the critique of judgement-第6章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


faculties　of　cognition　we　may　entirely　fail　to　see　this　necessity。　Accordingly；　in　respect　of　nature's　merely　empirical　laws；　we　must　think　in　nature　a　possibility　of　an　endless　multiplicity　of　empirical　laws；　which　yet　are　contingent　so　far　as　our　insight　goes；　i。e。；　cannot　be　cognized　a　priori。　In　respect　of　these　we　estimate　the　unity　of　nature　according　to　empirical　laws；　and　the　possibility　of　the　unity　of　experience；　as　a　system　according　to　empirical　laws；　to　be　contingent。　But；　now；　such　a　unity　is　one　which　must　be　necessarily　presupposed　and　assumed；　as　otherwise　we　should　not　have　a　thoroughgoing　connection　of　empirical　cognition　in　a　whole　of　experience。　For　the　universal　laws　of　nature；　while　providing；　certainly；　for　such　a　connection　among　things　generically；　as　things　of　nature　in　general；　do　not　do　so　for　them　specifically　as　such　particular　things　of　nature。　Hence　judgement　is　compelled；　for　its　own　guidance；　to　adopt　it　as　an　a　priori　principle；　that　what　is　for　human　insight　contingent　in　the　particular　（empirical）　laws　of　nature　contains　nevertheless　unity　of　law　in　the　synthesis　of　its　manifold　in　an　intrinsically　possible　experience…unfathomable；　though　still　thinkable；　as　such　unity　may；　no　doubt；　be　for　us。　Consequently；　as　the　unity　of　law　in　a　synthesis；　which　is　cognized　by　us　in　obedience　to　a　necessary　aim　（a　need　of　understanding）；　though　recognized　at　the　same　time　as　contingent；　is　represented　as　a　finality　of　objects　（here　of　nature）；　so　judgement；　which；　in　respect　of　things　under　possible　（yet　to　be　discovered）　empirical　laws；　is　merely　reflective；　must　regard　nature　in　respect　of　the　latter　according　to　a　principle　of　finality　for　our　cognitive　faculty；　which　then　finds　expression　in　the　above　maxims　of　judgement。　Now　this　transcendental　concept　of　a　finality　of　nature　is　neither　a　concept　of　nature　nor　of　freedom；　since　it　attributes　nothing　at　all　to　the　object；　i。e。；　to　nature；　but　only　represents　the　unique　mode　in　which　we　must　proceed　in　our　reflection　upon　the　objects　of　nature　with　a　view　to　getting　a　thoroughly　interconnected　whole　of　experience；　and　so　is　a　subjective　principle；　i。e。；　maxim；　of　judgement。　For　this　reason；　too；　just　as　if　it　were　a　lucky　chance　that　favoured　us；　we　are　rejoiced　（properly　speaking；　relieved　of　a　want）　where　we　meet　with　such　systematic　unity　under　merely　empirical　laws：　although　we　must　necessarily　assume　the　presence　of　such　a　unity；　apart　from　any　ability　on　our　part　to　apprehend　or　prove　its　existence。　　　In　order　to　convince　ourselves　of　the　correctness　of　this　deduction　of　the　concept　before　us；　and　the　necessity　of　assuming　it　as　a　transcendental　principle　of　cognition；　let　us　just　bethink　ourselves　of　the　magnitude　of　the　task。　We　have　to　form　a　connected　experience　from　given　perceptions　of　a　nature　containing　a　maybe　endless　multiplicity　of　empirical　laws；　and　this　problem　has　its　seat　a　priori　in　our　understanding。　This　understanding　is　no　doubt　a　priori　in　possession　of　universal　laws　of　nature；　apart　from　which　nature　would　be　incapable　of　being　an　object　of　experience　at　all。　But　over　and　above　this　it　needs　a　certain　order　of　nature　in　its　particular　rules　which　are　only　capable　of　being　brought　to　its　knowledge　empirically；　and　which；　so　far　as　it　is　concerned　are　contingent。　These　rules；　without　which　we　would　have　no　means　of　advance　from　the　universal　analogy　of　a　possible　experience　in　general　to　a　particular；　must　be　regarded　by　understanding　as　laws；　i。e。；　as　necessary…for　otherwise　they　would　not　form　an　order　of　nature…though　it　be　unable　to　cognize　or　ever　get　an　insight　into　their　necessity。　Albeit；　then；　it　can　determine　nothing　a　priori　in　respect　of　these　（objects）；　it　must；　in　pursuit　of　such　empirical　so…called　laws；　lay　at　the　basis　of　all　reflection　upon　them　an　a　priori　principle；　to　the　effect；　namely；　that　a　cognizable　order　of　nature　is　possible　according　to　them。　A　principle　of　this　kind　is　expressed　in　the　following　propositions。　There　is　in　nature　a　subordination　of　genera　and　species　comprehensible　by　us：　Each　of　these　genera　again　approximates　to　the　others　on　a　common　principle；　so　that　a　transition　may　be　possible　from　one　to　the　other；　and　thereby　to　a　higher　genus：　While　it　seems　at　outset　unavoidable　for　our　understanding　to　assume　for　the　specific　variety　of　natural　operations　a　like　number　of　various　kinds　of　causality；　yet　these　may　all　be　reduced　to　a　small　number　of　principles；　the　quest　for　which　is　our　business；　and　so　forth。　This　adaptation　of　nature　to　our　cognitive　faculties　is　presupposed　a　priori　by　judgement　on　behalf　of　its　reflection　upon　it　according　to　empirical　laws。　But　understanding　all　the　while　recognizes　it　objectively　as　contingent；　and　it　is　merely　judgement　that　attributes　it　to　nature　as　transcendental　finality；　i。e。；　a　finality　in　respect　of　the　subject's　faculty　of　cognition。　For；　were　it　not　for　this　presupposition；　we　should　have　no　order　of　nature　in　accordance　with　empirical　laws；　and；　consequently；　no　guiding…thread　for　an　experience　that　has　to　be　brought　to　bear　upon　these　in　all　their　variety；　or　for　an　investigation　of　them。　　　For　it　is　quite　conceivable　that；　despite　all　the　uniformity　of　the　things　of　nature　according　to　universal　laws；　without　which　we　would　not　have　the　form　of　general　empirical　knowledge　at　all；　the　specific　variety　of　the　empirical　laws　of　nature；　with　their　effects；　might　still　be　so　great　as　to　make　it　impossible　for　our　understanding　to　discover　in　nature　an　intelligible　order；　to　divide　its　products　into　genera　and　species　so　as　to　avail　ourselves　of　the　principles　of　explanation　and　comprehension　of　one　for　explaining　and　interpreting　another；　and　out　of　material　coming　to　hand　in　such　confusion　（properly　speaking　only　infinitely　multiform　and　ill…adapted　to　our　power…of　apprehension）　to　make　a　consistent　context　of　experience。　　　Thus　judgement；　also；　is　equipped　with　an　a　priori　principle　for　the　possibility　of　nature；　but　only　in　a　subjective　respect。　By　means　of　this　it　prescribes　a　law；　not　to　nature　（as　autonomy）；　but　to　itself　（as　heautonomy）；　to　guide　its　reflection　upon　nature。　This　law　may　be　called　the　law　of　the　specification　of　nature　in　respect　of　its　empirical　laws。　It　is　not　one　cognized　a　priori　in　nature；　but　judgement　adopts　it　in　the　interests　of　a　natural　order；　cognizable　by　our　understanding；　in　the　division　which　it　makes　of　nature's　universal　laws　when　it　seeks　to　subordinate　to　them　a　variety　of　particular　laws。　So　when　it　is　said　that　nature　specifies　its　universal　laws　on　a　principle　of　finality　for　our　cognitive　faculties；　i。e。；　of　suitability　for　the　human　understanding　and　its　necessary　function　of　finding　the　universal　for　the　particular　presented　to　it　by　perception；　and　again　for　varieties　（which　are；　of　course；　common　for　each　species）　connection　in　the　unity　of　principle；　we　do　not　thereby　either　prescribe　a　law　to　nature；　or　learn　one　from　it　by　observation…although　the　principle　in　question　may　be　confirmed　by　this　means。　For　it　is　not　a　principle　of　the　determinant　but　merely　of　the　reflective　judgement。　All　that　is　intended　is　that；　no　matter　what　is　the　order　and　disposition　of　nature　in　respect　of　its　universal　laws；　we　must　investigate　its　empirical　laws　throughout　on　that　principle　and　the　maxims　founded　thereon；　because　only　so　far　as　that　principle　applies　can　we　make　any　headway　in　the　employment　of　our　understanding　in　experience；　or　gain　knowledge。

　　　　　　　　　VI。　The　Association　of　the　Feeling　of　Pleasure　　　　　　　　　　　　with　the　Concept　of　the　Finality　of　Nature。

　　The　conceived　harmony　of　nature　in　the　manifold　of　its　particular　laws　with　our　need　of　finding　universality　of　principles　for　it　must；　so　far　as　our　insight　goes；　be　deemed　contingent；　but　withal　indispensable　for　the　requirements　of　our　understanding；　and；　consequently；　a　finality　by　which　nature　is　in　accord　with　our　aim；　but　only　so　far　as　this　is　directed　to　knowledge。　The　universal　laws　of　understanding；　which　are　equally　laws　of　nature；　are；　although　arising　from　spontaneity；　just　as　necessary　for　nature　as　the　laws　of　motion　applicable　to　matter。　Their　origin　does　not　presuppose　any　regard　to　our　cognitive　faculties；　seeing　that　it