the critique of judgement-第37章

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hich　as　mere　sound　（not　yet　cultivated）　understanding；　is　looked　upon　as　the　least　we　can　expect　from　any　one　claiming　the　name　of　man；　has　therefore　the　doubtful　honour　of　having　the　name　of　common　sense　（sensus　communis）　bestowed　upon　it；　and　bestowed；　too；　in　an　acceptation　of　the　word　common　（not　merely　in　our　own　language；　where　it　actually　has　a　double　meaning；　but　also　in　many　others）　which　makes　it　amount　to　what　is　vulgar…what　is　everywhere　to　be　met　with…a　quality　which　by　no　means　confers　credit　or　distinction　upon　its　possessor。　　　However；　by　the　name　sensus　communis　is　to　be　understood　the　idea　of　a　public　sense；　i。e。；　a　critical　faculty　which　in　its　reflective　act　takes　account　（a　priori）　of　the　mode　of　representation　of　everyone　else；　in　order；　as　it　were；　to　weigh　its　judgement　with　the　collective　reason　of　mankind；　and　thereby　avoid　the　illusion　arising　from　subjective　and　personal　conditions　which　could　readily　be　taken　for　objective；　an　illusion　that　would　exert　a　prejudicial　influence　upon　its　judgement。　This　is　accomplished　by　weighing　the　judgement；　not　so　much　with　actual；　as　rather　with　the　merely　possible；　judgements　of　others；　and　by　putting　ourselves　in　the　position　of　everyone　else；　as　the　result　of　a　mere　abstraction　from　the　limitations　which　contingently　affect　our　own　estimate。　This；　in　turn；　is　effected　by　so　far　as　possible　letting　go　the　element　of　matter；　i。e。；　sensation；　in　our　general　state　of　representative　activity；　and　confining　attention　to　the　formal　peculiarities　of　our　representation　or　general　state　of　representative　activity。　Now　it　may　seem　that　this　operation　of　reflection　is　too　artificial　to　be　attributed　to　the　faculty　which　we　call　common　sense。　But　this　is　an　appearance　due　only　to　its　expression　in　abstract　formulae。　In　itself　nothing　is　more　natural　than　to　abstract　from　charm　and　emotion　where　one　is　looking　for　a　judgement　intended　to　serve　as　a　universal　rule。　　　While　the　following　maxims　of　common　human　understanding　do　not　properly　come　in　here　as　constituent　parts　of　the　critique　of　taste；　they　may　still　serve　to　elucidate　its　fundamental　propositions。　They　are　these：　（I）　to　think　for　oneself；　（2）　to　think　from　the　standpoint　of　everyone　else；　（3）　always　to　think　consistently。　The　first　is　the　maxim　of　unprejudiced　thought；　the　second　that　of　enlarged　thought；　the　third　that　of　consistent　thought。　The　first　is　the　maxim　of　a　never…passive　reason。　To　be　given　to　such　passivity；　consequently　to　heteronomy　of　reason；　is　called　prejudice；　and　the　greatest　of　all　prejudices　is　that　of　fancying　nature　not　to　be　subject　to　rules　which　the　understanding　by　virtue　of　its　own　essential　laws　lays　at　its　basis；　i。e。；　superstition。　Emancipation　from　superstition　is　called　enlightenment*；　for　although　this　term　applies　also　to　emancipation　from　prejudices　generally；　still　superstition　deserves　pre…eminently　（in　sensu　eminenti）　to　be　called　a　prejudice。　For　the　condition　of　blindness　into　which　superstition　puts　one；　which　is　as　much　as　demands　from　one　as　an　obligation；　makes　the　need　of　being　led　by　others；　and　consequently　the　passive　state　of　the　reason；　pre…eminently　conspicuous。　As　to　the　second　maxim　belonging　to　our　habits　of　thought；　we　have　quite　got　into　the　way　of　calling　a　man　narrow　（narrow；　as　opposed　to　being　of　enlarged　mind）　whose　talents　fall　short　of　what　is　required　for　employment　upon　work　of　any　magnitude　（especially　that　involving　intensity）。　But　the　question　here　is　not　one　of　the　faculty　of　cognition；　but　of　the　mental　habit　of　making　a　final　use　of　it。　This；　however　small　the　range　and　degree　to　which　man's　natural　endowments　extend；　still　indicates　a　man　of　enlarged　mind：　if　he　detaches　himself　from　the　subjective　personal　conditions　of　his　judgement；　which　cramp　the　minds　of　so　many　others；　and　reflects　upon　his　own　judgement　from　a　universal　standpoint　（which　he　can　only　determine　by　shifting　his　ground　to　the　standpoint　of　others）。　The　third　maxim…that；　namely；　of　consistent　thought…is　the　hardest　of　attainment；　and　is　only　attainable　by　the　union　of　both　the　former；　and　after　constant　attention　to　them　has　made　one　at　home　in　their　observance。　We　may　say：　The　first　of　these　is　the　maxim　of　understanding；　the　second　that　of　judgement；　the　third　of　that　reason。

　　*We　readily　see　that　enlightenment；　while　easy；　no　doubt；　in　thesi；　in　hypothesis　is　difficult　and　slow　of　realization。　For　not　to　be　passive　with　one's　reason；　but　always　to　be　self…legislative；　is　doubtless　quite　an　easy　matter　for　a　man　who　only　desires　to　be　adapted　to　his　essential　end；　and　does　not　seek　to　know　what　is　beyond　his　understanding。　But　as　the　tendency　in　the　latter　direction　is　hardly　avoidable；　and　others　are　always　coming　and　promising　with　full　assurance　that　they　are　able　to　satisfy　one's　curiosity；　it　must　be　very　difficult　to　preserve　or　restore　in　the　mind　（and　particularly　in　the　public　mind）　that　merely　negative　attitude　（which　constitutes　enlightenment　proper）。

　　I　resume　the　thread　of　the　discussion　interrupted　by　the　above　digression；　and　I　say　that　taste　can　with　more　justice　be　called　a　sensus　communis　than　can　sound　understanding；　and　that　the　aesthetic；　rather　than　the　intellectual；　judgement　can　bear　the　name　of　a　public　sense；*　i。e。；　taking　it　that　we　are　prepared　to　use　the　word　sense　of　an　effect　that　mere　reflection　has　upon　the　mind；　for　then　by　sense　we　mean　the　feeling　of　pleasure。　We　might　even　define　taste　as　the　faculty　of　estimating　what　makes　our　feeling　in　a　given　representation　universally　communicable　without　the　mediation　of　a　concept。

　　*Taste　may　be　designated　a　sensus　communis　aestheticus；　common　human　understanding　a　sensus　communis　logicus。

　　The　aptitude　of　men　for　communicating　their　thoughts　requires；　also；　a　relation　between　the　imagination　and　the　understanding；　in　order　to　connect　intuitions　with　concepts；　and　concepts；　in　turn；　with　intuitions；　which　both　unite　in　cognition。　But　there　the　agreement　of　both　mental　powers　is　according　to　law；　and　under　the　constraint　of　definite　concepts。　Only　when　the　imagination　in　its　freedom　stirs　the　understanding；　and　the　understanding　apart　from　concepts　puts　the　imagination　into　regular　play；　does　the　representation　communicate　itself　not　as　thought；　but　as　an　internal　feeling　of　a　final　state　of　the　mind。　　　Taste　is；　therefore；　the　faculty　of　forming　an　a　priori　estimate　of　the　communicability　of　the　feeling　that；　without　the　mediation　of　a　concept；　are　connected　with　a　given　representation。　　　Supposing；　now；　that　we　could　assume　that　the　mere　universal　communicability　of　our　feeling　must　of　itself　carry　with　it　an　interest　for　us　（an　assumption；　however；　which　we　are　not　entitled　to　draw　as　a　conclusion　from　the　character　of　a　merely　reflective　judgement）；　we　should　then　be　in　a　position　to　explain　how　the　feeling　in　the　judgement　of　taste　comes　to　be　exacted　from　everyone　as　a　sort　of　duty。

　　　　　　　　SS　41。　The　empirical　interest　in　the　beautiful。

　　Abundant　proof　bas　been　given　above　to　show　that　the　judgement　of　taste　by　which　something　is　declared　beautiful　must　have　no　interest　as　its　determining　ground。　But　it　does　not　follow　from　this　that；　after　it　has　once　been　posited　as　a　pure　aesthetic　judgement；　an　interest　cannot　then　enter　into　combination　with　it。　This　combination；　however；　can　never　be　anything　but　indirect。　Taste　must；　that　is　to　say；　first　of　all　be　represented　in　conjunction　with　something　else；　if　the　delight　attending　the　mere　reflection　upon　an　object　is　to　admit　of　having　further　conjoined　with　it　a　pleasure　in　the　real　existence　of　the　object　（as　that　wherein　all　interest　consists）。　For　the　saying；　a　posse　ad　esse　non　valet　consequentia；*　which　is　applied　to　cognitive　judgements；　holds　good　here　in　the　case　of　aesthetic　judgements。　Now　this　〃something　else〃　may　be　something　empirical；　such　as　an　inclination　proper　to　the　nature　of　human　beings；　or　it　may　be　something　intellectual；　as　a　property　of　the　will　whereby　it　admits　of　rational　determination　a　priori。　Both　of　these　involve　a　delight　in　the　existence　of　the　object；　and　so　can　lay　the　foundation　for　an　interest　in　what　has　already　pleased　of　itself　and　without　regard　to　any　interest　whatsoever。