；　without　origin；　and
of　which　particular　things　are　only　modifications　which　are　conceived　through　substance。　But
hereby　Spinoza　has　done　an　injury　to　this　negative；　he　hence　arrived　at　no　immanent　determination；
for　all　that　is　determined　and　individual　is　merely　annihilated　in　his　system。　Now；　on　the　contrary；
the　general　inclination　of　consciousness　is　to　maintain　the　difference；　partly　in　order　to；　mark　itself
out　as　implicitly　free　in　opposition　to　its　object　…　Being；　nature；　and　God；　and　partly　in　order　to
recognize　the　unity　in　this　opposition；　and　from　the　opposition　itself　to　make　the　unity　emerge。　But
those　who　were　the　instruments　of　this　tendency　comprehended　themselves　but　little；　they　had　still
no　clear　consciousness　of　their　task；　nor　of　the　manner　in　which　their　claims　could　be　satisfied。
With　Locke；　this　principle　makes　its　first　entrance　into　Philosophy　in　a　manner　so　completely　at
variance　with　the　inflexible　undifferentiated　identity　of　the　substance　of　Spinoza；　that　the　sensuous
and　limited；　the　immediate　present　and　existent；　is　the　main　and　fundamental　matter。　Locke　does
not　get　beyond　the　ordinary　point　of　view　of　consciousness；　viz。　that　objects　outside　of　us　are　the
real　and　the　true。　The　finite　is　thus　not　grasped　by　Locke　as　absolute　negativity；　i。e。；　in　its
infinitude；　this　we　shall　not　find　until　we　come　to　deal　in　the　third　place　with　Leibnitz。　It　is　in　a
higher　sense　that　Leibnitz　asserts　individuality；　the　differentiated；　to　be　self…existent　and　indeed
objectless；　to　be　true　Being。　That　is　to　say；　it　is　not　according　to　him　finite；　but　is　yet　distinguished；
thus；　each　monad　is　itself　the　totality。　Leibnitz　and　Locke　hence　likewise　stand　in　a　position　of
mutual　independence　and　antagonism。

John　Locke　was　born　in　1632；　at　Wrington；　in　England。　He　studied　for　himself　the　Cartesian
philosophy　at　Oxford；　setting　aside　the　scholastic　philosophy　which　was　still　in　vogue。　He　devoted
himself　to　the　study　of　medicine；　which；　however；　on　account　of　his　delicate　health；　he　never　really
practised。　In　1664　he　went　with　an　English　ambassador　for　a　year　to　Berlin。　After　his　return　to
England；　he　became　acquainted　with　the　intellectual　Earl　of　Shaftesbury　of　that　time；　who　availed
himself　of　his　medical　advice；　and　in　whose　house　he　lived　without　requiring　to　give　himself　up　to
practice。　When　Lord　Shaftesbury　became　Lord　Chancellor　of　England；　Locke　received　an　office
from　him；　which；　however；　he　soon　lost　by　a　change　of　ministry。　Owing　to　his　dread　of　falling　a
prey　to　consumption；　he　betook　himself　in　1675　to　Montpellier　for　the　benefit　of　his　health。　When
his　patron　came　into　power　again　he　once　more　recovered　the　place　he　had　lost；　only　to　be　again
deposed　on　a　fresh　overthrow　of　this　minister；　and　he　was　now　compelled　to　flee　from　England。
“The　act　by　means　of　which　Locke　was　driven　from　Oxford”　（what　post　he　held　there　we　are　not
told）　“was　not　an　enactment　of　the　University；　but　of　James　II。；　by　whose　express　command；　and
by　the　peremptory　authority　of　a　written　warrant；　the　expulsion　was　carried　out。　From　the
correspondence　that　took　place；　it　is　evident　that　the　college　submitted　itself　against　its　will　to　a
measure　which　it　could　not　resist　without　compromising　the　peace　and　quiet　of　its　members。”
Locke　went　to　Holland；　which　was　at　that　time　the　land　wherein　all　who　were　obliged　to　effect
their　escape　from　any　oppression；　whether　political　or　religious；　found　protection；　and　in　which　the
most　famous　and　liberal…minded　men　were　to　be　met　with。　The　Court　party　persecuted　him　even
here；　and　by　royal　warrant　he　was　ordered　to　be　taken　prisoner　and　sent　to　England；　consequently
he　had　to　remain　hidden　with　his　friends。　When　William　of　Orange　ascended　the　English　throne；
after　the　Revolution　of　1688；　Locke　returned　with　him　to　England。　He　was　there　made
Commissioner　of　Trade　and　Plantation；　gave　to　the　world　his　famous　treatise　on　the　Human
Understanding；　and　finally；　having　withdrawn　from　public　office　or　account　of　the　delicacy　of　his
health；　he　spent　his　remaining　years　in　the　country　houses　of　English　nobles；　he　died　on　the　28th
day　of　October；　1704；　in　the　seventy…third　year　of　his　life。（1）

The　philosophy　of　Locke　is　much　esteemed；　it　is　still；　for　the　most　part；　the　philosophy　of　the
English　and　the　French；　and　likewise　in　a　certain　sense　of　the　Germans。　To　put　it　in　a　few　words；　it
asserts　on　the　one　hand　that　truth　and　knowledge　rest　upon　experience　and　observation；　and　on
the　other　the　analysis　of　and　abstraction　from　general　determinations　is　prescribed　as　the　method
of　knowledge；　it　is；　so　to　speak；　a　metaphysical　empiricism；　and　this　is　the　ordinary　method
adopted　in　the　sciences。　In　respect　of　method；　Locke　thus　employs　an　exactly　opposite　system　to
that　of　Spinoza。　In　the　methods　of　Spinoza　and　Descartes　an　account　of　the　origin　of　ideas　may　be
dispensed　with；　they　are　accepted　at　once　as　definitions；　such　as　those　of　substance；　the　infinite；
mode；　extension；　etc。；　all　of　which　constitute　a　quite　incoherent　list。　But　we　require　to　show　where
these　thoughts　come　in；　on　what　they　are　founded；　and　how　they　are　verified。　Thus　Locke　has
striven　to　satisfy　a　true　necessity。　For　he　has　the　merit　of　having　deserted　the　system　of　mere
definitions；　which　were　before　this　made　the　starting　point；　and　of　having　attempted　to　make
deduction　of　general　conceptions；　inasmuch　as　he　was；　for　example；　at　the　pains　to　show　how
substantiality　arises　subjectively　from　objects。　That　is　a　further　step　than　any　reached　by　Spinoza；
who　begins　at　once　with　definitions　and　axioms　which　are　unverified。　Now　they　are　derived；　and
no　longer　oracularly　laid　down；　even　if　the　method　and　manner　whereby　this　authentication　is
established　is　not　the　right　one。　That　is　to　say；　here　the　matter　in　question　is　merely　subjective；　and
somewhat　psychological；　since　Locke　merely　describes　the　methods　of　mind　as　it　appears　to　us　to
be。　For　in　his　philosophy　we　have　more　especially　to　deal　with　the　derivation　of　the　general
conceptions；　or　ideas；　as　he　called　them；　that　are　present　in　our　knowledge；　and　with　their　origin
as　they　proceed　from　what　is　outwardly　and　inwardly　perceptible。　Malebranche　no　doubt　likewise
asks　how