history of philosophy-第5章

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may　this　be　the　case　in　the　history　of　Philosophy；　and　representations　of　this　history　may　be
instanced　in　which　everything；　excepting　what　was　supposed　to　be　Philosophy；　appears　to　be
found。

In　other　histories　we　have　a　clear　conception　of　their　subjects；　at　least　so　far　as　their　principal
points　are　concerned；　we　know　whether　they　concern　a　particular　land；　people　or　race；　or
whether　their　subject　is　the　science　of　mathematics；　physics；　&c。；　or　an　art；　such　as　painting。　The
science　of　Philosophy　has；　however；　this　distinguishing　feature；　and；　if　you　will；　this　disadvantage
as　compared　with　other　sciences；　that　we　find　the　most　varied　points　of　view　as　regards　its
Notion；　and　regarding　that　which　it　ought　to　and　can　accomplish。　If　this　first　assumption；　the
conception　of　the　subject　of　the　history；　is　not　established；　the　history　itself　is　necessarily　made
vacillating；　and　it　only　obtains　consistency　when　it　sets　forth　a　definite　conception　but　then　in　view
of　the　various　ways　of　regarding　its　subject；　it　easily　draws　upon　itself　the　reproach　of
one…sidedness。

That　drawback　relates；　however；　only　to　an　external　consideration　of　this　narrative；　there　is
another　and　greater　disadvantage　allied　to　it。　If　there　are　different　Notions　of　the　science　of
Philosophy；　it　is　the　true　Notion　alone　that　puts　us　in　a　position　to　understand　the　writings　of
philosophers　who　have　worked　in　the　knowledge　of　it。　For　in　thought；　and　particularly　in
speculative　thought；　comprehension　means　something　quite　different　from　understanding　the
grammatical　sense　of　the　words　alone；　and　also　from　understanding　them　in　the　region　of　ordinary
conception　only。　Hence　we　may　possess　a　knowledge　of　the　assertions；　propositions；　or　of　the
opinions　of　philosophers；　we　may　have　occupied　ourselves　largely　with　the　grounds　of　and
deductions　from　these　opinions；　and　the　main　point　in　all　that　we　have　done　may　be　wanting…the
comprehension　of　the　propositions。　There　is　hence　no　lack　of　voluminous　and　even　learned
histories　of　Philosophy　in　which　the　knowledge　of　the　matter　itself　about　which　so　much　ado　has
been　made；　is　absent。　The　authors　of　such　histories　may　be　compared　to　animals　which　have
listened　to　all　the　tones　in　some　music；　but　to　whose　senses　the　unison；　the　harmony　of　their　tones；
has　not　penetrated。

The　circumstance　mentioned　makes　it　in　no　science　so　necessary　as　in　the　history　of　Philosophy　to
commence　with　an　Introduction；　and　in　it　correctly　to　define；　in　the　first　place；　the　subject　of　the
history　about　to　be　related。　For　it　may　be　said；　How　should　we　begin　to　treat　a　subject；　the　name
of　which　is　certainly　mentioned　often　enough；　but　of　whose　nature　we　as　yet　know　nothing？　In
treating　the　history　of　Philosophy　thus；　we　could　have　no　other　guidance　than　that　of　seeking　out
and　taking　up　whatever　has　received　the　name　of　Philosophy；　anywhere　or　any　time。　But　in　fact；
when　the　Notion　of　Philosophy　is　established；　not　arbitrarily　but　in　a　scientific　way；　such　treatment
becomes　the　science　of　Philosophy　itself。　For　in　this　science　the　peculiar　characteristic　is　that　its
Notion　forms　the　beginning　in　appearance　merely；　and　it　is　only　the　whole　treatment　of　the　science
that　is　the　proof；　and　indeed　we　may　say　the　finding　of　its　Notion；　and　this　is　really　a　result　of　that
treatment。

In　this　Introduction　the　Notion　of　the　science　of　Philosophy；　of　the　subject　of　its　history；　has　thus
likewise　to　be　set　forth。　At　the　same　time；　though　this　Introduction　professes　to　relate　to　the　history
of　Philosophy　only；　what　has　just　been　said　of　Philosophy　on　the　whole；　also　holds　good。　What
can　be　said　in　this　Introduction　is　not　so　much　something　which　may　be　stated　beforehand；　as　what
can　be　justified　or　proved　in　the　treatment　of　the　history。　These　preparatory　explanations　are　for
this　reason　only；　not　to　be　placed　in　the　category　of　arbitrary　assumptions。　But　to　begin　with
stating　what　in　their　justification　are　really　results；　can　only　have　the　interest　which　may　be
possessed　by　a　summary；　given　in　advance；　of　the　most　general　contents　of　a　science。　It　must
serve　to　set　aside　many　questions　and　demands　which　might；　from　our　ordinary　prejudices；　arise　in
such　a　history。




Introduction

THERE　are　various　aspects　under　which　the　History　of　Philosophy　may　possess　interest。　We　shall
find　the　central　point　of　this　interest　in　the　essential　connection　existing　between　what　is　apparently
past　and　the　present　stage　reached　by　Philosophy。　That　this　connection　is　not　one　of　the　external
considerations　which　may　be　taken　into　account　in　the　history　of　Philosophy；　but　really　expresses
its　inner　character：　that　the　events　of　this　history；　while　they　perpetuate　themselves　in　their　effects
like　all　other　events；　yet　produce　their　results　in　a　special　way…this　it　is　which　is　here　to　be　more
clearly　expounded。

What　the　history　of　Philosophy　shows　us　is　a　succession　of　noble　minds；　a　gallery　of　heroes　of
thought；　who；　by　the　power　of　Reason；　have　penetrated　into　the　being　of　things；　of　nature　and　of
spirit；　into　the　Being　of　God；　and　have　won　for　us　by　their　labours　the　highest　treasure；　the　treasure
of　reasoned　knowledge。

The　events　and　actions　of　this　history　are　therefore　such　that　personality　and　individual　character
do　not　enter　to　any　large　degree　into　its　content　and　matter。　In　this　respect　the　history　of
Philosophy　contrasts　with　political　history；　in　which　the　individual；　according　to　the　peculiarity　of
his　disposition；　talents；　affections；　the　strength　or　weakness　of　his　character；　and　in　general；
according　to　that　through　which　he　is　this　individual；　is　the　subject　of　actions　and　events。　In
Philosophy；　the　less　deserts　and　merits　are　accorded　to　the　particular　individual；　the　better　is　the
history；　and　the　more　it　deals　with　thought　as　free；　with　the　universal　character　of　man　as　man；　the
more　this　thought；　which　is　devoid　of　special　characteristic；　is　itself　shown　to　be　the　producing
subject。

The　acts　of　thought　appear　at　first　to　be　a　matter　of　history；　and；　therefore；　things　of　the　past　and
outside　our　real　existence。　But　in　reality　we　are　what　we　are　through　history：　or；　more　accurately；
as　in　the　history　of　Thought；　what　has　passed　away　is　only　one　side；　so　in　the　present；　what　we
have　as　a　permanent　possession　is　essentially　bound　up　with　our　place　in　history。　The　possession
of　self…conscious　reason；　which　belongs　to　us　of　the　present　world；　did　not　arise　suddenly；　nor　did
it　grow　only　from　the　soil　of　the　present。　This　possession　must　be　regarded　as　previously　present；
as　an　inheritance；　and　as　the　result　of　labour…the　labour　of　all　past　generations　of　men。　Just　as　the
arts　of　outward　life；　the　accumulated　skill　and　invention；　the　customs　and　arrangements　of　social
and　political　life；　are　the　result　of　the　thought；　care；　and　needs；　of　the　want　and　the　misery；　of　the
ingenuity；　the　plans　and　achievements　of　those　who　preceded　us　in　history；　so；　likewise；　in　science；
and　specially　in　Philosophy；　do　we　owe　what　we　are　to　the　tradition　which；　as　Herder　has　put　it
（1）　like　a　holy　chain；　runs　through　all　that　was　transient；　and　has　therefore　passed　away。　Thus　has
been　preserved　and　transmitted　to　us　what　antiquity　produced。

But　this　tradition　is　not　only　a　stewardess　who　simply　guards　faithfully　that　which　she　has　received；
and　thus　delivers　it　unchanged　to　posterity；　just　as　the　course　of　nature　in　the　infinite　change　and
activity　of　its　forms　ever　remains　constant　to　its　original　laws　and　makes　no　step　in　advance。　Such
tradition　is　no　motionless　statue；　but　is　alive；　and　swells　like　a　mighty　river；　which　increases　in　size
the　further　it　advances　from　its　source。　The　content　of　this　tradition　is　that　which　the　intellectual
world　has　brought　forth；　and　the　universal　Mind　does　not　remain　stationary。　But　it　is　just　the
universal　kind　with　which　we　have　to　do。　It　may　certainly　be　the　case　with　a　single　nation　that　its
culture；　art；　science…its　intellectual　activities　as　a　whole…are　at　a　standstill。　This　appears；　perhaps；
to　be　the　case　with　the　Chinese；　for　example；　who　may　have　been　as　far　advanced　in　every
respect　two　thousand　years　ago　as　now。　But　the　world…spirit　do