history of philosophy-第39章

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schools　were　spun　out　by　the　understanding　as　though　they　were　realities。　As　it　was　with　the
Schoolmen　and　with　the　ancients；　this　classification　is　still　the　mode　adopted　in　the　sciences；　in
which　the　nature　of　knowledge　is　unknown。　In　them　the　idea　of　the　science　is　advanced
beforehand；　and　to　this　idea　a　principle　foreign　to　it　is　added；　as　a　basis　of　division；　just　as　here　is
added　the　distinction　between　memory；　imagination　and　reason。　The　true　method　of　division　is
found　in　the　self…division　of　the　Notion；　its　separating　itself　from　itself。　In　knowledge　the　moment　of
self…consciousness　is　undoubtedly　found；　and　the　real　self…consciousness　has　in　it　the　moments　of
memory；　imagination　and　reason。　But　this　division　is　certainly　not　taken　from　the　Notion　of
self…consciousness；　but　from　experience；　in　which　self…consciousness　finds　itself　possessed　of
these　capacities。

2。　The　other　remarkable　feature　in　Bacon　is　that　in　his　second　work；　his　Organon；　he　sought　at
great　length　to　establish　a　new　method　in　learning；　in　this　regard　his　name　is　still　held　greatly　in
honour　by　many。　What　chiefly　distinguishes　his　system　is　his　polemical　attitude　towards　scholastic
methods　as　they　had　hitherto　existed；　towards　syllogistic　forms。　He　calls　these　methods
anticipationes　natur？；　in　them　men　begin　with　pre…suppositions；　definitions；　accepted　ideas；　with
a　scholastic　abstraction；　and　reason　further　from　these　without　regarding　that　which　is　present　in
actuality。　Thus　regarding　God　and　His　methods　of　operating　in　nature；　regarding　devils；　&c。；　they
make　use　of　passages　from　the　Bible；　such　as　“Sun；　stand　thou　still；”　in　order　to　deduce
therefrom　certain　metaphysical　propositions　from　which　they　go　further　still。　It　was　against　this　a
priori　method　that　Bacon　directed　his　polemic；　as　against　these　anticipations　of　nature　he　called
attention　to　the　explanation；　the　interpretation　of　nature。　（6）　“The　same　action　of　mind；”　he　says；
“which　discovers　a　thing　in　question；　judges　it；　and　the　operation　is　not　performed　by　the　help　of
any　middle　term；　but　directly；　almost　in　the　same　manner　as　by　the　sense。　For　the　sense　in　its
primary　objects　at　once　apprehends　the　appearance　of　the　object；　and　consents　to　the　truth
thereof。”　（7）　The　syllogism　is　altogether　rejected　by　Bacon。　As　a　matter　of　fact；　this　Aristotelian
deduction　is　not　a　knowledge　through　itself　in　accordance　with　its　content：　it　requires　a　foreign
universal　as　its　basis；　and　for　that　reason　its　movement　is　in　its　form　contingent。　The　content　is　not
in　unity　with　the　form；　and　this　form　is　hence　in　itself　contingent；　because　it；　considered　on　its　own
account；　is　the　movement　onwards　in　a　foreign　content。　The　major　premise　is　the　content　existent
for　itself；　the　minor　is　likewise　the　content　not　through　itself；　for　it　goes　back　into　the　infinite；　i。e。；　it
has　not　the　form　in　itself；　the　form　is　not　the　content。　The　opposite　may　always　be　made　out
equally　well　through　the　syllogism；　for　it　is　a　matter　of　indifference　to　this　form　what　content　is
made　its　basis。　“Dialectic　does　not　assist　in　the　discovery　of　the　arts；　many　arts　were　found　out　by
chance。”　（8）

It　was　not　against　this　syllogism　generally；　i。e。；　not　against　the　Notion　of　it　（for　Bacon　did　not
possess　this）；　but　against　deduction　as　it　was　put　into　operation；　as　it　was　to　the　scholastics　—　the
deduction　which　took　an　assumed　content　as　its　basis　—　that　Bacon　declaimed；　urging　that　the
content　of　experience　should　be　made　the　basis；　and　the　method　of　induction　pursued。　He
demanded　that　observations　on　nature　and　experiments　should　be　made　fundamental；　and　pointed
out　the　objects　whose　investigation　was　of　special　importance　in　the　interests　of　human　society；
and　so　on。　From　this　there　then　resulted　the　establishment　of　conclusions　through　induction　and
analogy。　（9）　In　fact　it　was　only　to　an　alteration　in　the　content　that；　without　being　aware　of　it；　Bacon
was　impelled。　For　though　he　rejected　the　syllogism　and　only　permitted　conclusions　to　be　reached
through　induction；　he　unconsciously　himself　drew　deductions；　likewise　all　these　champions　of
empiricism；　who　followed　after　him；　and　who　put　into　practice　what　he　demanded；　and　thought
they　could　by　observations；　experiments　and　experiences；　keep　the　matter　in　question　pure；　could
neither　so　do　without　drawing　deductions；　nor　without　introducing　conceptions；　and　they　drew
their　deductions　and　formed　their　notions　and　conceptions　all　the　more　freely　because　they　thought
that　they　had　nothing　to　do　with　conceptions　at　all；　nor　did　they　go　forth　from　deduction　to
immanent；　true　knowledge。　Thus　when　Bacon　set　up　induction　in　opposition　to　the　syllogism；　this
opposition　is　formal；　each　induction　is　also　a　deduction；　which　fact　was　known　even　to　Aristotle。
For　if　a　universal　is　deduced　from　a　number　of　things；　the　first　proposition　reads；　“These　bodies
have　these　qualities；”　the　second；　“All　these　bodies　belong　to　one　class；”　and　thus；　in　the　third
place；　this　class　has　these　qualities。　That　is　a　perfect　syllogism。　Induction　always　signifies　that
observations　are　instituted；　experiments　made；　experience　regarded；　and　from　this　the　universal
determination　is　derived。

We　have　already　called　to　mind　how　important　it　is　to　lead　on　to　the　content　as　the　content　of
actuality；　of　the　present；　for　the　rational　must　have　objective　truth。　The　reconciliation　of　spirit　with
the　world；　the　glorification　of　nature　and　of　all　actuality；　must　not　be　a　Beyond；　a　Futurity；　but　must
be　accomplished　now　and　here。　It　is　this　moment　of　the　now　and　here　which　thereby　comes　into
self…consciousness。　But　those　who　make　experiments　and　observations；　do　not　realize　what　they
are　really　doing；　for　the　sole　interest　taken　by　them　in　things；　is　owing　to　the　inward　and
unconscious　certainty　which　reason　has　of　finding　itself　in　actuality；　and　observations　and
experiments；　if　entered　upon　in　a　right　way；　result　in　showing　that　the　Notion　is　the　only　objective
existence。　The　sensuous　individual　eludes　the　experiments　even　while　it　is　being　operated　upon；
and　becomes　a　universal；　the　best　known　example　of　this　is　to　be　found　in　positive　and　negative
electricity　in　so　far　as　it　is　positive　and　negative。　There　is　another　shortcoming　of　a　formal　nature；
and　one　of　which　all　empiricists　partake；　—　that　is　that　they　believe　themselves　to　be　keeping　to
experience　alone；　it　is　to　them　an　unknown　fact　that　in　receiving　these　perceptions　they　are
indulging　in　metaphysics。　Man　does　not　stop　short　at　the　individual；　nor　can　he　do　so。　He　seeks
the　universal；　but　thoughts；　even　if　not　Notions　likewise；　are　what　constitute　the　same。　The　most
remarkable　thought…form　is　that　of　force；　we　thus　speak　of　the　force　of　electricity；　of　magnetism；
of　gravity。　Force；　however；　is　a　universal　and　not　a　perceptible；　quite　uncritically　and
unconsciously　the　empiricists　thus　permit　of　determinations　such　as　these。

3。　Bacon　finally　gives　the　objects　with　which　Philosophy　mainly　has　to　deal。　These　objects　contrast
much　with　that　which　we　derive　from　perception　and　experience。　“In　the　summary　which　Bacon
gives　of　what　he　conceives　ought　to　be　the　objects　of　philosophical　inquiry；　are　the　following；　and
we　select　those　which　he　principally　dwells　upon　in　his　works：　‘The　prolongation　of　life；　the
restitution　of　youth　in　some　degree；　the　retardation　of　old　age；　and　the　altering　of　statures；　the
altering　of　features；　versions　of　bodies　into　other　bodies；　making　of　new　species；　impression　of　the
air　and　raising　tempests；　greater　pleasures　of　the　senses；　&c。’”　He　likewise　deals　with　objects
such　as　these；　and　he　seeks　to　direct　attention　upon　whether　in　their　regard　the　means　could　not　be
found　to　carry　out　their　ends；　in　such　powers　we　should　be　able　to　make　some　progress。　“He
complains　that　such　investigations　have　been　neglected　by　those　whom　be　designates　ignavi
regionum　exploratores。　In　his　Natural　History　he　gives　formal　receipts　for　making　gold；　and
performing　many　wonders。”　（10）　Bacon　thus　does　not　by　any　means　take　the　intelligent
standpoint　of　an　investigation　of　nature；　being　still　involved　in　the　grossest　superstition；　false　magic；
&c。　This　we　f