the critique of judgement-第24章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


tion；　and　microscopes　the　same　in　making　the　second。　Nothing；　therefore；　which　can　be　an　object　of　the　senses　is　to　be　termed　sublime　when　treated　on　this　footing。　But　precisely　because　there　is　a　striving　in　our　imagination　towards　progress　ad　infinitum；　while　reason　demands　absolute　totality；　as　a　real　idea；　that　same　inability　on　the　part　of　our　faculty　for　the　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　things　of　the　world　of　sense　to　attain　to　this　idea；　is　the　awakening　of　a　feeling　of　a　supersensible　faculty　within　us；　and　it　is　the　use　to　which　judgement　naturally　puts　particular　objects　on　behalf　of　this　latter　feeling；　and　not　the　object　of　sense；　that　is　absolutely　great；　and　every　other　contrasted　employment　small。　Consequently　it　is　the　disposition　of　soul　evoked　by　a　particular　representation　engaging　the　attention　of　the　reflective　judgement；　and　not　the　object；　that　is　to　be　called　sublime。　　　The　foregoing　formulae　defining　the　sublime　may；　therefore；　be　supplemented　by　yet　another：　The　sublime　is　that；　the　mere　capacity　of　thinking　which　evidences　a　faculty　of　mind　transcending　every　standard　of　sense。

　　　　　　　SS　26。　The　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　natural　　　　　　　　　　　things　requisite　for　the　idea　of　the　sublime。

　　The　estimation　of　magnitude　by　means　of　concepts　of　number　（or　their　signs　in　algebra）　is　mathematical；　but　that　in　mere　intuition　（by　the　eye）　is　aesthetic。　Now　we　can　only　get　definite　concepts　of　how　great　anything　is　by　having　recourse　to　numbers　（or；　at　any　rate；　by　getting　approximate　measurements　by　means　of　numerical　series　progressing　ad　infinitum）；　the　unit　being　the　measure；　and　to　this　extent　all　logical　estimation　of　magnitude　is　mathematical。　But；　as　the　magnitude　of　the　measure　has　to　be　assumed　as　a　known　quantity；　if；　to　form　an　estimate　of　this；　we　must　again　have　recourse　to　numbers　involving　another　standard　for　their　unit；　and　consequently　must　again　proceed　mathematically；　we　can　never　arrive　at　a　first　or　fundamental　measure；　and　so　cannot　get　any　definite　concept　of　a　given　magnitude。　The　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　the　fundamental　measure　must；　therefore；　consist　merely　in　the　immediate　grasp　which　we　can　get　of　it　in　intuition；　and　the　use　to　which　our　imagination　can　put　this　in　presenting　the　numerical　concepts：　i。e。；　all　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　objects　of　nature　is　in　the　last　resort　aesthetic　（i。e。；　subjectively　and　not　objectively　determined）。　　　Now　for　the　mathematical　estimation　of　magnitude　there　is；　of　course；　no　greatest　possible　（for　the　power　of　numbers　extends　to　infinity）；　but　for　the　aesthetic　estimation　there　certainly　is　and　of　it　I　say　that　where　it　is　considered　an　absolute　measure　beyond　which　no　greater　is　possible　subjectively　（i。e。；　for　the　judging　subject）；　it　then　conveys　the　idea　of　the　sublime　and　calls　forth　that　emotion　which　no　mathematical　estimation　of　magnitudes　by　numbers　can　evoke　（unless　in　so　far　as　the　fundamental　aesthetic　measure　is　kept　vividly　present　to　the　imagination）：　because　the　latter　presents　only　the　relative　magnitude　due　to　comparison　with　others　of　a　like　kind；　whereas　the　former　presents　magnitude　absolutely；　so　far　as　the　mind　can　grasp　it　in　an　intuition。　　　To　take　in　a　quantum　intuitively　in　the　imagination　so　as　to　be　able　to　use　it　as　a　measure；　or　unit　for　estimating　magnitude　by　numbers；　involves　two　operations　of　this　faculty：　apprehension　（apprehensio）　and　comprehension　（comprehension　aesthetica）。　Apprehension　presents　no　difficulty：　for　this　process　can　be　carried　on　ad　infinitum；　but　with　the　advance　of　apprehension　comprehension　becomes　more　difficult　at　every　step　and　soon　attains　its　maximum；　and　this　is　the　aesthetically　greatest　fundamental　measure　for　the　estimation　of　magnitude。　For　if　the　apprehension　has　reached　a　point　beyond　which　the　representations　of　sensuous　intuition　in　the　case　of　the　parts　first　apprehended　begin　to　disappear　from　the　imagination　as　this　advances　to　the　apprehension　of　yet　others；　as　much；　then；　is　lost　at　one　end　as　is　gained　at　the　other；　and　for　comprehension　we　get　a　maximum　which　the　imagination　cannot　exceed。　　　This　explains　Savary's　observations　in　his　account　of　Egypt；　that　in　order　to　get　the　full　emotional　effect　of　the　size　of　the　Pyramids　we　must　avoid　coming　too　near　just　as　much　as　remaining　too　far　away。　For　in　the　latter　case　the　representation　of　the　apprehended　parts　（the　tiers　of　stones）　is　but　obscure；　and　produces　no　effect　upon　the　aesthetic　judgement　of　the　Subject。　In　the　former；　however；　it　takes　the　eye　some　time　to　complete　the　apprehension　from　the　base　to　the　summit；　but　in　this　interval　the　first　tiers　always　in　part　disappear　before　the　imagination　has　taken　in　the　last；　and　so　the　comprehension　is　never　complete。　The　same　explanation　may　also　sufficiently　account　for　the　bewilderment；　or　sort　of　perplexity；　which；　as　is　said；　seizes　the　visitor　on　first　entering　St。　Peter's　in　Rome。　For　here　a　feeling　comes　home　to　him　of　the　inadequacy　of　his　imagination　for　presenting　the　idea　of　a　whole　within　which　that　imagination　attains　its　maximum；　and；　in　its　fruitless　efforts　to　extend　this　limit；　recoils　upon　itself；　but　in　so　doing　succumbs　to　an　emotional　delight。　　　At　present　I　am　not　disposed　to　deal　with　the　ground　of　this　delight；　connected；　as　it　is；　with　a　representation　in　which　we　would　least　of　all　look　for　it…a　representation；　namely；　that　lets　us　see　its　own　inadequacy；　and　consequently　its　subjective　want　of　finality　for　our　judgement　in　the　estimation　of　magnitude…but　confine　myself　to　the　remark　that　if　the　aesthetic　judgement　is　to　be　pure　（unmixed　with　any　teleological　judgement　which；　as　such；　belongs　to　reason）；　and　if　we　are　to　give　a　suitable　example　of　it　for　the　Critique　of　aesthetic　judgement；　we　must　not　point　to　the　sublime　in　works　of　art；　e。g。；　buildings；　statues　and　the　like；　where　a　human　end　determines　the　form　as　well　as　the　magnitude；　nor　yet　in　things　of　nature；　that　in　their　very　concept　import　a　definite　end；　e。g。；　animals　of　a　recognized　natural　order；　but　in　rude　nature　merely　as　involving　magnitude　（and　only　in　this　so　far　as　it　does　not　convey　any　charm　or　any　emotion　arising　from　actual　danger）。　For；　in　a　representation　of　this　kind；　nature　contains　nothing　monstrous　（nor　what　is　either　magnificent　or　horrible）…the　magnitude　apprehended　may　be　increased　to　any　extent　provided　imagination　is　able　to　grasp　it　all　in　one　whole。　An　object　is　monstrous　where　by　its　size　it　defeats　the　end　that　forms　its　concept。　The　colossal　is　the　mere　presentation　of　a　concept　which　is　almost　too　great　for　presentation；　i。e。；　borders　on　the　relatively　monstrous；　for　the　end　to　be　attained　by　the　presentation　of　a　concept　is　made　harder　to　realize　by　the　intuition　of　the　object　being　almost　too　great　for　our　faculty　of　apprehension。　A　pure　judgement　upon　the　sublime　must；　however；　have　no　end　belonging　to　the　object　as　its　determining　ground；　if　it　is　to　be　aesthetic　and　not　to　be　tainted　with　any　judgement　of　understanding　or　reason。

　　Since　whatever　is　to　be　a　source　of　pleasure；　apart　from　interest；　to　the　merely　reflective　judgement　must　involve　in　its　representation　subjective；　and；　as　such；　universally　valid　finality…though　here；　however；　no　finality　of　the　form　of　the　object　underlies　our　estimate　of　it　（as　it　does　in　the　case　of　the　beautiful）…the　question　arises：　What　is　the　subjective　finality；　and　what　enables　it　to　be　prescribed　as　a　norm　so　as　to　yield　a　ground　for　universally　valid　delight　in　the　mere　estimation　of　magnitude；　and　that；　too；　in　a　case　where　it　is　pushed　to　the　point　at　which　faculty　of　imagination　breaks　down　in　presenting　the　concept　of　a　magnitude；　and　proves　unequal　to　its　task？　　　In　the　successive　aggregation　of　units　requisite　for　the　representation　of　magnitudes；　the　imagination　of　itself　advances　ad　infinitum　without　let　or　hindrance…understanding；　however；　conducting　it　by　means　of　concepts　of　number　for　which　the　former　must　supply　the　schema。　This　procedure　belongs　to　the　logical　estimation　of　magnitude；　and；　as　such；　is　doubtless　something　objectively　final　according　to　the　concept　of　an　end　（as　all　measurement　is）；　but　it　is　hot　anything　which　for　the　aesthetic　judgement　is　final　or　pleasin