history of philosophy-第109章

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different　from　what　is　perceived。　Now　intellectual　intuition　is　the　organ　of　all　transcendental
thought；”　the　act　of　pure　self…consciousness　generally。　“The　ego　is　nothing　else　than　a　process　of
production　which　ever　makes　itself　its　own　object。　Science　can　start　from　nothing　objective；”　but
from　“the　non…objective　which　itself　becomes　object”　as　an　“original　duplicity。　Idealism　is　the
mechanism　of　the　origination　of　the　objective　world　from　the　inward　principle　of　spiritual　activity。”
（10）

On　the　one　hand　Schelling's　system　is　related　to　the　philosophy　of　Fichte；　and；　on　the　other　hand；
he；　like　Jacobi；　makes　his　principle　immediate　knowledge　—　the　intelligent　intuitive　perception
which　all　who　wish　to　philosophize　must　have。　But　what　comes　next　is　that　its　content　is　no　longer
the　indeterminate；　the　essence　of　essence；　but　likewise　the　Absolute；　God；　the　absolutely
self…existent；　though　expressed　as　concrete；　i。e。　as　mediating　itself　within　itself；　as　the　absolute
unity　or　indifference　of　subjective　and　objective。　Intellectual　intuition　is　the　Fichtian　imagination
oscillating　between　two　different　points。　We　have　already　spoken　above　（p。　417）　of　the　form　of
intellectual　intuition；　it　is　the　most　convenient　manner　of　asserting　knowledge　respecting　—　anything
one　likes。　But　the　immediate　knowledge　of　God　as　spiritual　is　only　in　the　consciousness　of
Christian　nations；　and　not　for　others。　This　immediate　knowledge　appears　to　be　still　more
contingent　as　the　intellectual　intuition　of　the　concrete；　or　the　identity　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity。
This　intuition　is　intellectual　indeed；　because　it　is　a　rational　intuition；　and　as　knowledge　it　is　likewise
absolutely　one　with　the　object　of　knowledge。　But　this　intuition；　although　itself　knowledge；　is　not　as
yet　known；　it　is　the　unmediated；　the　postulated。　As　it　is　in　this　way　an　immediate　we　must　possess
it；　and　what　may　be　possessed　may　likewise　not　be　possessed。　Thus　since　the　immediate
pre…supposition　in　Philosophy　is　that　individuals　have　the　immediate　intuition　of　this　identity　of
subjective　and　objective；　this　gave　the　philosophy　of　Schelling　the　appearance　of　indicating　that　the
presence　of　this　intuition　in　individuals　demanded　a　special　talent；　genius；　or　condition　of　mind　of
their　own；　or　as　though　it　were　generally　speaking　an　accidental　faculty　which　pertained　to　the
specially　favoured　few。　For　the　immediate；　the　intuitively　perceived；　is　in　the　form　of　an　existent；
and　is　not　thus　an　essential；　and　whoever　does　not　understand　the　intellectual　intuition　must　come
to　the　conclusion　that　he　does　not　possess　it。　Or　else；　in　order　to　understand　it；　men　must　give
themselves　the　trouble　of　possessing　it；　but　no　one　can　tell　whether　he　has　it　or　not　—　not　even
from　understanding　it；　for　we　may　merely　think　we　understand　it。　Philosophy；　however；　is　in　its
own　nature　capable　of　being　universal；　for　its　ground…work　is　thought；　and　it　is　through　thought　that
man　is　man。　Schelling's　principle　is　thus　indeed　clearly　a　universal；　but　if　a　definite　intuition；　a
definite　consciousness　is　demanded；　such　as　the　consciousness　or　intuition　of　the　identity　of
subjective　and　objective；　this　determinate　particular　thought　is　not　as　yet　to　be　found　in　it。

It　was；　however；　in　this　form　of　knowledge　of　the　absolute　as　concrete；　and；　further；　in　the　form　of
unity　of　subjective　and　objective；　that　Philosophy　as　represented　by　Schelling　more　especially
marked　itself　off　from　the　ordinary　conceiving　consciousness　and　its　mode　of　reflection。　Even　less
than　Fichte　did　Schelling　attain　to　popularity　（supra；　pp。　504；　505）；　for　the　concrete　in　its　nature　is
directly　speculative。　The　concrete　content；　God；　life；　or　whatever　particular　form　it　has；　is　indeed
the　content　and　object　of　natural　consciousness；　but　the　difficulty　lies　in　bringing　what　is　contained
in　the　concrete　into　concrete　thought　in　accordance　with　its　different　determinations；　and　in　laying
hold　of　the　unity。　It　pertains　to　the　standpoint　of　the　understanding　to　divide　and　to　distinguish；　and
to　maintain　the　finite　thought…determinations　in　their　opposition；　but　Philosophy　demands　that　these
different　thoughts　should　be　brought　together。　Thought　begins　by　holding　apart　infinite　and　finite；
cause　and　effect；　positive　and　negative；　since　this　is　the　region　of　reflecting　consciousness；　the　old
metaphysical　consciousness　was　able　to　take　part　in　so　doing：　but　the　speculative　point　of　view　is
to　have　this　opposition　before　itself　and　to　reconcile　it。　With　Schelling　the　speculative　form　has　thus
again　come　to　the　front；　and　philosophy　has　again　obtained　a　special　character　of　its　own；　the
principle　of　Philosophy；　rational　thought　in　itself；　has　obtained　the　form　of　thought。　In　the
philosophy　of　Schelling　the　content；　the　truth；　has　once　more　become　the　matter　of　chief
importance；　whereas　in　the　Kantian　philosophy　the　point　of　interest　was　more　especially　stated　to
be　the　necessity　for　investigating　subjective　knowledge。　This　is　the　standpoint　of　Schelling's
philosophy　in　its　general　aspects。

b。　Since　in　further　analysis　the　distinction　between　subject　and　object　comes　into　view　and　is
accepted；　there　follows　the　relationship　of　the　ego　to　its　other；　with　Fichte　that　forms　the　second
proposition；　in　which　the　self…limitation　of　the　ego　is　posited。　The　ego　posits　itself　in　opposition　to
itself；　since　it　posits　itself　as　conditioned　by　the　non…ego；　that　is　the　infinite　repulsion；　for　this
conditionment　is　the　ego　itself。　Schelling；　on　the　one　hand；　says：　“The　ego　is　unlimited　as　the　ego
only　in　so　far　as　it　is　limited；”　as　it　relates　to　the　non…ego。　Only　thus　does　consciousness　exist；
self…consciousness　is　a　barren　determination；　through　its　intuition　of　self　the　ego　becomes　finite　to
itself。　“This　contradiction　only　allows　itself　to　be　dissolved　by　the　ego　becoming　in　this　finitude
infinite　to　itself；　i。e。　by　its　having　an　intuitive　perception　of　itself　as　an　infinite　Becoming。”　The
relation　of　the　ego　to　itself　and　to　the　infinite　check　or　force　of　repulsion　is　a　constant　one。　On　the
other　hand　it　is　said：　“The　ego　is　limited　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　unlimited；”　this　limitation　is　thus
necessary　in　order　to　be　able　to　get　beyond　it。　The　contradiction　which　we　find　here　remains　even
if　the　ego　always　limits　the　non…ego。　“Both　activities　—　that　which　makes　for　infinitude；　the
limitable；　real；　objective　activity；　and　the　limiting　and　ideal；　mutually　pre…suppose　one　another。
Idealism　reflects　merely　on　the　one；　realism　on　the　other；　transcendental　idealism　on　both。”　（11）
All　this　is　a　tangled　mass　of　abstractions。

c。　“Neither　through　the　limiting　activity　nor　through　the　limited　does　the　ego　arrive　at
self…consciousness。　There　consequently　is　a　third　activity；　compounded　from　the　other　two；
through　which　the　ego　of　self…consciousness　arises；　this　third　is　that　which　oscillates　between　the
two　—　the　struggle　between　opposing　tendencies。”　There　is　essential　relation　only；　relative
identity；　the　difference　therein　present　thus　ever　remains。　“This　struggle　cannot　be　reconciled　by
one　such　action；　but　only　by　an　infinite　succession　of　such；”　i。e。　the　reconciliation　of　the
opposition　between　the　two　tendencies　of　the　ego；　the　inward　and　the　outward；　is；　in　the　infinite
course　of　progression；　only　an　apparent　one。　In　order　that　it　may　be　complete；　the　whole　inward
and　outward　nature　must　be　presented　in　all　its　details：　but　Philosophy　can　only　set　forth　the
epochs　which　are　most　important。　“If　all　the　intermediate　links　in　sensation　could　be　set　forth；　that
would　necessarily　lead　us　to　a　deduction　of　all　the　qualities　in　nature；　which　last　is　impossible。”
Now　this　third　activity；　which　contains　the　union　directly　in　itself；　is　a　thought　in　which　particularity
is　already　contained。　It　is　the　intuitive　understanding　of　Kant；　the　intelligent　intuition　or　intuitively
perceiving　intelligence；　Schelling；　indeed；　definitely　names　this　absolute　unity　of　contradictions
intellectual　intuition。　The　ego　here　is　not　one…sided　in　regard　to　what　is　different；　it　is　identity　of　the
unconscious　and　the　conscious；　but　not　an　identity　of　such　a　nature　that　its　ground　rests　o