history of philosophy-第58章
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have a relation to each other； that is to say they must be of one nature； stand on a like basis； and
have a common sphere。 That is the affirmative side of the limit。 “Thus a thought is” only “limited
by another thought； a body by another body； but thoughts are not limited by bodies nor〃
conversely 〃bodies by thoughts。” We saw this （p。 244） with Descartes： thought is an independent；
totality and so is extension； they have nothing to do with one another； they do not limit each other；
each is included in itself。
c。 The third definition is that of substance。 “By substance I understand that which exists in itself
and is conceived by itself； i。e。 the conception of which does not require the aid of the conception
of any other thing for its formation （a quo formari debeat）；” otherwise it would be finite；
accidental。 What cannot have a conception formed of it without the aid of something else； is not
independent； but is dependent upon that something else。
d。 In the fourth place Spinoza defines attributes； which； as the moment coming； second to
substance； belong to it。 “By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives as constituting the
essence of substance；” and to Spinoza this alone is true。 This is an important determination； the
attribute is undoubtedly a determinateness； but at the same time it remains a totality。 Spinoza； like
Descartes； accepts only two attributes； thought and extension。 The understanding grasps them as
the reality of substance； but the reality is not higher than the substance； for it is only reality in the
view of the understanding； which falls outside substance。 Each of the two ways of regarding
substance — extension and thought — contains no doubt the whole content of substance； but only
in one form； which the understanding brings with it； and for this very reason both sides are in
themselves identical and infinite。 This is the true completion； but where substance passes over into
attribute is not stated。
e。 The fifth definition has to do with what comes third in relation to substance； the mode。 “By
mode I understand the affections of substance； or that which is in something else； through the aid
of which also it is conceived。” Thus substance is conceived through itself； attribute is not
conceived through itself； but has a relation to the conceiving understanding； in so far as this last
conceives reality； mode； finally； is what is not conceived as reality； but through and in something
else。
These last three moments Spinoza ought not merely to have established in this way as conceptions；
he ought to have deduced them； they are especially important； and correspond with what we more
definitely distinguish as universal； particular and individual。 They must not； however； be taken as
formal； but in their true concrete sense； the concrete universal is substance； the concrete particular
is the concrete species； the Father and Son in the Christian dogma are similarly particular； but each
of them contains the whole nature of God； only under a different form。 The mode is the individual；
the finite as such； which enters into external connection with what is “other。” In this Spinoza only
descends to a lower stage； the mode is only the foregoing warped and stunted。 Spinoza's defect is
therefore this； that he takes the third moment as mode alone； as a false individuality。 True
individuality and subjectivity is not a mere retreat from the universal； not merely something clearly
determinate； for； as clearly determinate； it is at the same time Being…for…itself； determined by itself
alone。 The individual； the subjective； is even in being so the return to the universal； and in that it is
at home with itself； it is itself the universal。 The return consists simply and solely in the fact of the
particular being in itself the universal； to this return Spinoza did not attain。 Rigid substantiality is the
last point he reached； not infinite form； this he knew not； and thus determinateness continually
vanishes from his thought。
f。 In the sixth place； the definition of the infinite is also of importance； for in the infinite Spinoza
defines more strictly than anywhere else the Notion of the Notion。 The infinite has a double
significance； according as it is taken as the infinitely many or as the absolutely infinite （infra； p。
263）。 “The infinite in its kind is not such in respect of all possible attributes； but the absolutely
infinite is that to whose essence all belongs that expresses an essence and contains no negation。”
In the same sense Spinoza distinguishes in the nine…and…twentieth Letter （Oper。 T。 I。 pp。 526…532）
the infinite of imagination from the infinite of thought （intellectus）； the actual （actu） infinite。 Most
men； when they wish to strive after the sublime； get no farther than the first of these； this is the false
infinite； just as when one says “and so on into infinity；” meaning perhaps the infinity of space from
star to star； or else the infinity of time。 An infinite numerical series in mathematics is exactly the
same thing。 If a certain fraction is represented as a decimal fraction； it is incomplete； 1/7 is； on the
contrary； the true infinite； and therefore not an incomplete expression； although the content here is
of course limited。 It is infinity in the incorrect sense that one usually has in view when infinity is
spoken of； and even if it is looked on as sublime； it yet is nothing present； and only goes ever out
into the negative； without being actual （actu）。 But for Spinoza the infinite is not the fixing of a limit
and then passing beyond the limit fixed — the sensuous infinity — but absolute infinity； the positive；
which has complete and present in itself an absolute multiplicity which has no Beyond。 Philosophic
infinity； that which is infinite actu； Spinoza therefore calls the absolute affirmation of itself。 This is
quite correct； only it might have been better expressed as： “It is the negation of negation。”
Spinoza here also employs geometrical figures as illustrations of the Notion of infinity。 In his Opera
postuma； preceding his Ethics； and also in the letter quoted above； he has two circles； one of
which lies within the other； which have not； however； a common centre。
“The inequalities of the space between A B and C D exceed every number； and
yet the space which lies between is not so very great。” That is to say； if I wish
to determine them all； I must enter upon an infinite series。 This “beyond”
always； however； remains defective； is always affected with negation； and yet
this false infinite is there to hand； circumscribed； affirmative； actual and present
in that plane as a complete space between the two circles。 Or a finite line
consists of an infinite number of points； and yet the line is present here and determined； the
“beyond” of the infinite number of points； which are not complete； is in it complete and called
back into unity。 The infinite should be represented as actually present； and this comes to pass in
the Notion of the cause of itself； which is therefore the true infinity。 As soon as the cause has
something else opposed to it — the effect — finitude is present； but here this something else is at
the same time abrogated and it becomes once more the cause itself。 The affirmative is thus
negation of negation； since； according to the well…known grammatical rule； duplex negatio
affirmat。 In the same way Spinoza's earlier definitions have also the infinite already implied in
them； for instance in the case of the just mentioned cause of itself； inasmuch as he defines it as that
whose essence involves existence （supra； p。 258）。 Notion and existence are each the Beyond of
the other； but cause of itself； as thus including them； is really the carrying back of this “beyond”
into unity。 Or （supra； p。 259） “Substance is that which is in itself and is conceived from itself；”
that is the same unity of Notion and existence。 The infinite is in the same way in itself and has also
its Notion in itself； its Notion is its Being； and its Being its Notion； true infinity is therefore to be
found in Spinoza。 But h
