history of philosophy-第102章

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determinations　of　the　ordinary　conception　and　of　thought；　but　without　—　on　the　theoretic　side　at
least　—　having　any　knowledge　of　it；　for　it　is　the　fact　of　being　limited　alone　that　is　present　to　it。　Thus；
when　I　see　a　large　square　object；　such　as　a　wall；　my　ordinary　consciousness　accepts　these
determinations　as　they　are　given　to　it；　the　object　is。　In　so　doing　I　do　not　think　of　seeing；　but　of　the
object；　seeing；　however；　is　my　activity；　the　determinations　of　my　faculty　of　sensation　are　thus
posited　through　me。（16）　The　ego　as　theoretic　is；　indeed；　aware　in　philosophic　consciousness　that　it
is　the　ego　which　posits；　but　here　it　posits　that　the　non…ego　posits　somewhat　in　me。　The　ego　thus
posits　itself　as　that　which　is　limited　by　the　non…ego。　I　make　this　limitation　mine；　thus　is　it　for　me　in
me；　this　passivity　of　the　ego　is　itself　the　activity　of　the　ego。　As　a　matter　of　fact；　all　reality　which
appears　in　the　object　for　the　ego　is　a　determination　of　the　ego；（17）　just　as　the　categories　and　other
determinations　were　in　Kant's　case。　Thus　it　is　here　more　especially　that　we　should　expect　Fichte　to
demonstrate　the　return　of　other…Being　into　absolute　consciousness。　However；　because　after　all　the
other…Being　was　regarded　as　unconditioned；　as　implicit；　this　return　does　not　come　to　pass。　The
ego　determines　the　'other；'　indeed；　but　this　unity　is　an　altogether　finite　unity；　non…ego　has　thus
immediately　escaped　from　determination　once　more　and　gone　forth　from　this　unity。　What　we　find
is　merely　an　alternation　between　self…consciousness　and　the　consciousness　of　another；　and　the
constant　progression　of　this　alternation；　which　never　reaches　any　end。（18）

The　development　of　theoretic　reason　is　the　following…out　of　the　manifold　relationships　between　the
ego　and　non…ego；　the　forms　of　this　limitation　which　Fichte　now　goes　through　are　the　determinations
of　the　object。　These　particular　thought…determinations　he　calls　categories；　and　he　seeks　to
demonstrate　them　in　their　necessity；　from　the　time　of　Aristotle　onwards　no　one　had　thought　of　so
doing。　The　first　of　these　forms　is　the　determination　of　reciprocity；　which　we　already　met　with　in　the
third　proposition：　“By　the　determination　of　the　reality　or　negation　of　the　ego；　the　negation　or　reality
of　the　non…ego　is　equally　determined；”　the　two　in　one　is　reciprocal　action。　In　the　second　place；
“Causality　is　the　same　degree　of　activity　in　the　one　as　of　passivity　in　the　other。”　In　so　far　as
something　is　considered　as　the　reality　of　the　non…ego；　the　ego　is　considered　as　passive；　and；　on　the
other　hand；　in　so　far　as　'I'　am　real；　the　object　is　passive；　this　relation；　that　the　passivity　of　the
object　is　my　activity　or　reality；　and　the　opposite；　is　the　conception　of　Causality。　“As　many　parts　of
negation　as　the　ego　posits　in　itself；　so　many　parts　of　reality　it　posits　in　the　non…ego；　it　therefore
posits　itself　as　self…determining　in　so　far　as　it　is　determined；　and　as　suffering　determination　in　so　far
as　it　determines　itself。　In　so　far；”　in　the　third　place；　“as　the　ego　is　regarded　as　embracing　the
whole　absolutely　determined　realm　of　all　reality；　it　is　substance；　on　the　other　hand　when　it　is
posited　in　a　not　absolutely　determined　sphere　of　this　realm；　in　so　far　there　is　an　accidence　in　the
ego。”　（19）　That　is　the　first　rational　attempt　that　has　ever　been　made　to　deduce　the　categories；　this
progress　from　one　determination　to　another　is；　however；　only　an　analysis　from　the　standpoint　of
consciousness；　and　is　not　in　and　for　itself。

The　ego　is　so　far　the　ideal　ground　of　all　conceptions　of　the　object；　all　determination　of　this　object　is
a　determination　of　the　ego。　But　in　order　that　it　may　be　object；　it　must　be　placed　in　opposition　to
the　ego；　i。e。　the　determinations　set　forth　through　the　ego　are　another；　the　non…ego；　this　placing　of
the　object　in　opposition　is　the　real　ground　of　conceptions。　The　ego　is；　however；　likewise　the　real
ground　of　the　object；　for　it　is　likewise　a　determination　of　the　ego　that　the　non…ego　as　object　is　set
in　opposition　to　the　ego。　Both；　the　real　ground　and　the　ideal　ground　of　the　conception；　are　thus
one　and　the　same。（20）　Regarding　the　ego　as　ideal　principle　and　the　non…ego　as　real　principle；
Krug　has　likewise　talked　a　great　deal　of　nonsense。　Regarded　from　the　one　point　of　view；　the　ego
is　active　and　the　non…ego　purely　passive；　while　from　the　other　side　the　ego　is　passive　and　the
object　active　and　operative。　But　since　the　ego　in　the　non…philosophic　consciousness　does　not　have
the　consciousness　of　its　activity　in　the　conception　of　the　object；　it　represents　to　itself　its　own
activity　as　foreign；　i。e。　as　belonging　to　the　non…ego。

We　here　see　the　opposition　adopting　various　forms：　ego；　non…ego；　positing；　setting　in　opposition；
two　sorts　of　activity　of　the　ego；　&c。　The　fact　that　I　represent　is　undoubtedly　my　activity；　but　the
matter　of　main　importance　is　the　content　of　the　positing　and　its　necessary　connection　through　itself。
If　one　occupies　oneself　only　with　this　content；　that　form　of　subjectivity　which　is　dominant　with
Fichte；　and　which　remains　in　his　opposition；　disappears。　As　the　ego　is　affirmative　and　determining；
there　now　is　in　this　determination　a　negative　likewise　present；　I　find　myself　determined　and　at　the
same　time　the　ego　is　like　itself；　infinite；　i。e。　identical　with　itself。　This　is　a　contradiction　which　Fichte
indeed　endeavours　to　reconcile；　but　in　spite　of　it　all　he　leaves　the　false　basis　of　dualism
undisturbed。　The　ultimate；　beyond　which　Fichte　does　not　get；　is　only　an　'ought；'　which　does　not
solve　the　contradiction；　for　while　the　ego　should　be　absolutely　at　home　with　itself；　i。e。　free；　it
should　at　the　same　time　be　associated　with　another。　To　Fichte　the　demand　for　the　solution　of　this
contradiction　thus　adopts　the　attitude　of　being　a　demanded　solution　only；　of　signifying　that　I　ever
have　to　destroy　the　barriers；　that　I　ever　have　to　reach　beyond　the　limitation　into　utter　infinitude；
and　that　I　ever　find　a　new　limit；　a　continual　alternation　takes　place　between　negation　and
affirmation；　an　identity　with　self　which　again　falls　into　negation；　and　from　this　negation　is　ever　again
restored。　To　speak　of　the　bounds　of　human　reason　is；　however；　an　unmeaning　form　of　words。
That　the　reason　of　the　subject　is　limited　is　comprehensible　from　the　nature　of　the　case；　but　when
we　speak　of　Thought；　infinitude　is　none　other　than　one's　own　relation　to　self；　and　not　to　one's　limit；
and　the　place　in　which　man　is　infinite　is　Thought。　Infinitude　may　then　be　likewise　very　abstract；　and
in　this　way　it　is　also　once　more　finite；　but　true　infinitude　remains　in　itself。

Fichte　further　deduces　the　ordinary　conception　thus：　the　fact　that　the　ego　in　going　forth　at　once
finds　its　activity　checked　by　a　limitation；　and　returns　once　more　into　itself；　brings　about　two
opposite　tendencies　in　me；　between　which　I　waver；　and　which　I　try　to　unite　in　the　faculty　of
imagination。　In　order　that　a　fixed　determination　may　exist　between　the　two；　I　have　to　make　the
limit　a　permanent　one；　and　we　have　that　in　the　understanding。　All　further　determinations　of　the
object　are；　as　categories　of　the　understanding；　modes　of　synthesis；　but　each　synthesis　is　a　new
contradiction。　New　mediations　are　thus　once　more　necessary；　and　these　are　new　determinations。
Thus　Fichte　says：　I　can　always　continue　to　determine　the　non…ego；　to　make　it　my　conception；　i。e。
to　take　from　it　its　negation　as　regards　me。　I　have　to　deal　with　my　activity　alone；　but　there　is　always
an　externality　therein　present　which　still　remains；　and　which　is　not　explained　by　my　activity。　This
Beyond　which　alone　remains　to　the　undetermined　ego　Fichte　calls　the　infinite　check　upon　the　ego；
with　which　it　ever　has　to　deal；　and　beyond　which　it　cannot　get；　thus　the　activity　which　proceeds
into　infinitude　finds　itself　checked　and　driven　back　by　this　repulsive　force；　and　then　it　reacts　upon
itself。　“The　ego　in　its　self…determination　has　been　considered　both　as　determining　and　determined；
if　we　reflect　on　the　fact　that　the　absolutely　determined　determining　power　must　be　an　absolutely
indeterminate；　and　further；　that　ego　and　non…ego　are　absolutely　opposed　to　one　another；　in　the　one
case　ego　is　the　indeterminate　and　in