history of philosophy-第104章

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it　is　a　progression　implying　just　the　same　contradiction　as　that　found　in　Kant；　and　having　no　present
actuality　in　itself；　for　the　ego　has　all　actuality　in　its　opposition　only。　The　Fichtian　philosophy
recognizes　the　finite　spirit　alone；　and　not　the　infinite；　it　does　not　recognize　spirit　as　universal
thought；　as　the　Kantian　philosophy　does　not　recognize　the　not…true；　or　it　is　formal。　The　knowledge
of　absolute　unity　is　apprehended　as　faith　in　a　moral　disposition　of　the　world；　an　absolute
hypothesis　in　accordance　with　which　we　have　the　belief　that　every　moral　action　that　we　perform
will　have　a　good　result。（27）　As　in　Kant's　case；　this　Idea　belongs　to　universal　thought。　“In　a　word；
when　anything　is　apprehended　it　ceases　to　be　God；　and　every　conception　of　God　that　is　set　up　is
necessarily　that　of　a　false　God。　Religion　is　a　practical　faith　in　the　moral　government　of　the　world；
faith　in　a　supersensuous　world　belongs；　according　to　our　philosophy；　to　the　immediate　verities。”
（28）　Fichte　thus　concludes　with　the　highest　Idea；　with　the　union　of　freedom　and　nature；　but　a　union
of　such　a　nature　that；　immediately　regarded；　it　is　not　known；　the　opposition　alone　falls　within
consciousness。　This　union　of　faith　he　likewise　finds　in　the　Love　of　God。　As　believed　and
experienced；　this　form　pertains　to　Religion；　and　not　to　Philosophy；　and　our　only　possible　interest　is
to　know　this　in　Philosophy。　But　with　Fichte　it　is　still　associated　with　a　most　unsatisfying　externality
of　which　the　basis　is　the　non…Idea；　for　the　one　determination　is　essential　only　because　the　other　is
so；　and　so　on　into　infinitude。　“The　theory　of　knowledge　is　realistic　—　it　shows　that　the
consciousness　of　finite　beings　can　only　be　explained　by　presupposing　an　independent　and　wholly
opposite　power；　on　which；　in　accordance　with　their　empirical　existence；　they　themselves　are
dependent。　But　it　asserts　nothing　more　than　this　opposed　power；　which　by　finite　beings　can　merely
be　felt　and　not　known。　All　possible　determinations　of　this　power　or　of　this　non…ego　which　can
come　forth　into　infinity　in　our　consciousness；　it　pledges　itself　to　deduce　from　the　determining
faculties　of　the　ego；　and　it　must　actually　be　able　to　deduce　these；　so　certainly　as　it　is　a　theory　of
knowledge。　This　knowledge；　however；　is　not　transcendent　but　transcendental。　It　undoubtedly
explains　all　consciousness　from　something　independent　of　all　consciousness；　but　it　does　not　forget
that　this　independent　somewhat　is　again　a　product　of　its　own　power　of　thought；　and　consequently
something　dependent　on　the　ego；　in　so　far　as　it　has　to　be　there　for　the　ego。　Everything　is；　in　its
ideality；　dependent　upon　the　ego；　but　in　its　reality　even　the　ego　is　dependent。　The　fact　that　the　finite
spirit　must　posit　for　itself　somewhat　outside　of　itself；　which　last　exists　only　for　it；　is　that　circle　which
it　may　infinitely　extend　but　never　break　through。”　The　further　logical　determination　of　the　object　is
that　which　in　subject　and　object　is　identical；　the　true　connection　is　that　in　which　the　objective　is　the
possession　of　the　ego；　as　thought；　the　ego　in　itself　determines　the　object。　But　Fichte's　theory　of
knowledge　regards　the　struggle　of　the　ego　with　the　object　as　that　of　the　continuous　process　of
determining　the　object　through　the　ego　as　subject　of　consciousness；　without　the　identity　of　the
restfully　self…developing　Notion。

Thirdly；　because　the　ego　is　thus　fixed　in　its　one…sidedness；　there　proceeds　from　it；　as　representing
one　extreme；　the　whole　of　the　progress　that　is　made　in　the　content　of　knowledge；　and　the
deduction　of　the　philosophy　of　Fichte；　cognition　in　its　content　and　form；　is　a　progression　from
certain　determinations　to　others　which　do　not　turn　back　into　unity；　or　through　a　succession　of
finitenesses　which　do　not　have　the　Absolute　in　them　at　all。　The　absolute　point　of　view；　like　an
absolute　content；　is　wanting。　Thus　the　contemplation　of　nature；　for　instance；　is　a　contemplation　of　it
as　of　pure　finitenesses　from　the　point　of　view　of　another；　as　though　the　organic　body　were
regarded　thus：　“Consciousness　requires　a　sphere　entirely　its　own　for　its　activity。　This　sphere　is
posited　through　an　original；　necessary　activity　of　the　ego；　in　which　it　does　not　know　itself　as　free。　It
is　a　sensuous　perception；　a　drawing　of　lines；　the　sphere　of　activity　thereby　becomes　something
extended　in　space。　As　quiescent；　continuous；　and　yet　unceasingly　changing；　this　sphere　is　matter；
which；　as　body；　has　a　number　of　parts　which　in　relation　to　one　another　are　called　limbs。　The
person　can　ascribe　to　himself　no　body　without　positing　it　as　being　under　the　influence　of　another
person。　But　it　is　likewise　essential　that　I　should　be　able　to　check　this　same　influence；　and　external
matter　is　also　posited　as　resisting　my　influences　on　it；　i。e。　as　a　tough；　compact　matter。”　（29）　These
tough　matters　must　further　be　separated　from　one　another　—　the　different　persons　cannot　hold
together　like　one　mass　of　dough。　For　“my　body　is　my　body　and　not　that　of　another；　it　must　further
operate　and　be　active　without　my　working　through　it。　It　is　only　through　the　operation　of　another
that　I　can　myself　be　active　and　represent　myself　as　a　rational　being　who　can　be　respected　by　him。
But　the　other　being　should　treat　me　immediately　as　a　rational　being；　I　should　be　for　him　a　rational
being　even　before　my　activity　begins。　Or　my　form　must　produce　an　effect　through　its　mere
existence　in　space；　without　my　activity；　i。e。　it　must　be　visible。　The　reciprocal　operation　of　rational
beings　must　take　place　without　activity；　thus　a　subtle　matter　must　be　assumed　in　order　that　it　way
be　modified　by　means　of　the　merely　quiescent　form。　In　this　way　are　deduced　first　Light　and　then
Air。”　（30）　This　constitutes　a　very　external　manner　of　passing　from　one　step　to　another；　resembling
the　method　of　the　ordinary　teleology；　which　makes　out；　for　instance；　that　plants　and　animals　are
given　for　the　nourishment　of　mankind。　This　is　how　it　is　put：　Man　must　eat；　and　thus　there　must　be
something　edible　—　consequently　plants　and　animals　are　at　once　deduced；　plants　must　have　their
root　in　something；　and　consequently　the　earth　is　forthwith　deduced。　What　is　altogether　lacking　is
any　consideration　of　the　object　as　what　it　is　in　itself；　it　is　plainly　considered　only　in　relation　to
another。　In　this　way　the　animal　organism　appears　as　a　tough；　tenacious　matter　which　is
“articulated”　and　can　be　modified；　light　is　a　subtle　matter　which　is　the　medium　of　communication
of　mere　existence；　&c。　—　just　as　in　the　other　case　plants　and　animals　are　merely　edible。　As　regards
a　philosophic　consideration　of　the　content　there　is　nothing　at　all　to　be　found。

Fichte　likewise　wrote　both　a　Science　of　Morals　and　of　Natural　Rights；　but　he　treats　them　as
sciences　pertaining　to　the　understanding　only；　and　his　method　of　procedure　is　destitute　of　ideas
and　carried　on　by　means　of　a　limited　understanding。　The　Fichtian　deduction　of　the　conceptions　of
justice　and　morality　thus　remains　within　the　limitations　and　rigidity　of　self…consciousness；　as　against
which　Fichte's　popular　presentations　of　religion　and　morality　present　inconsistencies。　The　treatise
on　Natural　Rights　is　a　special　failure；　e。g。　where　he；　as　we　have　just　seen　（p。　502）；　deduces　even
nature　just　as　far　as　he　requires　it。　The　organization　of　the　state　which　is　described　in　Fichte's
Science　of　Rights　is　furthermore　as　unspiritual　as　was　the　deduction　of　natural　objects　just
mentioned；　and　as　were　many　of　the　French　constitutions　which　have　appeared　in　modern　times
—　a　formal；　external　uniting　and　connecting；　in　which　the　individuals　as　such　are　held　to　be
absolute；　or　in　which　Right　is　the　highest　principle。　Kant　began　to　ground　Right　upon　Freedom；
and　Fichte　likewise　makes　freedom　the　principle　in　the　Rights　of　Nature；　but；　its　was　the　case　with
Rousseau；　it　is　freedom　in　the　form　of　the　isolated　individual。　This　is　a　great　commencement；　but　in
order　to　arrive　at　the　particular；　they　have　to　accept　certain　hypotheses。　The　universal　is　not　the
spirit；　the　substance　of　the　whole；　but　an　external；　negative　power　of　the　finite　understanding
directed　against　individuals。　The　state　is　not　apprehended　in　its　essence；