history of philosophy-第60章

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though　it　were　an　end。　If　this　view　is　taken；　God　is　not　a　free　cause；　but　is　subject　to　fate。　It　is
equally　inadmissible　to　subject　all　things　to　the　arbitrary　pleasure　of　God；　i。e。；　to　His　indifferent
will。”（4）　He　is　determined　solely　by　His　own　nature；　the　activity　of　God　is　thus　His　power；　and　that
is　necessity。　He　is　then　absolute　power　in　contrast　to　wisdom；　which　sets　up　definite　aims；　and
consequently　limitations；　particular　aims；　thoughts　of　what　is　about　to　come　to　pass；　and　the　like
are　therefore　put　out　of　the　question。　But　beyond　this　universal；　no　advance　is　made；　for　it　must　be
noticed　a　negation。　Moreover；　if　God　is　the　cause　of　the　world；　it　is　implied　that　He　is　finite；　for　the
world　is　here　put　beside　God　as　something　different　from　Him。

b。　The　greatest　difficulty　in　Spinoza　is；　in　the　distinctions　to　which　he　comes；　to　grasp　the　relation
of　this　determinate　to　God；　at　the　same　time　preserving　the　determination。　“God　is　a　thinking
Being；　because　all　individual　thoughts　are　modes　which　express　God's　nature　in　a　certain　and
determinate　manner；　there　pertains　therefore　to　God　an　attribute　the　conception　of　which　all
individual　thoughts　involve；　and　by　means　of　this　they　also　are　conceived。　God　is　an　extended
Being　for　the　same　reason。”　This　means　that　the　same　substance；　under　the　attribute　of　thought；　is
the　intelligible　world；　and　under　the　attribute　of　extension；　is　nature；　nature　and　thought　thus　both
express　the　same　Essence　of　God。　Or；　as　Spinoza　says；　“The　order　and　system　of　natural　things　is
the　same　as　the　order　of　the　thoughts。　Thus；　for　instance；　the　circle　which　exists　in　nature；　and　the
idea　of　the　existing　circle；　which　is　also　in　God；　are　one　and　the　same　thing”　（they　are　one　and　the
same　content）；　“which　is”　merely　“expressed　by　means　of　different　attributes。　If　we　therefore
regard　nature　either　under　the　attribute　of　extension　or　of　thought；　or　under　any　other　attribute
whatever；　we　shall　find　one　and　the　same　connection　of　causes；　i。e。；　the　same　sequence　of　things。
The　formal　Being　of　the　idea　of　the　circle　can　be　conceived　only　by　means　of　the　mode　of　thought；
as　its　proximate　cause；　and　this　mode　again　by　means　of　another；　and　so　on　infinitely；　so　that　we
must　explain　the　order　of　the　whole　of　nature；　or　the　connection　of　causes；　by　the　attribute　of
thought　alone；　and　if　things　are　considered　by　the　attribute　of　extension；　they　must　be　considered
only　by　the　attribute　of　extension；　—　and　the　same　holds　good。　of　other　causes。”（5）　It　is　one　and
the　same　system；　which　at　one　time　appears　as　nature；　and　at　another　time　in　the　form　of　thought。

But　Spinoza　does　not　demonstrate　how　these　two　are　evolved　from　the　one　substance；　nor　does
he　prove　why　there　can　only　be　two　of　them。　Neither　are　extension　and　thought　anything　to　him　in
themselves；　or　in　truth；　but　only　externally；　for　their　difference　is　a　mere　matter　of　the
understanding；　which　is　ranked　by　Spinoza　only　among　affections　（Eth。　P。　I。　Prop。　XXXI。
Demonst。　p。　62）；　and　as　such　has　no　truth。　This　has　in　recent　times　been　served　up　again　by
Schelling　in　the　following　form：　In　themselves；　the　intelligent　world　and　the　corporeal　world　are　the
same；　only　under　different　forms；　so　that　the　intelligent　universe　is　in　itself　the　whole　absolute　divine
totality；　and　the　corporeal　universe　is　equally　this　same　totality。　The　differences　are　not　in
themselves；　but　the　different　aspects　from　which　the　Absolute　is　regarded　are　matters　external　to
it。　We　take　a　higher　tone　in　saying　that　nature　and　mind　are　rational；　but　reason　is　for　us　no　empty
word；　for　it　means　the　totality　which　develops　itself　within　itself。　Again；　it　is　the　standpoint　of
reflection　to　regard　aspects　only；　and　nothing　in　itself。　This　defect　appears　in　Spinoza　and　Schelling
in　the　fact　that　they　see　no　necessity　why　the　Notion；　as　the　implicit　negative　of　its　unity；　should
make　a　separation　of　itself　into　different　parts；　so　that　out　of　the　simple　universal　the　real；　the
opposed；　itself　becomes　known。　Absolute　substance；　attribute　and　mode；　Spinoza　allows　to
follow　one　another　as　definitions；　he　adopts　them　ready…made；　without　the　attributes　being
developed　from　the　substance；　or　the　modes　from　the　attributes。　And　more　especially　in　regard　to
the　attributes；　there　is　no　necessity　evident；　why　these　are　thought　and　extension　in　particular。

c。　When　Spinoza　passes　on　to　individual　things；　especially　to　self…consciousness；　to　the　freedom
of　the　'I；'　he　expresses　himself　in　such　a　way　as　rather　to　lead　back　all　limitations　to　substance　than
to　maintain　a　firm　grasp　of　the　individual。　Thus　we　already　found；　the　attributes　not　to　be
independent；　but　only　the　forms　in　which　the　understanding　grasps　substance　in　its　differences；
what　comes　third；　the　modes；　is　that　under　which　for　Spinoza　all　difference　of　things　alone　falls。　Of
the　modes　he　says　（Ethic。　P。　I。　Prop。　XXXII。　Demonst。　et　Coroll。　11。　p。　63）：　In　every　attribute
there　are　two　modes；　in　extension；　these　are　rest　and　motion；　in　thought　they　are　understanding
and　will　（intellectus　et　voluntas）。　They　are　mere　modifications　which　only　exist　for　us　apart　from
God；　therefore　whatever　refers　to　this　difference　and　is　specially　brought　about　by　it；　is　not
absolute；　but　finite。　These　affections　Spinoza　sums　up　（Ethices；　P。　I。　Prop。　XXIX。　Schol。　pp。　61；
62）　under　the　head　of　natura　naturata：　“Natura　naturans　is　God　regarded　as　free　cause；　in　so
far　as　He　is　in　Himself　and　is　conceived　by　Himself：　or　such　attributes　of　substance　as　express　the
eternal　and　infinite　essence。　By　natura　naturata；　I　understand　all　that　follows　from　the　necessity
of　the　divine　nature；　or　from　any　of　the　attributes　of　God；　all　modes　of　the　divine　attributes；　in　so
far　as　they　are　regarded　as　things　which　are　in　God；　and　which　without　God　can　neither　exist　nor
be　conceived。”　From　God　proceeds　nothing；　for　all　things　merely　return　to　the　point　whence　they
came；　if　from　themselves　the　commencement　is　made。

These　then　are　Spinoza's　general　forms；　this　is　his　principal　idea。　Some　further　determinations　have
still　to　be　mentioned。　He　gives　definitions　of　the　terms　modes；　understanding；　will；　and　of　the
affections；　such　as　joy　and　sadness。（6）　We　further　find　consciousness　taken　into　consideration。　Its
development　is　extremely　simple；　or　rather　it　is　not　developed　at　all；　Spinoza　begins　directly　with
mind。　“The　essence　of　man　consists　of　certain　modifications　of　the　attributes　of　God”；　these
modifications　are　only　something　related　to　our　understanding。　“If　we；　therefore；　say　that　the
human　mind　perceives　this　or　that；　it　means　nothing　else　than　that　God　has　this　or　that　idea；　not　in
so　far　as　He　is　infinite；　but　in　so　far　as　He　is　expressed　by　the　idea　of　the　human　mind。　And　if　we
say　that　God　has　this　or　that　idea；　not　in　so　far　as　He　constitutes　the　idea　of　the　human　mind；　but　in
so　far　as　He　has；　along　with　the　human　mind；　the　idea　of　another　thing；　then　we　say　that　the　human
mind　perceives　the　thing　partially　or　inadequately。”　Truth　is　for　Spinoza；　on　the　other　hand；　the
adequate。（7）　The　idea　that　all　particular　content　is　only；　a　modification　of　God　is　ridiculed　by
Bayle；（8）　who　argues　from　it　that　God　modified　as　Turks　and　Austrians；　is　waging　war　with
Himself；　but　Bayle　has　not　a　trace　of　the　speculative　element　in　him；　although　he　is　acute　enough　as
a　dialectician；　and　has　contributed　to　the　intelligent　discussion　of　definite　subjects。

The　relation　of　thought　and　extension　in　the　human　consciousness　is　dealt　with　by　Spinoza　as
follows：　“What　has　a　place　in　the　object”　（or　rather　in　the　objective）　“of　the　idea　which　constitutes
the　human　mind　must　be　perceived　by　the　human　mind；　or　there　must　necessarily　be　in　the　mind　an
idea　of　this　object。　The　object　of　the　idea　which　constitutes　the　human　mind　is　body；　or　a　certain
mode　of　extension。　If；　then；　the　object　of　the　idea　which　constitutes　the　human　mind；　is　the　body；
there　can　happen　nothing　in　the　body　which　is　not　perceived　by　the　mind。　Otherwise　the　ideas　of
the　affections　of　the　body　would　not　be　in　God；　in　so　far　as　He　constitutes　our　mind；　but　the　idea
of　another　thing：　that　is　to　say；　the　ideas　of　the　affect