the critique of judgement-第17章

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ord；　no　sensation　as　matter　of　the　aesthetic　judgement。

　　　　　　　SS　15。　The　judgement　of　taste　is　entirely　independent　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　concept　of　perfection。

　　Objective　finality　can　only　be　cognized　by　means　of　a　reference　of　the　manifold　to　a　definite　end；　and　hence　only　through　a　concept。　This　alone　makes　it　clear　that　the　beautiful；　which　is　estimated　on　the　ground　of　a　mere　formal　finality；　i。e。；　a　finality　apart　from　an　end；　is　wholly　independent　of　the　representation　of　the　good。　For　the　latter　presupposes　an　objective　finality；　i。e。；　the　reference　of　the　object　to　a　definite　end。　　　Objective　finality　is　either　external；　i。e。；　the　utility；　or　internal；　i。　e。；　the　perfection；　of　the　object。　That　the　delight　in　an　object　on　account　of　which　we　call　it　beautiful　is　incapable　of　resting　on　the　representation　of　its　utility；　is　abundantly　evident　from　the　two　preceding　articles；　for　in　that　case；　it　would　not　be　an　immediate　delight　in　the　object；　which　latter　is　the　essential　condition　of　the　judgement　upon　beauty。　But　in　an　objective；　internal　finality；　i。e。；　perfection；　we　have　what　is　more　akin　to　the　predicate　of　beauty；　and　so　this　has　been　held　even　by　philosophers　of　reputation　to　be　convertible　with　beauty；　though　subject　to　the　qualification：　where　it　is　thought　in　a　confused　way。　In　a　critique　of　taste　it　is　of　the　utmost　importance　to　decide　whether　beauty　is　really　reducible　to　the　concept　of　perfection。　　　For　estimating　objective　finality　we　always　require　the　concept　of　an　end；　and；　where　such　finality　has　to　be；　not　an　external　one　（utility）；　but　an　internal　one；　the　concept　of　an　internal　end　containing　the　ground　of　the　internal　possibility　of　the　object。　Now　an　end　is　in　general　that；　the　concept　of　which　may　be　regarded　as　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of　the　object　itself。　So　in　order　to　represent　an　objective　finality　in　a　thing　we　must　first　have　a　concept　of　what　sort　of　a　thing　it　is　to　be。　The　agreement　of　the　manifold　in　a　thing　with　this　concept　（which　supplies　the　rule　of　its　synthesis）　is　the　qualitative　perfection　of　the　thing。　Quantitative　perfection　is　entirely　distinct　from　this。　It　consists　in　the　completeness　of　anything　after　its　kind；　and　is　a　mere　concept　of　quantity　（of　totality）。　In　its　case　the　question　of　what　the　thing　is　to　be　is　regarded　as　definitely　disposed　of；　and　we　only　ask　whether　it　is　possessed　of　all　the　requisites　that　go　to　make　it　such。　What　is　formal　in　the　representation　of　a　thing；　i。e。；　the　agreement　of　its　manifold　with　a　unity　（i。e。；　irrespective　of　what　it　is　to　be）；　does　not；　of　itself；　afford　us　any　cognition　whatsoever　of　objective　finality。　For　since　abstraction　is　made　from　this　unity　as　end　（what　the　thing　is　to　be）；　nothing　is　left　but　the　subjective　finality　of　the　representations　in　the　mind　of　the　subject　intuiting。　This　gives　a　certain　finality　of　the　representative　state　of　the　subject；　in　which　the　subject　feels　itself　quite　at　home　in　its　effort　to　grasp　a　given　form　in　the　imagination；　but　no　perfection　of　any　object；　the　latter　not　being　here　thought　through　any　concept。　For　instance；　if　in　a　forest　I　light　upon　a　plot　of　grass；　round　which　trees　stand　in　a　circle；　and　if　I　do　not　then　form　any　representation　of　an　end；　as　that　it　is　meant　to　be　used；　say；　for　country　dances；　then　not　the　least　hint　of　a　concept　of　perfection　is　given　by　the　mere　form。　To　suppose　a　formal　objective　finality　that　is　yet　devoid　of　an　end；　i。e。；　the　mere　form　of　a　perfection　（apart　from　any　matter　or　concept　of　that　to　which　the　agreement　relates；　even　though　there　was　the　mere　general　idea　of　a　conformity　to　law）　is　a　veritable　contradiction。　　　Now　the　judgement　of　taste　is　an　aesthetic　judgement；　one　resting　on　subjective　grounds。　No　concept　can　be　its　determining　ground；　and　hence　not　one　of　a　definite　end。　Beauty；　therefore；　as　a　formal　subjective　finality；　involves　no　thought　whatsoever　of　a　perfection　of　the　object；　as　a　would…be　formal　finality　which　yet；　for　all　that；　is　objective：　and　the　distinction　between　the　concepts　of　the　beautiful　and　the　good；　which　represents　both　as　differing　only　in　their　logical　form；　the　first　being　merely　a　confused；　the　second　a　clearly　defined；　concept　of　perfection；　while　otherwise　alike　in　content　and　origin；　all　goes　for　nothing：　for　then　there　would　be　no　specific　difference　between　them；　but　the　judgement　of　taste　would　be　just　as　much　a　cognitive　judgement　as　one　by　which　something　is　described　as　good…just　as　the　man　in　the　street；　when　be　says　that　deceit　is　wrong；　bases　his　judgement　on　confused；　but　the　philosopher　on　clear　grounds；　while　both　appeal　in　reality　to　identical　principles　of　reason。　But　I　have　already　stated　that　an　aesthetic　judgement　is　quite　unique；　and　affords　absolutely　no　（not　even　a　confused）　knowledge　of　the　object。　It　is　only　through　a　logical　judgement　that　we　get　knowledge。　The　aesthetic　judgement；　on　the　other　hand；　refers　the　representation；　by　which　an　object　is　given；　solely　to　the　subject；　and　brings　to　our　notice　no　quality　of　the　object；　but　only　the　final　form　in　the　determination　of　the　powers　of　representation　engaged　upon　it。　The　judgement　is　called　aesthetic　for　the　very　reason　that　its　determining　ground　cannot　be　a　concept；　but　is　rather　the　feeling　（of　the　internal　sense）　of　the　concert　in　the　play　of　the　mental　powers　as　a　thing　only　capable　of　being　felt。　If；　on　the　other　band；　confused　concepts；　and　the　objective　judgement　based　on　them；　are　going　to　be　called　aesthetic；　we　shall　find　ourselves　with　an　understanding　judging　by　sense；　or　a　sense　representing　its　objects　by　concepts…a　mere　choice　of　contradictions。　The　faculty　of　concepts；　be　they　confused　or　be　they　clear；　is　understanding；　and　although　understanding　has　（as　in　all　judgements）　its　role　in　the　judgement　of　taste；　as　an　aesthetic　judgement；　its　role　there　is　not　that　of　a　faculty　for　cognizing　an　object；　but　of　a　faculty　for　determining　that　judgement　and　its　representation　（without　a　concept）　according　to　its　relation　to　the　subject　and　its　internal　feeling；　and　for　doing　so　in　so　far　as　that　judgement　is　possible　according　to　a　universal　rule。

　　　　　　SS　16。　A　judgement　of　taste　by　which　an　object　is　　　　　　　　described　as　beautiful；　under　the　condition　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　　a　definite　concept；　is　not　pure。

　　There　are　two　kinds　of　beauty：　free　beauty　（pulchritudo　vaga）；　or　beauty　which　is　merely　dependent　（pulchritudo　adhaerens）。　The　first　presupposes　no　concept　of　what　the　object　should　be；　the　second　does　presuppose　such　a　concept　and；　with　it；　an　answering　perfection　of　the　object。　Those　of　the　first　kind　are　said　to　be　（self…subsisting）　beauties　of　this　thing　or　that　thing；　the　other　kind　of　beauty；　being　attached　to　a　concept　（conditioned　beauty）；　is　ascribed　to　objects　which　come　under　the　concept　of　a　particular　end。　　　Flowers　are　free　beauties　of　nature。　Hardly　anyone　but　a　botanist　knows　the　true　nature　of　a　flower；　and　even　he；　while　recognizing　in　the　flower　the　reproductive　organ　of　the　plant；　pays　no　attention　to　this　natural　end　when　using　his　taste　to　judge　of　its　beauty。　Hence　no　perfection　of　any　kind…no　internal　finality；　as　something　to　which　the　arrangement　of　the　manifold　is　related…underlies　this　judgement。　Many　birds　（the　parrot；　the　humming…bird；　the　bird　of　paradise）；　and　a　number　of　crustacea；　are　self…subsisting　beauties　which　are　not　appurtenant　to　any　object　defined　with　respect　to　its　end；　but　please　freely　and　on　their　own　account。　So　designs　a　la　grecque；　foliage　for　framework　or　on　wall…papers；　etc。；　have　no　intrinsic　meaning；　they　represent　nothing…no　object　under　a　definite　concept…and　are　free　beauties。　We　may　also　rank　in　the　same　class　what　in　music　are　called　fantasias　（without　a　theme）；　and；　indeed；　all　music　that　is　not　set　to　words。　　　In　the　estimate　of　a　free　beauty　（according　to　mere　form）　we　have　the　pure　judgement　of　taste。　No　concept　is　here　presupposed　of　any　end　for　which　the　manifold　should　serve　the　given　object；　and　which　the　latter；　therefore；　should　represent…an　incumbrance　which　would　only　restrict　the　freedom　of　the　imagination　that；　as　it　were；　is　at　play　in　the　contemplation　of　the　outward　form。　　　But　the　beauty　of　man　（including　under　this　head　tha