history of philosophy-第62章

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self…preservation。　This　striving　is　the　actual　essence　of　the　thing；　and　involves　only　indefinite　time；
when　referred　exclusively　to　mind；　it　is　termed　will；　when　referred　to　both　mind　and　body　together；
it　is　called　desire。　Determination　of　the　will　（volitio）　and　Idea　are　one　and　the　same　thing。　The
sense　of　liberty　rests　on　this；　that　men　do　not　know　the　determining　causes　of　their　actions。　The
affection　is　a　confused　Idea；　the　more　clearly　and　distinctly；　therefore；　we　know　the　affection；　the
more　it　is　under　our　control。”（11）　The　influence　of　the　affections；　as　confused　and　limited
（inadequate）　ideas；　upon　human　action；　constitutes　therefore；　according　to　Spinoza；　human
slavery；　of　the　passionate　affections　the　principal　are　joy　and　sorrow；　we　are　in　suffering　and
slavery　in　so　far　as　we　relate　ourselves　as　a　part。（12）

“Our　happiness　and　liberty　consist　in　an　enduring　and　eternal　love　to　God；　this　intellectual　love
follows　from　the　nature　of　mind　in　so　far　as　it　is　regarded　as　eternal　truth　through　the　nature　of
God。　The　more　a　man　recognizes　God's　existence　and　loves　Him；　the　less　does　he　suffer　from　evil
affections　and　the　less　is　his　fear　of　death。”（13）　Spinoza　requires　in　addition　the　true　kind　of
knowledge。　There　are；　according　to　him；　three　kinds　of　knowledge；　in　the　first；　which　he　calls
opinion　and　imagination；　he　includes　the　knowledge　which　we　obtain　from　an　individual　object
through　the　senses　—　a　knowledge　fragmentary　and　ill…arranged　—　also　knowledge　drawn　from
signs；　pictorial　conceptions　and　memory。　The　second　kind　of　knowledge　is　for　Spinoza　that　which
we　derive　from　general　conceptions　and　adequate　ideas　of　the　properties　of　things。　The　third　is
intuitive　knowledge　（scientia　intuitiva）　which　rises　from　the　adequate　idea　of　the　formal　essence
of　certain　attributes　of　God　to　the　adequate　knowledge　of　the　essence　of　things。”（14）　Regarding
this　last　he　then　says：　“The　nature　of　reason　is　not　to　contemplate　things　as　contingent；　but　as
necessary　。　。　。　to　think　of　all　things　under　a　certain　form　of　eternity　（sub　quadam　specie
？ternitatis）；”　i。e。；　in　absolutely　adequate　Notions；　i。e。　in　God。　“For　the　necessity　of　things　is　the
necessity　of　the　eternal　nature　of　God　Himself。　Every　idea　of　an　individual　thing　necessarily
includes　the　eternal　and　infinite　essence　of　God　in　itself。　For　individual　things　are　modes　of　an
attribute　of　God；　therefore　they　must　include　in　themselves　His　eternal　essence。　Our　mind；　in　so　far
as　it　knows　itself　and　the　body　under　the　form　of　eternity；　has　to　that　extent　necessarily　the
knowledge　of　God；　and　knows　that　it　is　itself　in　God　and　is　conceived　through　God。　All　Ideas；　in
so　far　as　they　are　referable　to　God；　are　true。”（15）　Man　must　trace　back　all　things　to　God；　for　God
is　the　One　in　All；　the　eternal　essence　of　God　is　the　one　thing　that　is；　the　eternal　truth　is　the　only
thing　for　man　to　aim　at　in　his　actions。　With　Spinoza　this　is　not　a　knowledge　arrived　at　through
philosophy；　but　only　knowledge　of　a　truth。　“The　mind　can　succeed　in　tracing　back　all　affections　of
the　body　or　images　of　things　to　God。　In　proportion　as　the　mind　regards　all　things　as　necessary；　it
has　a　greater　power　over　its　affections；”　which　are　arbitrary　and　contingent。　This　is　the　return　of
the　mind　to　God；　and　this　is　human　freedom；　as　mode；　on　the　other　hand；　the　spirit　has　no
freedom；　but　is　determined　from　without。　“From　the　third　kind　of　knowledge　there　arises　the
repose　of　the　mind；　the　supreme　good　of　the　mind　is　to　know　God；　and　this　is　the　highest　virtue。
This　knowledge　necessarily　produces　the　intellectual　love　of　God；　for　it　produces　a　joyfulness
accompanied　by　the　Idea　of　God　as　cause　—　i。e。　the　intellectual　love　of　God。　God　Himself　loves
Himself　with　an　infinite　intellectual　love。”（16）　For　God　can　have　only　Himself　as　aim　and　cause；
and　the　end　of　the　subjective　mind　is　to　be　directed　on　Him。　This　is　therefore　the　purest；　but　also　a
universal　morality。

In　the　thirty…sixth　Letter　（pp。　581…582）　Spinoza；　speaks　of　Evil。　The　allegation　is　made　that　God；
as　the　originator　of　all　things　and　everything；　is　also　the　originator　of　evil；　is　consequently　Himself
evil；　in　this　identity　all　things　are　one；　good　and　evil　are　in　themselves　the　same　thing；　in　God's
substance　this　difference　has　disappeared。　Spinoza　says　in　answer　to　this　“I　assert　the　fact　that
God　absolutely　and　truly”　（as　cause　of　Himself）　“is　the　cause　of　everything　that　has　an　essential
content”　（i。e。；　affirmative　reality）　“be　it　what　it　may。　Now　if　you　can　prove　to　me　that　evil；　error；
crime；　etc。；　are　something　that　expresses　an　essence；　I　will　freely　admit　to　you　that　God　is　the
originator　of　crime　and　evil　and　error。　But　I　have　elsewhere　abundantly　demonstrated　that　the　form
of　evil　cannot　subsist　in　anything　that　expresses　an　essence；　and　therefore　it　cannot　be　said　that
God　is　the　cause　of　evil。”　Evil　is　merely　negation；　privation；　limitation；　finality；　mode　—　nothing　in
itself　truly　real。　“Nero's　murder　of　his　mother；　in　so　far　as　it　had　positive　content；　was　no　crime。
For　Orestes　did　the　same　external　deed；　and　had　in　doing　itthe　same　end　in　view　—　to　kill　his
mother；　and　yet　he　is　not　blamed；”　and　so　on。　The　affirmative　is　the　will；　the　intention；　the　act　of
Nero。　“Wherein　then　consists　Nero's　criminality？　In　nothing　else　but　that　he　proved　himself
ungrateful；　merciless；　and　disobedient。　But　it　is　certain　that　all　this　expresses　no　essence；　and
therefore　God　was　not　the　cause　of　it；　though　He　was　the　cause　of　Nero's　action　and　intention。”
These　last　are　something　positive；　but　yet　they　do　not　constitute　the　crime　as　such；　it　is　only　the
negative　element；　such　as　mercilessness；　etc。　that　makes　the　action　a　crime。　“We　know　that
whatever　exists；　regarded　in　itself　and　without　taking　anything　else　into　consideration；　contains　a
perfection　which　extends　as　widely　as　the　essence　of　the　thing　itself　extends；　for　the　essence　is　in
no　way　different　therefrom。〃　—　〃Because　then；”　we　find　in　the　thirty…second　letter　（pp。　541；　543）；
“God　does　not　regard　things　abstractly；　or　form　general　definitions；”　（of　what　the　thing　ought　to
be）　“and　no　more　reality　is　required　of　things　than　the　Divine　understanding　and　power　has　given
and　actually　meted　out　to　them；　therefore　it　clearly　follows　that　such　privation　exists　only　and　solely
in　respect　to　our　understanding；　but　not　in　respect　to　God；”　for　God　is　absolutely　real。　It　is　all
very　well　to　say　this；　but　it　does　not　meet　the　case。　For　in　this　way　God　and　the　respect　to　our
understanding　are　different。　Where　is　their　unity？　How　is　this　to　be　conceived？　Spinoza　continues
in　the　thirty…sixth　letter：　“Although　the　works　of　the　righteous　（i。e。；　of　those　who　have　a　clear　idea
of　God；　to　which　they　direct　all　their　actions　and　even　their　thoughts）；　and”　also　the　works　“of　the
wicked　（i。e。；　of　those　who　have　no　idea　of　God；　but　only　ideas　of　earthly　things；〃　—　individual；
personal　interests　and　opinions；　—　〃by　which　their　actions　and　thoughts　are　directed）；　and　all
whatsoever　exists；　necessarily　proceed　from　God's　eternal　laws　and　counsels；　and　perpetually
depend　on　God；　they　are　yet　not　distinguished　from　one　another　in　degree；　but　in　essence；　for
although　a　mouse　as　well　as　an　angel　depends　on　God；　and　sorrow　as　well　as　joy；　yet　a　mouse
cannot　be　a　kind　of　angel；　and　sorrow　cannot　be　a　kind　of　joy；〃　—　they　are　different　in　essence。

There　is　therefore　no　ground　for　the　objection　that　Spinoza's　philosophy　gives　the　death…blow　to
morality；　we　even　gain　from　it　the　great　result　that　all　that　is　sensuous　is　mere　limitation；　and　that
there　is　only　one　true　substance；　and　that　human　liberty　consists　in　keeping　in　view　this　one
substance；　and　in　regulating　all　our　conduct　in　accordance　with　the　mind　and　will　of　the　Eternal
One。　But　in　this　philosophy　it　may　with　justice　be　objected　that　God　is　conceived　only　as
Substance；　and　not　as　Spirit；　as　concrete。　The　independence　of　the　human　soul　is　therein　also
denied；　while　in　the　Christian　religion　every　individual　appears　as　determined　to　salvation。　Here；　on
the　contrary；　the　individual　spirit　is　only　a　mode；　an　accident；　but　not　anything　substantial。　This