history of philosophy-第101章

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it　many　other　determinations　of　our　Being。　I　merely　remark　this；　that　when　'I　am'　is　overstepped；
Spinozism　is　necessarily　reached。　Its　unity　is　something　which　ought　to　be　produced　through　us；
but　which　cannot　be　so；　it　is　not　anything　that　is。”　The　first　proposition　is　then　that　I　am　identical
with　myself；　Ego　=　Ego；（12）　that　undoubtedly　is　the　definition　of　the　ego。　The　subject　and　the
predicate　are　the　content；　and　this　content　of　the　two　sides　is　likewise　their　relation；　i。e。　form。
Relation　requires　two　sides；　the　relating　and　the　related　are　here；　however；　the　same；　for　on
account　of　the　simplicity　of　the　ego；　there　is　nothing　but　a　relation　of　the　ego　to　the　ego。　I　have
knowledge　of　myself；　but　in　so　far　as　I　am　consciousness；　I　know　of　an　object　which　is　different
from　me；　and　which　is　then　likewise　mine。　But　the　ego　is　in　such　a　way　identical　with　its　difference
that　what　is　different　is　immediately　the　same；　and　what　is　identical　is　likewise　different；　we　have　a
difference　without　a　difference。　Self…consciousness　is　not　dead　identity；　or　non…Being；　but　the
object　which　is　identical　with　me。　This　is　immediately　certain；　all　else　must　be　as　certain　to　me；
inasmuch　as　it　must　be　my　relation　to　myself。　The　content　must　be　transformed　into　the　ego；　so　that
in　it　I　have　my　determination　alone。　This　principle　is　at　first　abstract　and　deficient；　because　in　it　no
difference；　or　a　formal　difference　only　is　expressed；　whereas　the　principle　should　possess　a
content：　a　subject　and　a　predicate　are　indeed　distinguished　in　it；　but　only　for　us　who　reflect　upon　it；
i。e。　in　itself　there　is　no　difference；　and　consequently　no　true　content。　In　the　second　place；　this
principle　is　indeed　the　immediate　certainty　of　self…consciousness；　but　self…consciousness　is　likewise
consciousness；　and　in　it　there　is　likewise　the　certainty　that　other　things　exist　to　which　it　stands　in　an
attitude　of　opposition。　In　the　third　place；　that　principle　has　not　the　truth　in　it；　for　the　very　reason
that　the　certainty　of　itself　possessed　by　the　ego　has　no　objectivity；　it　has　not　the　form　of　the
differentiated　content　within　it　—　or　it　stands　in　opposition　to　the　consciousness　of　an　“other。”　

Now　in　order　that　determination　should　come　to　pass；　i。e。　a　content　and　difference；　it　is　essential
for　Fichte　that　a　second　principle　should　be　established；　which　in　regard　to　form　is　unconditioned；
but　the　content　of　which　is　conditioned；　because　it　does　not　belong　to　the　ego。　This　second
principle；　set　forth　under　the　first；　is；　“I　assert　a　non…ego　in　opposition　to　the　ego；”　and　in　this
something　other　than　absolute　self…consciousness　is　set　forth。（13）　To　this　pertains　the　form　therein
present；　relation；　but　the　content　is　the　non…ego；　another　content　from　the　ego。　We　might　say　that
through　this　content　the　proposition　is　independent；　since　the　negative　therein　is　an　absolute；　as
truly　as　the　reverse　—　that　it　is　independent　through　the　form　of　opposition　which　cannot　be
derived　from　the　original。　Here；　then；　we　have　no　more　to　do　with　derivation；　although　this
derivation　of　opposition　from　the　first　proposition　was　all　the　same　demanded。　Inasmuch　as　I　posit
another　in　opposition　to　the　ego；　I　posit　myself　as　not　posited；　this　non…ego　is　the　object　generally；
i。e。　that　which　is　opposed　to　me。　This　other　is　the　negative　of　the　ego；　thus　when　Fichte　called　it
the　non…ego　he　was　expressing　himself　in　a　very　happy；　suitable；　and　consistent　manner。　There　has
been　a　good　deal　of　ridicule　cast　on　the　ego　and　non…ego；　the　expression　is　new；　and　therefore　to
us　Germans　it　seems　strange　at　first。　But　the　French　say　Moi　and　Non…moi；　without　finding
anything　laughable　in　it。　In　this　principle　the　positing　belongs；　however；　to　the　ego；　but　because　the
non…ego　is　independent　of　the　ego；　we　have　two　sides；　and　self…consciousness　relates　itself　to
another。　This　second　proposition　thus　signifies　that　I　posit　myself　as　limited；　as　non…ego；　but
non…ego　is　something　quite　new　to　be　added。　On　the　one　side　we　thus　have　before　us　a　field　which
is　merely　appropriated　from　the　ego；　and　in　this　way　we　have　before　us　the　non…ego　as　our　object。

To　these　is　added　yet　a　third　proposition；　in　which　I　now　make　this　division　into　ego　and　non…ego：
it　is　the　synthetic　principle；　the　proposition　of　ground；　which　in　content　is　unconditioned；　just　as　in
the　second　was　the　case　in　regard　to　form。　This　third　proposition　is　the　determination　of　the　first
two　through　one　another；　in　such　a　way　that　the　ego　limits　the　non…ego。　“In　and　through　the　ego
both　the　ego　and　the　non…ego　are　posited　as　capable　of　being　mutually　limited　by　means　of　one
another；　i。e。　in　such　a　way　that　the　reality　of　the　one　abrogates　the　reality　of　the　other。”　In
limitation　both　are　negated；　but　“only　in　part”　；　only　thus　are　synthesis　and　deduction　possible。　I
posit　the　non…ego；　which　is　for　me；　in　myself；　in　my　identity　with　myself；　thus　I　take　it　from　its
non…identity；　its　not…being…I；　that　is　to　say　I　limit　it。　This　limitation　of　the　non…ego　Fichte　expresses
thus：　“I　place　in　opposition　to　the　ego；”　and　indeed　“to　the　divisible　ego；　a　divisible　non…ego。”
The　non…ego　I　destroy　as　a　complete　sphere；　which　it　was　according　to　the　second　principle；　and
posit　it　as　divisible；　I　likewise　posit　the　ego　as　divisible　in　so　far　as　the　non…ego　is　present　in　it。　The
whole　sphere　which　I　have　before　me　is　supposed　indeed　to　be　the　ego；　but　in　it　I　have　not　one
but　two。　The　proposition　of　ground　is　thus　the　relation　of　reality　and　negation；　i。e。　it　is　limitation；　it
contains　the　ego　limited　by　the　non…ego；　and　the　non…ego　limited　by　the　ego。（14）　Of　this　synthesis
there　is　nothing；　properly　speaking；　contained　in　the　two　earlier　propositions。　Even　this　first
presentation　of　the　three　principles　does　away　with　the　immanence　of　real　knowledge。　Thus　the
presentation　is　here　also　subject　to　an　opposite　from　the　first；　as　it　is　with　Kant；　even　if　these　are
two　acts　of　the　ego　merely；　and　we　remain　entirely　in　the　ego。

Now　that　limitation　may　take　place　for　me　in　two　different　ways：　at　one　time　the　one　is　passive；　at
another　time　the　other　is　so。　In　this　limitation　the　ego　may　posit　the　non…ego　as　limiting　and　itself　as
limited；　in　such　a　way　that　the　ego　posits　itself　as　requiring　to　have　an　object；　I　know　myself　indeed
as　ego；　but　determined　by　the　non…ego；　non…ego　is　here　active　and　ego　passive。　Or；　on　the　other
hand；　the　ego；　as　abrogating　other…being；　is　that　which　limits；　and　non…ego　is　the　limited。　I　know
myself　then　as　clearly　determining　the　non…ego；　as　the　absolute　cause　of　the　non…ego　as　such；　for　I
can　think。　The　first　is　the　proposition　of　the　theoretic　reason；　of　intelligence：　the　second　the
proposition　of　practical　reason；　of　will。（15）　The　will　is　this；　that　I　am　conscious　of　myself　as　limiting
the　object；　thus　I　make　myself　exercise　activity　upon　the　object　and　maintain　myself。　The　theoretic
proposition　is　that　the　object　is　before　me　and　it　determines　me。　The　ego　is；　since　I　perceive；　a
content；　and　I　have　this　content　in　me；　which　is　thus　outside　of　me。　This　is　on　the　whole　the　same
thing　as　we　meet　with　in　the　experience　of　Kant：　it　comes　to　the　same　thing　whether　it　is　by　matter
or　the　non…ego　that　the　ego　is　here　determined。

b。　In　the　theoretic　consciousness　the　ego；　although　the　assertive　generally；　finds　itself　limited　by　the
non…ego。　But　it　is　identical　with　itself；　hence　its　infinite　activity　ever　sets　itself　to　abrogate　the
non…ego　and　to　bring　forth　itself。　Now　the　different　methods　whereby　the　ego　sets　forth　itself　are
the　different　methods　of　its　activity；　these　we　have　to　understand　in　their　necessity。　But　since
philosophic　knowledge　is　the　consideration　of　consciousness　itself　（supra；　p。　483）；　I　can　only
know　knowledge；　the　act　of　the　ego。　Fichte　thus　appeals　to　consciousness；　postulates　ego　and
non…ego　in　their　abstraction；　and　since　philosophic　knowledge　is　the　consciousness　of
consciousness；　it　is　not　sufficient　that　I　should　find　its　determinations　in　consciousness；　for　I
produce　them　with　consciousness。　Common　consciousness；　indeed；　likewise　brings　forth　all　the
determinations　of　the　ordinary　conception　and　of　thought；　but　withou