history of philosophy-第100章

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with；　or　not　distinguished　from　it。（4）　Hence　it　is　pure　thought；　or　the　ego　is　the　true　synthetic
judgment　a　priori；　as　Kant　called　it。　This　principle　is　apprehended　actuality；　for　the　taking　back　of
the　other…Being　into　self…consciousness　is　just　apprehension。　The　Notion　of　the　Notion　is　from　this
point　of　view　found　in　the　fact　that　in　what　is　apprehended　self…consciousness　has　the　certainty　of
itself；　what　is　not　apprehended　is　something　foreign　to　it。　This　absolute　Notion　or　this　absolutely
existent　infinitude　it　is　which　has　to　be　developed　in　knowledge；　and　its　distinction　as　the　whole
distinction　of　the　universe　has　to　be　represented　from　itself；　and　this　has　in　its　distinction　to　remain
reflected　within　itself　in　equal　absoluteness。　Nothing　other　than　the　ego　anywhere　exists；　and　the
ego　is　there　because　it　is　there；　what　is　there　is　only　in　the　ego　and　for　the　ego。（5）

Now　Fichte　merely　set　forth　this　Notion；　he　did　not　bring　it　to　a　scientific　realization　from　itself。
For　to　him　this　Notion　maintains　and　asserts　itself　as　this　Notion；　it　has　absoluteness　for　him　in　so
far　as　it　is　merely　the　unrealized　Notion；　and　thus　indeed　comes　once　more　into　opposition　with
reality。　The　Fichtian　philosophy　has　the　great　advantage　of　having　set　forth　the　fact　that　Philosophy
must　be　a　science　derived　from　one　supreme　principle；　from　which　all　determinations　are
necessarily　derived。　The　important　point　is　this　unity　of　principle　and　the　attempt　to　develop　from　it
in　a　scientifically　consistent　way　the　whole　content　of　consciousness；　or；　as　has　been　said；　to
construct　the　whole　world。（6）　Beyond　this　no　progress　was　made。（7）　But　the　great　necessity　in
Philosophy　is　to　possess　one　living　Idea；　the　world　is　a　flower　which　is　eternally　produced　from
one　grain　of　seed。　Thus　Fichte　does　not；　like　Kant；　throw　his　work　into　narrative　form　because　he
begins　with　the　ego；　but　he　has　proceeded　further；　inasmuch　as　he　sought　to　bring　about　a
construction　of　determinations　of　knowledge　from　the　ego。　The　whole　extent　of　knowledge　in　all
the　world　must　be　developed；　and　further　this　knowledge　must　be　the　consequence　of　the
development　of　determinations；　but　because　Fichte　says　that　what　is　not　for　us　does　not　concern
us；　he　has　not　grasped　this　principle　of　the　ego　as　Idea；　but　solely　in　the　consciousness　of　the
activity　which　we　exercise　in　knowing；　and　consequently　it　is　still　laid　hold　of　in　the　form　of
subjectivity。

Thus　as　Kant　treats　of　cognition　＇Erkennen＇；　so　Fichte　sets　forth　real　knowledge　＇Wissen＇。　Fichte
states　that　the　task　of　Philosophy　is　to　find　a　theory　of　knowledge；　universal　knowledge　is　both　the
object　and　the　starting…point　of　Philosophy。　Consciousness　knows；　that　is　its　nature；　the　end　of
philosophic　learning　is　the　knowledge　of　this　knowledge。　Hence　Fichte　called　his　philosophy　the
Theory　of　Knowledge　（Begriff　der　Wissenschaftslehre；　p。　181）；　the　science　of　knowledge。　That　is
to　say　ordinary　consciousness　as　the　active　ego　finds　this　and　that；　occupies　itself；　not　with　itself；
but　with　other　objects　and　interests；　but　the　necessity　that　I　bring　forth　determinations；　and　which
determinations　—　cause　and　effect；　for　example；　—　lies　beyond　my　consciousness：　I　bring　them
forth　instinctively　and　cannot　get　behind　my　consciousness。　But　when　I　philosophize；　I　make　my
ordinary　consciousness　itself　my　object；　because　I　make　a　pure　category　my　consciousness。　I
know　what　my　ego　is　doing；　and　thus　I　got　behind　my　ordinary　consciousness。　Fichte　thus　defines
Philosophy　as　the　artificial　consciousness。（8）

a。　Where　Fichte　in　his　system　has　attained　the　highest　degree　of　determinateness　he　begins；　as　we
saw　Kant　did　before　（pp。　437；　438）；　from　the　transcendental　unity　of　self…consciousness；　in　it　I　—
as　this　—　am　one；　this　unity　is　to　Fichte　the　same　and　the　original。　Ego　is　there　a　fact；　says　Fichte；
but　not　yet　a　proposition。　As　proposition；　as　principle；　the　ego　must　not　remain　barren；　nor　be
accepted　as　one；　for　to　a　proposition　pertains　a　synthesis。　Now　Fichte　proceeds　in　his　system
from　the　fact　that　Philosophy　must　begin　with　an　absolutely　unconditioned；　certain　principle；　with
something　indubitably　certain　in　ordinary　knowledge。　“It　cannot　be　proved　or　defined；　because　it
must；　be　absolutely　the　first　principle。”　（9）　According　to　Wendt's　account　（Tennernann's
Grundriss；　§　393；　pp。　494；　495）　Fichte　gives　an　exposition　of　the　necessity　of　such　a　principle　as
follows：　“Scientific　knowledge　is　a　system　of　cognition　obtained　through　a　supreme　principle　which
expresses　the　content　and　form　of　knowledge。　The　theory　of　knowledge　is　the　science　of
knowledge　which　sets　forth　the　possibility　and　validity　of　all　knowledge；　and　proves　the　possibility
of　principles　in　reference　to　form　and　content；　the　principles　themselves；　and　thereby　the
connection　existing　in　all　human　knowledge。　It　must　have　a　principle　which　can　neither　be　proved
from　it　nor　from　another　science；　for　it　is　supreme。　If　there　is　a　theory　of　knowledge　there　also　is　a
system；　if　there　is　a　system　there　is　also　a　theory　of　knowledge　and　an　absolute　first　principle　—
and　so　on　through　an　inevitable　circle。”　（10）

The　simple　principle　of　this　knowledge　is　certainty　of　myself；　which　is　the　relation　of　me　to　myself；
what　is　in　me；　that　I　know。　The　supreme　principle；　as　immediate　and　not　derived；　must　be　certain
on　its　own　account；　that　is；　a　determination　of　the　ego　only；　for　it　is　only　from　the　ego　that　I　cannot
abstract。（11）　Fichte　thus　begins；　like　Descartes；　with　'I　think；　therefore　I　am；'　and　he　expressly
brings　this　proposition　to　mind。　The　Being　of　the　ego　is　not　a　dead；　but　a　concrete　Being；　but　the
highest　Being　is　thought。　Ego；　as　an　explicitly　self…existent　activity　of　thought；　is　thus　knowledge；
even　if　it　is　only　abstract　knowledge；　as　in　the　beginning　at　least　it　cannot　help　being。　At　the　same
time　Fichte　begins　from　this　absolute　certainty　with　quite　other　necessities　and　demands；　for　from
this　ego　not　only　Being　but　also　the　larger　system　of　thought　has　to　be　derived　（supra；　p。　230）。
According　to　Fichte；　the　ego　is　the　source　of　the　categories　and　ideas；　but　all　conceptions　and
thoughts　are　a　manifold　reduced　to　a　synthesis　through　Thought。　Thus　while　with　Descartes　in
connection　with　the　ego　other　thoughts　appear　which　we　simply　find　already　in　us；　such　as　God；
nature；　&c。；　Fichte　sought　for　a　philosophy　entirely　of　a　piece；　in　which　nothing　empiric　was　to　be
admitted　from　without。　With　this　reflection　a　false　point　of　view　was　at　once　introduced；　namely
that　contained　in　the　old　conception　of　knowledge；　of　commencing　with　principles　in　this　form　and
proceeding　from　them；　so　that　the　reality　which　is　derived　from　such　a　principle　is　brought　into
opposition　with　it；　and　hence　in　truth　is　something　different；　i。e。　it　is　not　derived：　or　that　principle
for　this　same　reason　expresses　only　the　absolute　certainty　of　itself　and　not　the　truth。　The　ego　is
certain；　it　cannot　be　doubted；　but　Philosophy　desires　to　reach　the　truth。　The　certainty　is　subjective；
and　because　it　is　made　to　remain　the　basis；　all　else　remains　subjective　also　without　there　being　any
possibility　of　this　form　being　removed。　Fichte　now　analyzes　the　ego；　reducing　it　to　three　principles
from　which　the　whole　of　knowledge　has　to　be　evolved。

The　first　proposition　must　be　simple；　in　it　predicate　and　subject　must　be　alike；　for　were　they　unlike；
their　connection　—　since　in　accordance　with　their　diversity　the　determinations　are　not　directly　one
—　would　have　to　be　first　of　all　proved　by　means　of　a　third。　The　first　principle　must　thus　be
identical。　Fichte　now　proceeds　further　to　distinguish　in　this　first　principle　the　form　and　content；　but
in　order　that　this　same　may　be　immediately　true　through　itself；　form　and　content　must　be　again　the
same；　and　the　principle　conditioned　by　neither。　It　signifies　A　=　A；　the　abstract　undetermined
identity；　that　is　the　proposition　of　contradiction；　wherein　A　is　an　indifferent　content。　Fichte　says；
“Thought　is　by　no　means　essence；　but　only　a　particular　determination　of　Being；　there　are　outside　of
it　many　other　determinations　of　our　Being。　I　merely　remark　this；　that　when　'I　am'　is　oversteppe