history of philosophy-第12章

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moments　in　development。　Philosophy　has　now　become　for　itself　the　apprehension　of　this
development；　and　as　conceiving　Thought；　is　itself　this　development　in　Thought。　The　more　progress
made　in　this　development；　the　more　perfect　is　the　Philosophy。　

This　development　goes　no　further　out　than　into　externality；　but　the　going　without　itself　of
development　also　is　a　going　inwards。　That　is　to　say；　the　universal　Idea　continues　to　remain　at　the
foundation　and　still　is　the　all…embracing　and　unchangeable。　While　in　Philosophy　the　going　out　of　the
Idea　in　course　of　its　development　is　not　a　chance；　a　becoming　〃another；〃　but　really　is　a　going　within
itself；　a　self…immersion；　the　progress　forward　makes　the　Idea　which　was　previously　general　and
undetermined；　determined　within　itself。　Further　development　of　the　Idea　or　its　further　determination
is　the　same　thing　exactly。　Depth　seems　to　signify　intensiveness；　but　in　this　case　the　most　extensive
is　also　the　most　intensive。　The　more　intensive　is　the　Mind；　the　more　extensive　is　it；　hence　the　larger
is　its　embrace。　Extension　as　development；　is　not　dispersion　or　falling　asunder；　but　a　uniting　bond
which　is　the　more　powerful　and　intense　as　the　expanse　of　that　embraced　is　greater　in　extent　and
richer。　In　such　a　case　what　is　greater　is　the　strength　of　opposition　and　of　separation；　and　the
greater　power　overcomes　the　greater　separation。　

These　are　the　abstract　propositions　regarding　the　nature　of　the　Idea　and　of　its　development；　and
thus　within　it　Philosophy　in　its　developed　state　is　constituted：　it　is　one　Idea　in　its　totality　and　in　all　its
individual　parts；　like　one　life　in　a　living　being；　one　pulse　throbs　throughout　all　its　members。　All　the
parts　represented　in　it；　and　their　systematization；　emanate　from　the　one　Idea；　all　these　particulars
are　but　the　mirrors　and　copies　of　this　one　life；　and　have　their　actuality　only　in　this　unity。　Their
differences　and　their　various　qualities　are　only　the　expression　of　the　Idea　and　the　form　contained
within　it。　Thus　the　Idea　is　the　central　point；　which　is　also　the　periphery；　the　source　of　light；　which　in
all　its　expansion　does　not　come　without　itself；　but　remains　present　and　immanent　within　itself。　Thus
it　is　both　the　system　of　necessity　and　its　own　necessity；　which　also　constitutes　its　freedom。　

3。　RESULTS　OBTAINED　WITH　RESPECT　TO　THE　NOTION　OF　THE
HISTORY　OF　PHILOSOPHY。

Thus　we　see　that　Philosophy　is　system　in　development；　the　history　of　Philosophy　is　the　same；　and
this　is　the　main　point　to　be　noted　and　the　first　principle　to　be　dealt　with　in　this　treatise　on　that
history。　In　order　to　make　this　evident；　the　difference　in　respect　to　the　possible　modes　of
manifestation　must　first　be　pointed　out。　That　is　to　say；　the　progression　of　the　various　stages　in　the
advance　of　Thought　may　occur　with　the　consciousness　of　necessity；　in　which　case　each　in
succession　deduces　itself；　and　this　form　and　this　determination　can　alone　emerge。　Or　else　it　may
come　about　without　this　consciousness　as　does　a　natural　and　apparently　accidental　process；　so
that　while　inwardly；　indeed；　the　Notion　brings　about　its　result　consistently；　this　consistency　is　not
made　manifest。　This　is　so　in　nature；　in　the　various　stages　of　the　development　of　twigs；　leaves；
blossom　and　fruit；　each　proceeds　for　itself；　but　the　inward　Idea　is　the　directing　and　determining
force　which　governs　the　progression。　This　is　also　so　with　the　child　whose　bodily　powers；　and
above　all　whose　intellectual　activities；　make　their　appearance　one　after　the　other；　simply　and
naturally；　so　that　those　parents　who　form　such　an　experience　for　the　first　time；　marvel　whence　all
that　is　now　showing　itself　from　within；　comes　from；　for　the　whole　of　these　manifestations　merely
have　the　form　of　a　succession　in　time。　

The　one　kind　of　progression　which　represents　the　deduction　of　the　forms；　the　necessity　thought　out
and　recognized；　of　the　determinations；　is　the　business　of　Philosophy；　and　because　it　is　the　pure
Idea　which　is　in　question　and　not　yet　its　mere　particularized　form　as　Nature　and　as　Mind；　that
representation　is；　in　the　main；　the　business　of　logical　Philosophy。　But　the　other　method；　which
represents　the　part　played　by　the　history　of　Philosophy；　shows　the　different　Stages　and　moments　in
development　in　time；　in　manner　of　occurrence；　in　particular　places；　in　particular　people　or　political
circumstances；　the　complications　arising　thus；　and；　in　short；　it　shows　us　the　empirical　form。　This
point　of　view　is　the　only　one　worthy　of　this　science。　From　the　very　nature　of　the　subject　it　is
inherently　the　true　one；　and　through　the　study　of　this　history　it　will　be　made　manifest　that　it　actually
shows　and　proves　itself　so。　

Now　in　reference　to　this　Idea；　I　maintain　that　the　sequence　in　the　systems　of　Philosophy　in　History
is　similar　to　the　sequence　in　the　logical　deduction　of　the　Notion　…　determinations　in　the　Idea。　I
maintain　that　if　the　fundamental　conceptions　of　the　systems　appearing　in　the　history　of　Philosophy
be　entirely　divested　of　what　regards　their　outward　form；　their　relation　to　the　particular　and　the　like；
the　various　stages　in　the　determination　of　the　Idea　are　found　in　their　logical　Notion。　Conversely　in
the　logical　progression　taken　for　itself；　there　is；　so　far　as　its　principal　elements　are　concerned；　the
progression　of　historical　manifestations；　but　it　is　necessary　to　have　these　pure　Notions　in　order　to
know　what　the　historical　form　contains。　It　may　be　thought　that　Philosophy　must　have　another　order
as　to　the　stages　in　the　Idea　than　that　in　which　these　Notions　have　gone　forth　in　time；　but　in　the　main
the　order　is　the　same。　This　succession　undoubtedly　separates　itself；　on　the　one　hand；　into　the
sequence　in　time　of　History；　and　on　the　other　into　succession　in　the　order　of　ideas。　But　to　treat
more　fully　of　this　last　would　divert　us　too　far　from　our　aim。　

I　would　only　remark　this；　that　what　has　been　said　reveals　that　the　study　of　the　history　of
Philosophy　is　the　study　of　Philosophy　itself；　for；　indeed；　it　can　be　nothing　else。　Whoever　studies
the　history　of　sciences　such　as　Physics　and　Mathematics　makes　himself　acquainted　with　Physics
and　Mathematics　themselves。　But　in　order　to　obtain　a　knowledge　of　its　progress　as　the
development　of　the　Idea　in　the　empirical；　external　form　in　which　Philosophy　appears　in　History；　a
corresponding　knowledge　of　the　Idea　is　absolutely　essential；　just　as　in　judging　of　human　affairs　one
must　have　a　conception　of　that　which　is　right　and　fitting。　Else；　indeed；　as　in　so　many　histories　of
Philosophy；　there　is　presented　to　the　vision　devoid　of　idea；　only　a　disarranged　collection　of
opinions。　To　make　you　acquainted　with　this　Idea；　and　consequently　to　explain　the　manifestations；
is　the　business　of　the　history　of　Philosophy；　and　to　do　this　is　my　object　in　undertaking　to　lecture　on
the　subject。　Since　the　observer　must　bring　with　him　the　Notion　of　the　subject　in　order　to　see　it　in
its　phenomenal　aspect　and　in　order　to　expose　the　object　faithfully　to　view；　we　need　not　wonder　at
there　being　so　many　dull　histories　of　Philosophy　in　which　the　succession　of　its　systems　are
represented　simply　as　a　number　of　opinions；　errors　and　freaks　of　thought。　They　are　freaks　of
thought　which；　indeed；　have　been　devised　with　a　great　pretension　of　acuteness　and　of　mental
exertion；　and　with　everything　else　which　can　be　said　in　admiration　of　what；　is　merely　formal。　But；
considering　the　absence　of　philosophic　mind　in　such　historians　as　these；　how　should　they　be　able
to　comprehend　and　represent　the　content；　which　is　reasoned　thought？　

It　is　shown　from　what　has　been　said　regarding　the　formal　nature　of　the　Idea；　that　only　a　history　of
Philosophy　thus　regarded　as　a　system　of　development　in　Idea；　is　entitled　to　the　name　of　Science：　a
collection　of　facts　constitutes　no　science。　Only　thus　as　a　succession　of　phenomena　established
through　reason；　and　having　as　content　just　what　is　reason　and　revealing　it；　does　this　history　show
that　it　is　rational：　it　shows　that　the　events　recorded　are　in　reason。　How　should　the　whole　of　what
has　taken　place　in　reason　not　itself　be　rational？　That　faith　must　surely　be　the　more　reasonable　in
which　chance　is　not　made　ruler　over　human　affairs；　an