the critique of judgement-第44章

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riction　of　having　to　be　conformable　to　the　concept　belonging'　thereto；　whereas　aesthetically　it　is　free　to　furnish　of　its　own　accord；　over　and　above　that　agreement　with　the　concept；　a　wealth　of　undeveloped　material　for　the　understanding；　to　which　the　latter　paid　no　regard　in　its　concept；　but　which　it　can　make　use　of；　not　so　much　objectively　for　cognition；　as　subjectively　for　quickening　the　cognitive　faculties；　and　hence　also　indirectly　for　cognitions；　it　may　be　seen　that　genius　properly　consists　in　the　happy　relation；　which　science　cannot　teach　nor　industry　learn；　enabling　one　to　find　out　ideas　for　a　given　concept；　and；　besides；　to　hit　upon　the　expression　for　them…the　expression　by　means　of　which　the　subjective　mental　condition　induced　by　the　ideas　as　the　concomitant　of　a　concept　may　be　communicated　to　others。　This　latter　talent　is　properly　that　which　is　termed　soul。　For　to　get　an　expression　for　what　is　indefinable　in　the　mental　state　accompanying　a　particular　representation　and　to　make　it　universally　communicable…be　the　expression　in　language　or　painting　or　statuary…is　a　〃thing　requiring　a　faculty　for　laying　hold　of　the　rapid　and　transient　play　of　the　imagination；　and　for　unifying　it　in　a　concept　（which　for　that　very　reason　is　original；　and　reveals　a　new　rule　which　could　not　have　been　inferred　from　any　preceding　principles　or　examples）　that　admits　of　communication　without　any　constraint　of　rules。

　　If；　after　this　analysis；　we　cast　a　glance　back　upon　the　above　definition　of　what　is　called　genius；　we　find：　First；　that　it　is　a　talent　for　art…not　one　for　science；　in　which　clearly　known　rules　must　take　the　lead　and　determine　the　procedure。　Secondly；　being　a　talent　in　the　line　of　art；　it　presupposes　a　definite　concept　of　the　product…as　its　end。　Hence　it　presupposes　understanding；　but；　in　addition；　a　representation；　indefinite　though　it　be；　of　the　material；　i。e。；　of　the　intuition；　required　for　the　presentation　of　that　concept；　and　so　a　relation　of　the　imagination　to　the　understanding。　Thirdly；　it　displays　itself；　not　so　much　in　the　working　out　of　the　projected　end　in　the　presentation　of　a　definite　concept；　as　rather　in　the　portrayal；　or　expression　of　aesthetic　ideas　containing　a　wealth　of　material　for　effecting　that　intention。　Consequently　the　imagination　is　represented　by　it　in　its　freedom　from　all　guidance　of　rules；　but　still　as　final　for　the　presentation　of　the　given　concept。　Fourthly；　and　lastly；　the　unsought　and　undesigned　subjective　finality　in　the　free　harmonizing　of　the　imagination　with　the　understanding's　conformity　to　law　presupposes　a　proportion　and　accord　between　these　faculties　such　as　cannot　be　brought　about　by　any　observance　of　rules；　whether　of　science　or　mechanical　imitation；　but　can　only　be　produced　by　the　nature　of　the　individual。　　　Genius；　according　to　these　presuppositions；　is　the　exemplary　originality　of　the　natural　endowments　of　an　individual　in　the　free　employment　of　his　cognitive　faculties。　On　this　showing；　the　product　of　a　genius　（in　respect　of　so　much　in　this　product　as　is　attributable　to　genius；　and　not　to　possible　learning　or　academic　instruction）　is　an　example；　not　for　imitation　（for　that　would　mean　the　loss　of　the　element　of　genius；　and　just　the　very　soul　of　the　work）；　but　to　be　followed　by　another　genius…one　whom　it　arouses　to　a　sense　of　his　own　originality　in　putting　freedom　from　the　constraint　of　rules　so　into　force　in　his　art　that　for　art　itself　a　new　rule　is　won…which　is　what　shows　a　talent　to　be　exemplary。　Yet；　since　the　genius　is　one　of　nature's　elect…a　type　that　must　be　regarded　as　but　a　rare　phenomenon…for　other　clever　minds　his　example　gives　rise　to　a　school；　that　is　to　say　a　methodical　instruction　according　to　rules；　collected；　so　far　as　the　circumstances　admit；　from　such　products　of　genius　and　their　peculiarities。　And；　to　that　extent；　fine　art　is　for　such　persons　a　matter　of　imitation；　for　which　nature；　through　the　medium　of　a　genius　gave　the　rule。　　　But　this　imitation　becomes　aping　when　the　pupil　copies　everything　down　to　the　deformities　which　the　genius　only　of　necessity　suffered　to　remain；　because　they　could　hardly　be　removed　without　loss　of　force　to　the　idea。　This　courage　has　merit　only　in　the　case　of　a　genius。　A　certain　boldness　of　expression　and；　in　general；　many　a　deviation　from　the　common　rule　becomes　him　well；　but　in　no　sense　is　it　a　thing　worthy　of　imitation。　On　the　contrary　it　remains　all　through　intrinsically　a　blemish；　which　one　is　bound　to　try　to　remove；　but　for　which　the　genius　is；　as　it　were；　allowed　to　plead　a　privilege；　on　the　ground　that　a　scrupulous　carefulness　would　spoil　what　is　inimitable　in　the　impetuous　ardour　of　his　soul。　Mannerism　is　another　kind　of　aping…an　aping　of　peculiarity　（originality）　in　general；　for　the　sake　of　removing　oneself　as　far　as　possible　from　imitators；　while　the　talent　requisite　to　enable　one　to　be　at　the　same　time　exemplary　is　absent。　There　are；　in　fact；　two　modes　（modi）　in　general　of　arranging　one's　thoughts　for　utterance。　The　one　is　called　a　manner　（modus　aestheticus）；　the　other　a　method　（modus　logicus）。　The　distinction　between　them　is　this：　the　former　possesses　no　standard　other　than　the　feeling　of　unity　in　the　presentation；　whereas　the　latter　here　follows　definite　principles。　As　a　consequence；　the　former　is　alone　admissible　for　fine　art。　It　is　only；　however；　where　the　manner　of　carrying　the　idea　into　execution　in　a　product　of　art　is　aimed　at　singularity；　instead　of　being　made　appropriate　to　the　idea；　that　mannerism　is　properly　ascribed　to　such　a　product。　The　ostentatious　（precieux）；　forced；　and　affected　styles；　intended　to　mark　one　out　from　the　common　herd　（though　soul　is　wanting）；　resemble　the　behaviour　of　a　man　who；　as　we　say；　hears　himself　talk；　or　who　stands　and　moves　about　as　if　he　were　on　a　stage　to　be　gaped　at…action　which　invariably　betrays　a　tyro。

　　　　　　　　SS　50。　The　combination　of　taste　and　genius　in　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　products　of　fine　art。

　　To　ask　whether　more　stress　should　be　laid　in　matters　of　fine　art　upon　the　presence　of　genius　or　upon　that　of　taste；　is　equivalent　to　asking　whether　more　turns　upon　imagination　or　upon　judgement。　Now；　imagination　rather　entitles　an　art　to　be　called　an　inspired　（geistreiche）　than　a　fine　art。　It　is　only　in　respect　of　judgement　that　the　name　of　fine　art　is　deserved。　Hence　it　follows　that　judgement；　being　the　indispensable　condition　（conditio　sine　qua　non）；　is　at　least　what　one　must　look　to　as　of　capital　importance　in　forming　an　estimate　of　art　as　fine　art。　So　far　as　beauty　is　concerned；　to　be　fertile　and　original　in　ideas　is　not　such　an　imperative　requirement　as　it　is　that　the　imagination　in　its　freedom　should　be　in　accordance　with　the　understanding's　conformity　to　law。　For；　in　lawless　freedom；　imagination；　with　all　its　wealth；　produces　nothing　but　nonsense；　the　power　of　judgement；　on　the　other　hand；　is　the　faculty　that　makes　it　consonant　with　understanding。　　　Taste；　like　judgement　in　general；　is　the　discipline　（or　corrective）　of　genius。　It　severely　clips　its　wings；　and　makes　it　orderly　or　polished；　but　at　the　same　time　it　gives　it　guidance　directing　and　controlling　its　flight；　so　that　it　may　preserve　its　character　of　finality。　It　introduces　a　clearness　and　order　into　the　plenitude　of　thought；　and　in　so　doing　gives　stability　to　the　ideas；　and　qualifies　them　at　once　for　permanent　and　universal　approval；　for　being　followed　by　others；　and　for　a　continually　progressive　culture。　And　so；　where　the　interests　of　both　these　qualities　clash　in　a　product；　and　there　has　to　be　a　sacrifice　of　something；　then　it　should　rather　be　on　the　side　of　genius；　and　judgement；　which　in　matters　of　fine　art　bases　its　decision　on　its　own　proper　principles；　will　more　readily　endure　an　abatement　of　the　freedom　and　wealth　of　the　imagination　than　that　the　understanding　should　be　compromised。　　　The　requisites　for　fine　art　are；　therefore；　imagination；　understanding；　soul；　and　taste。*

　　*The　first　three　faculties　are　first　brought　into　union　by　means　of　the　fourth。　Hume；　in　his　history；　informs　the　English　that　although　they　are　second　in　their　works　to　no　other　people　in　the　world　in　respect　the　evidences　they　afford　of　the　three　first　qualities　separately　considered；　still　in　what　unites　them　they　must　yield　to　their　neighbo