the critique of judgement-第28章

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which　a　temper　of　calm　reflection　and　a　quite　free　judgement　are　required。　Only　when　he　becomes　conscious　of　having　a　disposition　that　is　upright　and　acceptable　to　God；　do　those　operations　of　might　serve；　to　stir　within　him　the　idea　of　the　sublimity　of　this　Being；　so　far　as　he　recognizes　the　existence　in　himself　of　a　sublimity　of　disposition　consonant　with　His　will；　and　is　thus　raised　above　the　dread　of　such　operations　of　nature；　in　which　he　no　longer　sees　God　pouring　forth　the　vials　of　the　wrath。　Even　humility；　taking　the　form　of　an　uncompromising　judgement　upon　his　shortcomings；　which；　with　consciousness　of　good　intentions；　might　readily　be　glossed　over　on　the　ground　of　the　frailty　of　human　nature；　is　a　sublime　temper　of　the　mind　voluntarily　to　undergo　the　pain　of　remorse　as　a　means　of　more　and　more　effectually　eradicating　its　cause。　In　this　way　religion　is　intrinsically　distinguished　from　superstition；　which　latter　rears　in　the　mind；　not　reverence　for　the　sublime；　but　dread　and　apprehension　of　the　all…powerful　Being　to　whose　will　terror…stricken　man　sees　himself　subjected；　yet　without　according　Him　due　honour。　From　this　nothing　can　arise　but　grace…begging　and　vain　adulation；　instead　of　a　religion　consisting　in　a　good　life。　　　Sublimity；　therefore；　does　not　reside　in　any　of　the　things　of　nature；　but　only　in　our　own　mind；　in　so　far　as　we　may　become　conscious　of　our　superiority　over　nature　within；　and　thus　also　over　nature　without　us　（as　exerting　influence　upon　us）。　Everything　that　provokes　this　feeling　in　us；　including　the　might　of　nature　which　challenges　our　strength；　is　then；　though　improperly；　called　sublime；　and　it　is　only　under　presupposition　of　this　idea　within　us；　and　in　relation　to　it；　that　we　are　capable　of　attaining　to　the　idea　of　the　sublimity　of　that　Being　Which　inspires　deep　respect　in　us；　not　by　the　mere　display　of　its　might　in　nature；　but　more　by　the　faculty　which　is　planted　in　us　of　estimating　that　might　without　fear；　and　of　regarding　our　estate　as　exalted　above　it。

　　　　　　　SS　29。　Modality　of　the　judgement　on　the　sublime　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in　nature。

　　Beautiful　nature　contains　countless　things　as　to　which　we　at　once　take　every　one　as　in　their　judgement　concurring　with　our　own；　and　as　to　which　we　may　further　expect　this　concurrence　without　facts　finding　us　far　astray。　But　in　respect　of　our　judgement　upon　the　sublime　in　nature；　we　cannot　so　easily　vouch　for　ready　acceptance　by　others。　For　a　far　higher　degree　of　culture；　not　merely　of　the　aesthetic　judgement；　but　also　of　the　faculties　of　cognition　which　lie　at　its　basis；　seems　to　be　requisite　to　enable　us　to　lay　down　a　judgement　upon　this　high　distinction　of　natural　objects。　　　The　proper　mental　mood　for　a　feeling　of　the　sublime　postulates　the　mind's　susceptibility　for　ideas；　since　it　is　precisely　in　the　failure　of　nature　to　attain　to　these…　and　consequently　only　under　presupposition　of　this　susceptibility　and　of　the　straining　of　the　imagination　to　use　nature　as　a　schema　for　ideas…　that　there　is　something　forbidding　to　sensibility；　but　which；　for　all　that；　has　an　attraction　for　us；　arising　from　the　fact　of　its　being　a　dominion　which　reason　exercises　over　sensibility　with　a　view　to　extending　it　to　the　requirements　of　its　own　realm　（the　practical）　and　letting　it　look　out　beyond　itself　into　the　infinite；　which　for　it　is　an　abyss。　In　fact；　without　the　development　of　moral　ideas；　that　which；　thanks　to　preparatory　culture；　we　call　sublime；　merely　strikes　the　untutored　man　as　terrifying。　He　will　see　in　the　evidences　which　the　ravages　of　nature　give　of　her　dominion；　and　in　the　vast　scale　of　her　might；　compared　with　which　his　own　is　diminished　to　insignificance；　only　the　misery；　peril；　and　distress　that　would　compass　the　man　who　was　thrown　to　its　mercy。　So　the　simpleminded；　and；　for　the　most　part；　intelligent；　Savoyard　peasant；　（as　Herr　von　Sassure　relates）；　unhesitatingly　called　all　lovers　of　snow　mountains　fools。　And　who　can　tell　whether　he　would　have　been　so　wide　of　the　mark；　if　that　student　of　nature　had　taken　the　risk　of　the　dangers　to　which　he　exposed　himself　merely；　as　most　travellers　do；　for　a　fad；　or　so　as　some　day　to　be　able　to　give　a　thrilling　account　of　his　adventures？　But　the　mind　of　Sassure　was　bent　on　the　instruction　of　mankind；　and　soul…stirring　sensations　that　excellent　man　indeed　had；　and　the　reader　of　his　travels　got　them　thrown　into　the　bargain。　　　But　the　fact　that　culture　is　requisite　for　the　judgement　upon　the　sublime　in　nature　（more　than　for　that　upon　the　beautiful）　does　not　involve　its　being　an　original　product　of　culture　and　something　introduced　in　a　more　or　less　conventional　way　into　society。　Rather　is　it　in　human　nature　that　its　foundations　are　laid；　and；　in　fact；　in　that　which；　at　once　with　common　understanding；　we　may　expect　every　one　to　possess　and　may　require　of　him；　namely；　a　native　capacity　for　the　feeling　for　（practical）　ideas；　i。e。；　for　moral　feeling。　　　This；　now；　is　the　foundation　of　the　necessity　of　that　agreement　between　other　men's　judgements　upon　the　sublime　and　our　own；　which　we　make　our　own　imply。　For　just　as　we　taunt　a　man　who　is　quite　inappreciative　when　forming　an　estimate　of　an　object　of　nature　in　which　we　see　beauty；　with　want　of　taste；　so　we　say　of　a　man　who　remains　unaffected　in　the　presence　of　what　we　consider　sublime；　that　he　has　no　feeling。　But　we　demand　both　taste　and　feeling　of　every　man；　and；　granted　some　degree　of　culture；　we　give　him　credit　for　both。　Still；　we　do　so　with　this　difference：　that；　in　the；　case　of　the　former；　since　judgement　there　refers　the　imagination　merely　to　the　understanding；　as　a　the　faculty　of　concepts；　we　make　the　requirement　as　a　matter　of　course；　whereas　in　the　case　of　the　latter；　since　here　the　judgement　refers　the　imagination　to　reason；　as　a　faculty　of　ideas；　we　do　so　only　under　a　subjective　presupposition　（which；　however；　we　believe　we　are　warranted　in　making）；　namely；　that　of　the　moral　feeling　in　man。　And；　on　this　assumption；　we　attribute　necessity　to　the　latter　aesthetic　judgement　also。　　　In　this　modality　of　aesthetic　judgements；　namely；　their　assumed　necessity；　lies　what　is　for　the　Critique　of　judgement　a　moment　of　capital　importance。　For　this　is　exactly　what　makes　an　a　priori　principle　apparent　in　their　case；　and　lifts　them　out　of　the　sphere　of　empirical　psychology；　in　which　otherwise　they　would　remain　buried　amid　the　feelings　of　gratification　and　pain　（only　with　the　senseless　epithet　of　finer　feeling）；　so　as　to　place　them；　and；　thanks　to　them；　to　place　the　faculty　of　judgement　itself；　in　the　class　of　judgements　of　which　the　basis　of　an　a　priori　principle　is　the　distinguishing　feature；　and；　thus　distinguished；　to　introduce　them　into　transcendental　philosophy。

　　　　　　　　　　　General　Remark　upon　the　Exposition　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Aesthetic　Reflective　Judgements。

　　In　relation　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　an　object　is　to　be　counted　either　as　agreeable；　or　beautiful；　or　sublime；　or　good　（absolutely）；　（incundum；　pulchrum；　sublime；　honestum）。　　　As　the　motive　of　desires　the　agreeable　is　invariably　of　one　and　the　same　kind；　no　matter　what　its　source　or　how　specifically　different　the　representation　（of　sense　and　sensation　objectively　considered）。　Hence　in　estimating　its　influence　upon　the　mind；　the　multitude　of　its　charms　（simultaneous　or　successive）　is　alone　revelant；　and　so　only；　as　it　were；　the　mass　of　the　agreeable　sensation；　and　it　is　only　by　the　quantity；　therefore；　that　this　can　be　made　intelligible。　Further　it　in　no　way　conduces　to　our　culture；　but　belongs　only　to　mere　enjoyment。　The　beautiful；　on　the　other　hand；　requires　the　representation　of　a　certain　quality　of　the　object；　that　pern…fits　also　of　being　understood　and　reduced　to　concepts　（although　in　the　aesthetic　judgement　it　is　not　reduced）；　and　it　cultivates；　as　it　instructs　us　to　attend　to；　finality　in　the　feeling　of　pleasure。　The　sublime　consists　merely　in　the　relation　exhibited　by　the　estimate　of　the　serviceability　of　the　sensible　in　the　representation　of　nature　for　a　possible　supersensible　employment。　The　absolutely　good；　estimated　subjectively　according　to　the　feeling　it　inspires　（the　object　of　the　moral　feeling）；　as　the　determinability　of　the　powers　of　the　subject　by　means　of　the　representation　of　an　absolutely　necessitating　law