history of philosophy-第15章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



c。　Further　comparison　between　the　History　of　Philosophy　and
Philosophy　itself。

We　may　appropriate　to　ourselves　the　whole　of　the　riches　apportioned　out　in　time：　it　must　be
shown　from　the　succession　in　philosophies　how　that　succession　is　the　systematization　of　the
science　of　Philosophy　itself。　But　a　distinction　is　to　be　noted　here：　that　which　first　commences　is
implicit；　immediate；　abstract；　general…it　is　what　has　not　yet　advanced；　the　more　concrete　and　richer
comes　later；　and　the　first　is　poorer　in　determinations。　This　may　appear　contrary　to　one's　first
impressions；　but　philosophic　ideas　are　often　enough　directly　opposed　to　ordinary　ideas；　and　what
is　generally　supposed；　is　not　found　to　be　the　case。　It　may　be　thought　that　what　comes　first　must　be
the　concrete。　The　child；　for　instance；　as　still　in　the　original　totality　of　his　nature；　is　thought　to　be
more　concrete　than　the　man；　hence　we　imagine　the　latter　to　be　more　limited；　no　longer　forming　a
totality；　but　living　an　abstract　life。　Certainly　the　man　acts　in　accordance　with　definite　ends；　not
bringing　his　whole　soul　and　mind　into　a　subject；　but　splitting　his　life　into　a　number　of　abstract
unities。　The　child　and　the　youth；　on　the　contrary；　act　straight　from　the　fullness　of　the　heart。　Feeling
and　sense…perception　come　first；　thought　last；　and　thus　feeling　appears　to　us　to　be　more　concrete
than　thought；　or　the　activity　of　abstraction　and　of　the　universal。　In　reality；　it　is　just　the　other　way。
The　sensuous　consciousness　is　certainly　the　more　concrete；　and　if　poorer　in　thought；　at　least　richer
in　content。　We　must　thus　distinguish　the　naturally　concrete　from　the　concrete　of　thought；　which　on
its　side；　again；　is　wanting　in　sensuous　matter。　The　child　is　also　the　most　abstract　and　the　poorest　in
thought：　as　to　what　pertains　to　nature；　the　man　is　abstract；　but　in　thought　he　is　more　concrete　than
the　child。　Man's　ends　and　objects　are　undoubtedly　abstract　in　general　affairs；　such　as　in
maintaining　his　family　or　performing　his　business　duties；　but　he　contributes　to　a　great　objective
organic　whole；　whose　progress　he　advances　and　directs。　In　the　acts　of　a　child；　on　the　other　hand；
only　a　childish　and；　indeed；　momentary　〃I；〃　and　in　those　of　the　youth　the　subjective　constitution　or
the　random　aim；　form　the　principle　of　action。　It　is　in　this　way　that　science　is　more　concrete　than
sense…perception。　

In　applying　this　to　the　different　forms　of　Philosophy；　it　follows　in　the　first　place；　that　the　earliest
philosophies　are　the　poorest　and　the　most　abstract。　In　them　the　Idea　is　least　determined；　they　keep
merely　to　generalities　not　yet　realized。　This　must　be　known　in　order　that　we　may　not　seek　behind
the　old　philosophies　for　more　than　we　are　entitled　to　find；　thus　we　need　not　require　from　them
determinations　proceeding　from　a　deeper　consciousness。　For　instance；　it　has　been　asked　whether
the　philosophy　of　Thales　is；　properly　speaking；　Theism　or　Atheism；　（5）　whether　he　asserted　a
personal　God　or　merely　an　impersonal；　universal　existence。　The　question　here　regards　the
attribution　of　subjectivity　to　the　highest　Idea；　the　conception　of　the　Personality　of　God。　Such
subjectivity　as　we　comprehend　it；　is　a　much　richer；　more　concentrated；　and　therefore　much　later
conception；　which　need　not　be　sought　for　in　distant　ages。　The　Greek　gods　had；　indeed；　personality
in　imagination　and　idea　like　the　one　God　of　the　Jewish　religion；　but　to　know　what　is　the　mere
picture　of　fancy；　and　what　the　insight　of　pure　Thought　and　Notion；　is　quite　another　thing。　If　we
take　as　basis　our　own　ideas　judged　by　these　deeper　conceptions；　an　ancient　Philosophy　may
undoubtedly　be　spoken　of　as　Atheism。　But　this　expression　would　at　the　same　time　be　false；　for　the
thoughts　as　thoughts　in　beginning；　could　not　have　arrived　at　the　development　which　we　have
reached。　

From　this　it　follows…since　the　progress　of　development　is　equivalent　to　further　determination；　and
this　means　further　immersion　in；　and　a　fuller　grasp　of　the　Idea　itself…that　the　latest；　most　modern
and　newest　philosophy　is　the　most　developed；　richest　and　deepest。　In　that　philosophy　everything
which　at　first　seems　to　be　past　and　gone　must　be　preserved　and　retained；　and　it　must　itself　be　a
mirror　of　the　whole　history。　The　original　philosophy　is　the　most　abstract；　because　it　is　the　original
and　has　not　as　yet　made　any　movement　forward；　the　last；　which　proceeds　from　this　forward　and
impelling　influence；　is　the　most　concrete。　This；　as　may　at　once　be　remarked；　is　no　mere　pride　in　the
philosophy　of　our　time；　because　it　is　in　the　nature　of　the　whole　process　that　the　more　developed
philosophy　of　a　later　time　is　really　the　result　of　the　previous　operations　of　the　thinking　mind；　and
that　it；　pressed　forwards　and　onwards　from　the　earlier　standpoints；　has　not　grown　up　on　its　own
account　or　in　a　state　of　isolation。　

It　must　also　be　recollected　that　we　must　not　hesitate　to　say；　what　is　naturally　implied；　that　the　Idea；
as　comprehended　and　shown　forth　in　the　latest　and　newest　philosophy；　is　the　most　developed；　the
richest　and　deepest。　I　call　this　to　remembrance　because　the　designation；　new　or　newest　of　all　in
reference　to　Philosophy；　has　become　a　very　common　by…word。　Those　who　think　they　express
anything　by　using　such　terms　might　quite　easily　render　thanks　respecting　any　number　of
philosophies　just　as　fast　as　their　inclination　directs；　regarding　either　every　shooting…star　and　even
every　candle…gleam　in　the　light　of　a　sun；　or　else　calling　every　popular　cry　a　philosophy；　and
adducing　as　proof　that　at　any　rate　there　are　so　many　philosophies　that　every　day　one　displaces
another。　Thus　they　have　the　category　in　which　they　can　place　any　apparently　significant
philosophy；　and　through　which　they　may　at　the　same　time　set　it　aside；　this　they　call　a
fashion…philosophy。　

　　　　　Scoffer；　thou　call'st　this　but　a　fleeting　phase
　　　　　When　the　Spirit　of　Man　once　again　and　anew；
　　　　　Strives　earnestly　on；　towards　forms　that　are　higher。　

A　second　consequence　has　regard　to　the　treatment　of　the　older　philosophies。　Such　insight　also
prevents　us　from　ascribing　any　blame　to　the　philosophies　when　we　miss　determinations　in　them
which　were　not　yet　present　to　their　culture；　and　similarly　it　prevents　our　burdening　them　with
deductions　and　assertions　which　were　neither　made　nor　thought　of　by　them；　though　they　might
correctly　enough　allow　themselves　to　be　derived　from　the　thought　of　such　a　philosophy。　It　is
necessary　to　set　to　work　on　an　historical　basis；　and　to　ascribe　to　Philosophy　what　is　immediately
given　to　us；　and　that　alone。　Errors　crop　up　here　in　most　histories　of　Philosophy；　since　we　may　see
in　them　a　number　of　metaphysical　propositions　ascribed　to　a　philosopher　and　given　out　as　an
historical　statement　of　the　views　which　he　has　propounded；　of　which　he　neither　thought　nor　knew　a
word；　and　of　which　there　is　not　the　slightest　trace　found　in　history。　Thus　in　Brucker's　great　History
of　Philosophy　（Pt。　I。　pp。　465…478　seq。）　a　list　of　thirty；　forty；　or　a　hundred　theorems　are　quoted
from　Thales　and　others；　no　idea　of　which　can　be　traced　in　history　as　having　been　present　to　these
philosophers。　There　are　also　propositions　in　support　of　them　and　citations　taken　from　discussions
of　a　similar　kind　with　which　we　may　occupy　ourselves　long　enough。　Brucker's　method　is　to　endow
the　single　theorem　of　an　ancient　philosopher　with　all　the　consequences　and　premises　which　must；
according　to　the　idea　of　the　Wolffian　Metaphysics；　be　the　premises　and　conclusions　of　that
theorem；　and　thus　easily　to　produce　a　simple；　naked　fiction　as　if　it　were　an　actual　historical　fact。
Thus；　according　to　Brucker；　Thales　said；　Ex　nihilo　fit　nihil；　since　he　said　that　water　was　eternal。
Thus；　too；　he　was　to　be　counted　amongst　the　philosophers　who　deny　creation　out　of　nothing；　and
of　this；　historically　at　least；　Thales　was　ignorant。　Professor　Ritter；　too；　whose　history　of　Ionic
Philosophy　is　carefully　written；　and　who　on　the　whole　is　cautious　not　to　introduce　foreign　matter；
has　very　possibly　ascribed　to　Thales　more　than　is　found　in　history。　He　says　（pp。　12；　13）；　〃Hence
we　must　regard　the　view　of　nature　which　we　find　in　Thales　as　dynamic　in　principle。　He　regarded
the　world　as　the