the critique of judgement-第32章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


hy　can　only　be　accounted　beautiful。　Sassure；　who　was　no　less　ingenious　than　profound；　in　the　description　of　his　Alpine　travels　remarks　of　Bonhomme；　one　of　the　Savoy　mountains：　〃There　reigns　there　a　certain　insipid　sadness。〃　He　recognized；　therefore；　that；　besides　this；　there　is　an　interesting　sadness；　such　as　is　inspired　by　the　sight　of　some　desolate　place　into　which　men　might　fain　withdraw　themselves　so　as　to　hear　no　more　of　the　world　without；　and　be　no　longer　versed　in　its　affairs；　a　place；　however；　which　must　yet　not　be　so　altogether　inhospitable　as　only　to　afford　a　most　miserable　retreat　for　a　human　being。　I　only　make　this　observation　as　a　reminder　that　even　melancholy；　（but　not　dispirited　sadness）；　may　take　its　place　among　the　vigorous　affections；　provided　it　has　its　root　in　moral　ideas。　If；　however；　it　is　grounded　upon　sympathy；　and；　as　such；　is　lovable；　it　belongs　only　to　the　languid　affections。　And　this　serves　to　call　attention　to　the　mental　temperament　which　in　the　first　case　alone　is　sublime　are

　　The　transcendental　exposition　of　aesthetic　judgements　now　brought　to　a　close　may　be　compared　with　the　physiological；　as　worked　out　by　Burke　and　many　acute　men　among　us；　so　that　we　may　see　where　a　merely　empirical　exposition　of　the　sublime　and　beautiful　would　bring　us。　Burke；　who　deserves　to　be　called　the　foremost　author　in　this　method　of　treatment；　deduces；　on　these　lines；　〃that　the　feeling　of　the　sublime　is　grounded　on　the　impulse　towards　self…preservation　and　on　fear；　i。e。；　on　a　pain；　which；　since　it　does　not　go　the　length　of　disordering　the　bodily　parts；　calls　forth　movements　which；　as　they　clear　the　vessels；　whether　fine　or　gross；　of　a　dangerous　and　troublesome　encumbrance；　are　capable　of　producing　delight；　not　pleasure　but　a　sort　of　delightful　horror；　a　sort　of　tranquility　tinged　With　terror。〃　The　beautiful；　which　he　grounds　on　love　（from　which；　still；　he　would　have　desire　kept　separate）；　he　reduces　to　〃the　relaxing；　slackening；　and　enervating　of　the　fibres　of　the　body；　and　consequently　a　softening；　a　dissolving；　a　languor；　and　a　fainting；　dying；　and　melting　away　for　pleasure。〃　And　this　explanation　he　supports；　not　alone　by　instances　in　which　the　feeling　of　the　beautiful　as　well　as　of　the　sublime　is　capable　of　being　excited　in　us　by　the　imagination　in　conjunction　with　the　understanding；　but　even　by　instances　when　it　is　in　conjunction　with　sensations。　As　psychological　observations；　these　analyses　of　our　mental　phenomena　are　extremely　fine；　and　supply　a　wealth　of　material　for　the　favourite　investigations　of　empirical　anthropology。　But；　besides　that；　there　is　no　denying　the　fact　that　all　representations　within　us；　no　matter　whether　they　are　objectively　merely　sensible　or　wholly　intellectual；　are　still　subjectively　associable　with　gratification　or　pain；　however　imperceptible　either　of　these　may　be。　（For　these　representations　one　and　all　have　an　influence　on　the　feeling　of　life；　and　none　of　them；　so　far　as　it　is　a　modification　of　the　subject；　can　be　indifferent。）　We　must　even　admit　that；　as　Epicurus　maintained；　gratification　and　pain　though　proceeding　from　the　imagination　or　even　from　representations　of　the　understanding；　are　always　in　the　last　resort　corporeal；　since　apart　from　any　feeling　of　the　bodily　organ　life　would　be　merely　a　consciousness　of　one's　existence；　and　could　not　include　any　feeling　of　well…being　or　the　reverse；　i。e。；　of　the　furtherance　or　hindrance　of　the　vital　forces。　For；　of　itself　alone；　the　mind　is　all　life　（the　life…principle　itself）；　and　hindrance　or　furtherance　has　to　be　sought　outside　it；　and　yet　in　the　man　himself　consequently　in　the　connection　with　his　body　and　melting　　　But　if　we　attribute　the　delight　in　the　object　wholly　and　entirely　to　the　gratification　which　it　affords　through　charm　or　emotion；　then　we　must　not　exact　from　any　one　else　agreement　with　the　aesthetic　judgement　passed　by　us。　For；　in　such　matters　each　person　rightly　consults　his　own　personal　feeling　alone。　But　in　that　case　there　is　an　end　of　all　censorship　of　taste…unless　the　afforded　by　others　as　the　result　of　a　contingent　coincidence　of　their　judgements　is　to　be　held　over　us　as　commanding　our　assent。　But　this　principle　we　would　presumably　resent；　and　appeal　to　our　natural　right　of　submitting　a　judgement　to　our　own　sense；　where　it　rests　upon　the　immediate　feeling　of　personal　well…being；　instead　of　submitting　it　to　that　of　others。　　　Hence　if　the　import　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　where　we　appraise　it　as　a　judgement　entitled　to　require　the　concurrence　of　every　one；　cannot　be　egoistic；　but　must　necessarily；　from　its　inner　nature；　be　allowed　a　pluralistic　validity；　i。e。；　on　account　of　what　taste　itself　is；　and　not　on　account　of　the　examples　which　others　give　of　their　taste；　then　it　must　found　upon　some　a　priori　principle　（be　it　subjective　or　objective）；　and　no　amount　of　prying　into　the　empirical　laws　of　the　changes　that　go　on　within　the　mind　can　succeed　in　establishing　such　a　principle。　For　these　laws　only　yield　a　knowledge　of　how　we　do　judge；　but　they　do　not　give　us　a　command　as　to　how　we　ought　to　judge；　and；　what　is　more；　such　a　command　as　is　unconditioned…and　commands　of　this　kind　are　presupposed　by　judgements　of　taste；　inasmuch　as　they　require　delight　to　be　taken　as　immediately　connected　with　a　representation。　Accordingly；　though　the　empirical　exposition　of　aesthetic　judgements　may　be　a　first　step　towards　accumulating　the　material　for　a　higher　investigation；　yet　a　transcendental　examination　of　this　faculty　is　possible；　and　forms　an　essential　part　of　the　Critique　of　Taste。　For；　were　not　taste　in　possession　of　a　priori　principles；　it　could　not　possibly　sit　in　judgement　upon　the　judgements　of　others　and　pass　sentence　of　commendation　or　condemnation　upon　them；　with　even　the　least　semblance　of　authority。　　　The　remaining　part　of　the　Analytic　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　contains　first　of　all　the：

　　　　　　　　　　　　Deduction　of　Pure　Aesthetic　Judgements。　　　　　SS　30。　The　deduction　of　aesthetic　judgements　upon　objects　of　　　　　　　nature　must　not　be　directed　to　what　we　call　sublime　in　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　nature；　but　only　to　the　beautiful。

　　The　claim　of　an　aesthetic　judgement　to　universal　validity　for　every　subject；　being　a　judgement　which　must　rely　on　some　a　priori　principle；　stands　in　need　of　a　deduction　（i。e。；　a　derivation　of　its　title）。　Further；　where　the　delight　or　aversion　turns　on　the　form　of　the　object　this　has　to　be　something　over　and　above　the　exposition　of　the　judgement。　Such　is　the　case　with　judgements　of　taste　upon　the　beautiful　in　nature。　For　there　the　finality　has　its　foundation　in　the　object　and　its　outward　form…although　it　does　not　signify　the　reference　of　this　to　other　objects　according　to　concepts　（for　the　purpose　of　cognitive　judgements）；　but　is　merely　concerned　in　general　with　the　apprehension　of　this　form　so　far　as　it　proves　accordant　in　the　mind　with　the　faculty　of　concepts　as　well　as　with　that　of　their　presentation　（which　is　identical　with　that　of　apprehension）。　With　regard　to　the　beautiful　in　nature；　therefore；　we　may　start　a　number　of　questions　touching　the　cause　of　this　finality　of　their　forms　e。g。；　how　we　are　to　explain　why　nature　has　scattered　beauty　abroad　with　so　lavish　a　hand　even　in　the　depth　of　the　ocean　where　it　can　but　seldom　be　reached　by　the　eye　of　man…for　which　alone　it　is。　final？　　　But　the　sublime　in　nature…if　we　pass　upon　it　a　pure　aesthetic　judgement　unmixed　with　concepts　of　perfection；　as　objective　finality；　which　would　make　the　judgement　teleological…may　be　regarded　as　completely　wanting　in　form　or　figure；　and　none　the　less　be　looked　upon　as　an　object　of　pure　delight；　and　indicate　a　subjective　finality　of　the　given　representation。　So；　now；　the　question　suggests　itself；　whether　in　addition　to　the　exposition　of　what　is　thought　in　an　aesthetic　judgement　of　this　kind；　we　may　be　called　upon　to　give　a　deduction　of　its　claim　to　some　（subjective）　a　priori　principle。　　　This　we　may　meet　with　the　reply　that　the　sublime　in　nature　is　improperly　so　called；　and　that　sublimity　should；　in　strictness；　be　attributed　merely　to　the　attitude　of　thought；　or；　rather；　to　that　which　serves　as　basis　for　this　in　human　nature。　The　apprehension　of　an　object　otherwise　formless　and　in　conflict　with　ends　supplies　the　mere　occasion　for　our　coming