history of philosophy-第57章

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upon　himself　amongst　Christian；　and　especially　amongst　Protestant　theologians　—　chiefly　through
the　medium　of　this　essay。　It　contains　his　views　on　inspiration；　a　critical　treatment　of　the　books　of
Moses　and　the　like　chiefly　from　the　point　of　view　that　the　laws　therein　contained　are　limited　in　their
application　to　the　Jews。　Later　Christian　theologians　have　written　critically　on　this　subject；　usually
making　it　their　object　to　show　that　these　books　were　compiled　at　a　later　time；　and　that　they　date　in
part　from　a　period　subsequent　to　the　Babylonian　captivity；　this　has　become　a　crucial　point　with
Protestant　theologians；　and　one　by　which　the　modern　school　distinguishes　itself　from　the　older；
greatly　pluming　itself　thereon。　All　this；　however；　is　already　to　be　found　in　the　above…mentioned
work　of　Spinoza。　But　Spinoza　drew　the　greatest　odium　upon　himself　by　his　philosophy　proper；
which　we　must　now　consider　as　it　is　given　to　us　in　his　Ethics。　While　Descartes　published　no
writings　on　this　subject；　the　Ethics　of　Spinoza　is　undoubtedly　his　greatest　work；　it　was　published
after　his　death　by　Ludwig　Mayer；　a　physician；　who　had　been　Spinoza's　most　intimate　friend。　It
consists　of　five　parts；　the　first　deals　with　God　（De　Deo）。　General　metaphysical　ideas　are　contained
in　it；　which　include　the　knowledge　of　God　and　nature。　The　second　part　deals　with　the　nature　and
origin　of　mind　（De　natura　et　origine　mentis）。　We　see　thus　that　Spinoza　does　not　treat　of　the
subject　of　natural　philosophy；　extension　and　motion　at　all；　for　he　passes　immediately　from　God　to
the　philosophy　of　mind；　to　the　ethical　point　of　view；　and　what　refers　to　knowledge；　intelligent　mind；
is　brought　forward　in　the　first　part；　under　the　head　of　the　principles　of　human　knowledge。　The　third
book　of　the　Ethics　deals　with　the　origin　and　nature　of　the　passions　（De　oriqine　et　natura
affectuum）；　the　fourth　with　the　powers　of　the　same；　or　human　slavery　（De　servitute　humana　seu
de　affectuum　viribus）；　the　fifth；　lastly；　with　the　power　of　the　understanding；　with　thought；　or　with
human　liberty　（De　potentia　intellectus　seu　de　libertate　humana）。　（2）　Kirchenrath　Professor
Paulus　published　Spinoza's　works　in　Jena；　I　had　a　share　in　the　bringing　out　of　this　edition；　having
been　entrusted　with　the　collation　of　French　translations。

As　regards　the　philosophy　of　Spinoza；　it　is　very　simple；　and　on　the　whole　easy　to　comprehend；　the
difficulty　which　it　presents　is　due　partly　to　the　limitations　of　the　method　in　which　Spinoza　presents
his　thoughts；　and　partly　to　his　narrow　range　of　ideas；　which　causes　him　in　an　unsatisfactory　way　to
pass　over　important　points　of　view　and　cardinal　questions。　Spinoza's　system　is　that　of　Descartes
made　objective　in　the　form　of　absolute　truth。　The　simple　thought　of　Spinoza's　idealism　is　this：　The
true　is　simply　and　solely　the　one　substance；　whose　attributes　are　thought　and　extension　or　nature：
and　only　this　absolute　unity　is　reality；　it　alone　is　God。　It　is；　as　with　Descartes；　the　unity　of　thought
and　Being；　or　that　which　contains　the　Notion　of　its　existence　in　itself。　The　Cartesian　substance；　as
Idea；　has　certainly　Being　included　in　its　Notion；　but　it　is　only　Being　as　abstract；　not　as　real　Being　or
as　extension　（supra；　p。　241）。　With　Descartes　corporeality　and　the　thinking　'I'　are　altogether
independent　Beings；　this　independence　of　the　two　extremes　is　done　away　with　in　Spinozism　by
their　becoming　moments　of　the　one　absolute　Being。　This　expression　signifies　that　Being　must　be
grasped　as　the　unity　of　opposites；　the　chief　consideration　is　not　to　let　slip　the　opposition　and　set　it
aside；　but　to　reconcile　and　resolve　it。　Since　then　it　is　thought　and　Being；　and　no　longer　the
abstractions　of　the　finite　and　infinite；　or　of　limit　and　the　unlimited；　that　form　the　opposition　（supra；
p。　161）；　Being　is　here　more　definitely　regarded　as　extension；　for　in　its　abstraction　it　would　be　really
only　that　return　into　itself；　that　simple　equality　with　itself；　which　constitutes　thought　（supra；　p。　229）。
The　pure　thought　of　Spinoza　is　therefore　not　the　simple　universal　of　Plato；　for　it　has　likewise　come
to　know　the　absolute　opposition　of　Notion　and　Being。

Taken　as　a　whole；　this　constitutes　the　Idea　of　Spinoza；　and　it　is　just　what　pure　being　was　to　the
Eleatics　（Vol。　1。　pp。　244；　252）。　This　Idea　of　Spinoza's　we　must　allow　to　be　in　the　main　true　and
well…grounded；　absolute　substance　is　the　truth；　but　it　is　not　the　whole　truth；　in　order　to　be　this　it
must　also　be　thought　of　as　in　itself　active　and　living；　and　by　that　very　means　it　must　determine　itself
as　mind。　But　substance　with　Spinoza　is　only　the　universal　and　consequently　the　abstract
determination　of　mind；　it　may　undoubtedly　be　said　that　this　thought　is　the　foundation　of　all　true
views　—　not；　however；　as　their　absolutely　fixed　and　permanent　basis；　but　as　the　abstract　unity
which　mind　is　in　itself。　It　is　therefore　worthy　of　note　that　thought　must　begin　by　placing　itself　at　the
standpoint　of　Spinozism；　to　be　a　follower　of　Spinoza　is　the　essential　commencement　of　all
Philosophy。　For　as　we　saw　above　（Vol。　I。　p。　144）；　when　man　begins　to　philosophize；　the　soul
must　commence　by　bathing　in　this　ether　of　the　One　Substance；　in　which　all　that　man　has　held　as
true　has　disappeared；　this　negation　of　all　that　is　particular；　to　which　every　philosopher　must　have
come；　is　the　liberation　of　the　mind　and　its　absolute　foundation。　The　difference　between　our
standpoint　and　that　of　the　Eleatic　philosophy　is　only　this；　that　through　the　agency　of　Christianity
concrete　individuality　is　in　the　modern　world　present　throughout　in　spirit。　But　in　spite　of　the　infinite
demands　on　the　part　of　the　concrete；　substance　with　Spinoza　is　not　yet　determined　as　in　itself
concrete。　As　the　concrete　is　thus　not　present　in　the　content　of　substance；　it　is　therefore　to　be　found
within　reflecting　thought　alone；　and　it　is　only　from　the　endless　oppositions　of　this　last　that　the
required　unity　emerges。　Of　substance　as　such　there　is　nothing　more　to　be　said；　all　that　we　can　do　is
to　speak　of　the　different　ways　in　which　Philosophy　has　dealt　with　it；　and　the　opposites　which　in　it
are　abrogated。　The　difference　depends　on　the　nature　of　the　opposites　which　are　held　to　be
abrogated　in　substance。　Spinoza　is　far　from　having　proved　this　unity　as　convincingly　as　was　done
by　the　ancients；　but　what　constitutes　the　grandeur　of　Spinoza's　manner　of　thought　is　that　he　is　able
to　renounce　all　that　is　determinate　and　particular；　and　restrict　himself　to　the　One；　giving　heed　to　this
alone。

1。　Spinoza　begins　（Eth。　P。　I　pp。　35；　36）　with　a　series　of　definitions；　from　which　we　take　the
following。

a。　Spinoza's　first　definition　is　of　the　Cause　of　itself。　He　says：　“By　that　which　is　causa　sui；　its　own
cause；　I　understand　that　whose　essence”　（or　Notion）　“involves　existence；　or　which　cannot　be
conceived　except　as　existent。”　The　unity　of　existence　and　universal　thought　is　asserted　from　the
very　first；　and　this　unity　will　ever　be　the　question　at　issue。　“The　cause　of　itself”　is　a　noteworthy
expression；　for　while　we　picture　to　ourselves　that　the　effect　stands　in　opposition　to　the　cause；　the
cause　of　itself　is　the　cause　which；　while　it　operates　and　separates　an　“other；”　at　the　same　time
produces　only　itself；　and　in　the　production　therefore　does　away　with　this　distinction。　The
establishing　of　itself　as　an　other　is　loss　or　degeneration；　and　at　the　same　time　the　negation　of　this
loss；　this　is　a　purely　speculative　Notion；　indeed　a　fundamental　Notion　in　all　speculation。　The　cause
in　which　the　cause　is　identical　with　the　effect；　is　the　infinite　cause　（infra；　p。　263）；　if　Spinoza　had
further　developed　what　lies　in　causa　sui；　substance　with　him　would　not　have　been　rigid　and
unworkable。

b。　The　second　definition　is　that　of　the　finite。　“That　thing　is　said　to　be　finite　in　its　kind　which　can　be
limited　by　another　of　the　same　nature。”　For　it　comes　then　to　an　end；　it　is　not　there；　what　is　there　is
something　else。　This　something　else　must；　however；　be　of　a　like　nature；　for　those　things　which　are
to　limit　each　other　must；　in　order　to　be　able　to　limit　each　other；　touch　each　other；　and　consequently
have　a　relation　to　each　other；　that　is　to　say　they　must　be　of　one　natu