the critique of judgement-第33章

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of　an　object　otherwise　formless　and　in　conflict　with　ends　supplies　the　mere　occasion　for　our　coming　to　a　consciousness　of　this　basis；　and　the　object　is　in　this　way　put　to　a　subjectively…final　use；　but　it　is　not　estimated　as　subjectively…final　on　its　own　account　and　because　of　its　form。　（It　is；　as　it　were；　a　species　finalis　accepta；　non　data。）　Consequently　the　exposition　we　gave　of　judgements　upon　the　sublime　in　nature　was　at　the　same　time　their　deduction。　For；　in　our　analysis　of　the　reflection　on　the　part　of　judgement　in　this　case；　we　found　that　in　such　judgements　there　is　a　final　relation　of　the　cognitive　faculties；　which　has　to　be　laid　a　priori　at　the　basis　of　the　faculty　of　ends　（the　will）；　and　which　is　therefore　itself　a　priori　final。　This；　then；　at　once　involves　the　deduction；　i。e。；　the　justification　of　the　claim　of　such　a　judgement　to　universally…necessary　validity。　　　Hence　we　may　confine　our　search　to　one　for　the　deduction　of　judgements　of　taste；　i。e。；　of　judgements　upon　the　beauty　of　things　of　nature；　and　this　will　satisfactorily　dispose　of　the　problem　for　the　entire　aesthetic　faculty　of　judgement。

　　　　　　　SS　31。　Of　the　method　of　the　deduction　of　judgements　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　taste。

　　The　obligation　to　furnish　a　deduction；　i。e。；　a　guarantee　of　the　legitimacy　of　judgements　of　a　particular　kind；　only　arises　where　the　judgement　lays　claim　to　necessity。　This　is　the　case　even　where　it　requires　subjective　universality；　i。e。；　the　concurrence　of　every　one；　albeit　the　judgement　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement；　but　only　one　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　in　a　given　object；　i。e。；　an　assumption　of　a　subjective　finality　that　has　a　thoroughgoing　validity　for　every　one；　and　which；　since　the　judgement　is　one　of　taste；　is　not　to　be　grounded　upon　any　concept　of　the　thing。　　　Now；　in　the　latter　case；　we　are　not　dealing　with　a　judgement　of　cognition…neither　with　a　theoretical　one　based　on　the　concept　of　a　nature　in　general；　supplied　by　understanding；　nor　with　a　（pure）　practical　one　based　on　the　idea　of　freedom；　as　given　a　priori　by　reason…and　so　we　are　not　called　upon　to　justify　a　priori　the　validity　of　a　judgement　which　represents　either　what　a　thing　is；　or　that　there　is　something　which　I　ought　to　do　in　order　to　produce　it。　Consequently；　if　for　judgement　generally　we　demonstrate　the　universal　validity　of　a　singular　judgement　expressing　the　subjective　finality　of　an　empirical　representation　of　the　form　of　an　object；　we　shall　do　all　that　is　needed　to　explain　how　it　is　possible　that　something　can　please　in　the　mere　formation　of　an　estimate　of　it　（without　sensation　or　concept）；　and　how；　just　as　the　estimate　of　an　object　for　the　sake　of　a　cognition　generally　has　universal　rules；　the　delight　of　any　one　person　may　be　pronounced　as　a　rule　for　every　other。　　　Now　if　this　universal　validity　is　not　to　be　based　on　a　collection　of　votes　and　interrogation　of　others　as　to　what　sort　of　sensations　they　experience；　but　is　to　rest；　as　it　were；　upon　an；　autonomy　of　the　subject　passing　judgement　on　the　feeling　of　pleasure　（in　the　given　representation）；　i。e。；　upon　his　own　taste；　and　yet　is　also　not　to　be　derived　from　concepts；　then　it　follows　that　such　a　judgement…and　such　the　judgement　of　taste　in　fact　is…has　a　double　and　also　logical　peculiarity。　For；　first；　it　has　universal　validity　a　priori；　yet　without　having　a　logical　universality　according　to　concepts；　but　only　the　universality　of　a　singular　judgement。　Secondly；　it　has　a　necessity　（which　must　invariably　rest　upon　a　priori　grounds）；　but　one　which　depends　upon　no　a　priori　proofs　by　the　representation　of　which　it　would　be　competent　to　enforce　the　assent　which　the　judgement　of　taste　demands　of　every　one。　　　The　solution　of　these　logical　peculiarities；　which　distinguish　a　judgement　of　taste　from　all　cognitive　judgements；　will　of　itself　suffice　for　a　deduction　of　this　strange　faculty；　provided　we　abstract　at　the　outset　from　all　content　of　the　judgement；　viz。；　from　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　and　merely　compare　the　aesthetic　form　with　the　form　of　objective　judgements　as　prescribed　by　logic。　We　shall　first　try；　with　the　help　of　examples；　to　illustrate　and　bring　out　these　characteristic　properties　of　taste。

　　　　　　　SS　32。　First　peculiarity　of　the　judgement　of　taste。

　　The　judgement　of　taste　determines　its　object　in　respect　of　delight　（as　a　thing　of　beauty）　with　a　claim　to　the　agreement　of　every　one；　just　as　if　it　were　objective。　　　To　say：　〃this　flower　is　beautiful　is　tantamount　to　repeating　its　own　proper　claim　to　the　delight　of　everyone。　The　agreeableness　of　its　smell　gives　it　no　claim　at　all。　One　man　revels　in　it；　but　it　gives　another　a　headache。　Now　what　else　are　we　to　suppose　from　this　than　that　its　beauty　is　to　be　taken　for　a　property　of　the　flower　itself　which　does　not　adapt　itself　to　the　diversity　of　heads　and　the　individual　senses　of　the　multitude；　but　to　which　they　must　adapt　themselves；　if　they　are　going　to　pass　judgement　upon　it。　And　yet　this　is　not　the　way　the　matter　stands。　For　the　judgement　of　taste　consists　precisely　in　a　thing　being　called　beautiful　solely　in　respect　of　that　quality　in　which　it　adapts　itself　to　our　mode　of　taking　it　in。　　　Besides；　every　judgement　which　is　to　show　the　taste　of　the　individual；　is　required　to　be　an　independent　judgement　of　the　individual　himself。　There　must　be　no　need　of　groping　about　among　other　people's　judgements　and　getting　previous　instruction　from　their　delight　in　or　aversion　to　the　same　object。　Consequently　his　judgement　should　be　given　out　a　priori；　and　not　as　an　imitation　relying　on　the　general　pleasure　a　thing　gives　as　a　matter　of　fact。　One　would　think；　however；　that　a　judgement　a　priori　must　involve　a　concept　of　the　object　for　the　cognition　of　which　it　contains　the　principle。　But　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　founded　on　concepts；　and　is　in　no　way　a　cognition；　but　only　an　aesthetic　judgement。　　　Hence　it　is　that　a　youthful　poet　refuses　to　allow　himself　to　be　dissuaded　from　the　conviction　that　his　poem　is　beautiful；　either　by　the　judgement　of　the　public　or　of　his　friends。　And　even　if　he　lends　them　an　ear；　he　does　so；…not　because　he　has　now　come　to　a　different　judgement；　but　because；　though　the　whole　public；　at　least　so　far　as　his　work　is　concerned；　should　have　false　taste；　he　still；　in　his　desire　for　recognition；　finds　good　reason　to　accommodate　himself　to　the　popular　error　（even　against　his　own　judgement）。　It　is　only　in　aftertime；　when　his　judgement　has　been　sharpened　by　exercise；　that　of　his　own　free　will　and　accord　he　deserts　his　former　judgements　behaving　in　just　the　same　way　as　with　those　of　his　judgements　which　depend　wholly　upon　reason。　Taste　lays　claim　simply　to　autonomy。　To　make　the　judgements　of　others　the　determining　ground　of　one's　own　would　be　heteronomy。　　　The　fact　that　we　recommend　the　works　of　the　ancients　as　models；　and　rightly　too；　and　call　their　authors　classical；　as　constituting　sort　of　nobility　among　writers　that　leads　the　way　and　thereby　gives　laws　to　the　people；　seems　to　indicate　a　posteriori　sources　of　taste　and　to　contradict　the　autonomy　of　taste　in　each　individual。　But　we　might　just　as　well　say　that　the　ancient　mathematicians；　who；　to　this　day；　are　looked　upon　as　the　almost　indispensable　models　of　perfect　thoroughness　and　elegance　in　synthetic　methods；　prove　that　reason　also　is　on　our　part　only　imitative；　and　that　it　is　incompetent　with　the　deepest　intuition　to　produce　of　itself　rigorous　proofs　by　means　of　the　construction　of　concepts。　There　is　no　employment　of　our　powers；　no　matter　how　free；　not　even　of　reason　itself　（which　must　create　all　its　judgements　from　the　common　a　priori　source）；　which；　if　each　individual　had　always　to　start　afresh　with　the　crude　equipment　of　his　natural　state；　would　not　get　itself　involved　in　blundering　attempts；　did　not　those　of　others　tie　before　it　as　a　warning。　Not　that　predecessors　make　those　who　follow　in　their　steps　mere　imitators；　but　by　their　methods　they　set　others　upon　the　track　of　seeking　in　themselves　for　the　principles；　and　so　of　adopting　their　own；　often　better；　course。　Even　in　religion…where　undoubtedly　every　one　bas　to　derive　his　rule　of　conduct　from　himself；　seeing　that　he　himself　remains　responsible　for　it　and；　when　he　goes　wrong；　cannot　shift　the　blame　upon　others　as　teachers　or　leaders…