the critique of judgement-第15章

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resentation；　harmonious　activity；　such　as　belongs　to　cognition　generally；　is　the　sensation　whose　universal　communicability　is　postulated　by　the　judgement　of　taste。　An　objective　relation　can；　of　course；　only　be　thought；　yet　in　so　far　as；　in　respect　of　its　conditions；　it　is　subjective；　it　may　be　felt　in　its　effect　upon　the　mind；　and；　in　the　case　of　a　relation　（like　that　of　the　powers　of　representation　to　a　faculty　of　cognition　generally）　which　does　not　rest　on　any　concept；　no　other　consciousness　of　it　is　possible　beyond　that　through　sensation　of　its　effect　upon　the　mind　…an　effect　consisting　in　the　more　facile　play　of　both　mental　powers　（imagination　and　understanding）　as　quickened　by　their　mutual　accord。　A　representation　which　is　singular　and　independent　of　comparison　with　other　representations；　and；　being　such；　yet　accords　with　the　conditions　of　the　universality　that　is　the　general　concern　of　understanding；　is　one　that　brings　the　cognitive　faculties　into　that　proportionate　accord　which　we　require　for　all　cognition　and　which　we　therefore　deem　valid　for　every　one　who　is　so　constituted　as　to　judge　by　means　of　understanding　and　sense　conjointly　（i。e。；　for　every　man）。

　　　　　Definition　of　the　Beautiful　drawn　from　the　Second　Moment。

　　The　beautiful　is　that　which；　apart　from　a　concept；　pleases　universally。

　　　　　　　　THIRD　MOMENT。　Of　Judgements　of　Taste：　Moment　of　　　　　　　　　　the　relation　of　the　Ends　brought　under　Review　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in　such　Judgements。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　10。　Finality　in　general。

　　Let　us　define　the　meaning　of　〃an　end〃　in　transcendental　terms　（i。e。；　without　presupposing　anything　empirical；　such　as　the　feeling　of　pleasure）。　An　end　is　the　object　of　a　concept　so　far　as　this　concept　is　regarded　as　the　cause　of　the　object　（the　real　ground　of　its　possibility）；　and　the　causality　of　a　concept　in　respect　of　its　object　is　finality　（forma　finalis）。　Where；　then；　not　the　cognition　of　an　object　merely；　but　the　object　itself　（its　form　or　real　existence）　as　an　effect；　is　thought　to　be　possible　only　through　a　concept　of　it；　there　we　imagine　an　end。　The　representation　of　the　effect　is　here　the　determining　ground　of　its　cause　and　takes　the　lead　of　it。　The　consciousness　of　the　causality　of　a　representation　in　respect　of　the　state　of　the　subject　as　one　tending　to　preserve　a　continuance　of　that　state；　may　here　be　said　to　denote　in　a　general　way　what　is　called　pleasure；　whereas　displeasure　is　that　representation　which　contains　the　ground　for　converting　the　state　of　the　representations　into　their　opposite　（for　hindering　or　removing　them）。　　　The　faculty　of　desire；　so　far　as　determinable　only　through　concepts；　i。e。；　so　as　to　act　in　conformity　with　the　representation　of　an　end；　would　be　the　Will。　But　an　object；　or　state　of　mind；　or　even　an　action　may；　although　its　possibility　does　not　necessarily　presuppose　the　representation　of　an　end；　be　called　final　simply　on　account　of　its　possibility　being　only　explicable　and　intelligible　for　us　by　virtue　of　an　assumption　on　our　part　of　fundamental　causality　according　to　ends；　i。e。；　a　will　that　would　have　so　ordained　it　according　to　a　certain　represented　rule。　Finality；　therefore；　may　exist　apart　from　an　end；　in　so　far　as　we　do　not　locate　the　causes　of　this　form　in　a　will；　but　yet　are　able　to　render　the　explanation　of　its　possibility　intelligible　to　ourselves　only　by　deriving　it　from　a　will。　Now　we　are　not　always　obliged　to　look　with　the　eye　of　reason　into　what　we　observe　（i。e。；　to　consider　it　in　its　possibility）。　So　we　may　at　least　observe　a　finality　of　form；　and　trace　it　in　objects…though　by　reflection　only…without　resting　it　on　an　end　（as　the　material　of　the　nexus　finalis）。

　　　　　SS　11。　The　sole　foundation　of　the　judgement　of　taste　　　　　　　　is　the　form　of　finality　of　an　object　（or　mode　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　representing　it）。

　　Whenever　an　end　is　regarded　as　a　source　of　delight；　it　always　imports　an　interest　as　determining　ground　of　the　judgement　on　the　object　of　pleasure。　Hence　the　judgement　of　taste　cannot　rest　on　any　subjective　end　as　its　ground。　But　neither　can　any　representation　of　an　objective　end；　i。e。；　of　the　possibility　of　the　object　itself　on　principles　of　final　connection；　determine　the　judgement　of　taste；　and；　consequently；　neither　can　any　concept　of　the　good。　For　the　judgement　of　taste　is　an　aesthetic　and　not　a　cognitive　judgement；　and　so　does　not　deal　with　any　concept　of　the　nature　or　of　the　internal　or　external　possibility；　by　this　or　that　cause；　of　the　object；　but　simply　with　the　relative　bearing　of　the　representative　powers　so　far　as　determined　by　a　representation。　　　Now　this　relation；　present　when　an　object　is　characterized　as　beautiful；　is　coupled　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure。　This　pleasure　is　by　the　judgement　of　taste　pronounced　valid　for　every　one；　hence　an　agreeableness　attending　the　representation　is　just　as　incapable　of　containing　the　determining　ground　of　the　judgement　as　the　representation　of　the　perfection　of　the　object　or　the　concept　of　the　good。　We　are　thus　left　with　the　subjective　finality　in　the　representation　of　an　object；　exclusive　of　any　end　（objective　or　subjective）…consequently　the　bare　form　of　finality　in　the　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given　to　us；　so　far　as　we　are　conscious　of　it　as　that　which　is　alone　capable　of　constituting　the　delight　which；　apart　from　any　concept；　we　estimate　as　universally　communicable；　and　so　of　forming　the　determining　ground　of　the　judgement　of　taste。

　　　　　　　　　SS　12。　The　judgement　of　taste　rests　upon　a　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　priori　grounds。

　　To　determine　a　priori　the　connection　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　as　an　effect；　with　some　representation　or　other　（sensation　or　concept）　as　its　cause；　is　utterly　impossible；　for　that　would　be　a　causal　relation　which　（with　objects　of　experience）　is　always　one　that　can　only　be　cognized　a　posteriori　and　with　the　help　of　experience。　True；　in　the　Critique　of　Practical　Reason　we　did　actually　derive　a　priori　from　universal　moral　concepts　the　feeling　of　respect　（as　a　particular　and　peculiar　modification　of　this　feeling　which　does　not　strictly　answer　either　to　the　pleasure　or　displeasure　which　we　receive　from　empirical　objects）。　But　there　we　were　further　able　to　cross　the　border　of　experience　and　call　in　aid　a　causality　resting　on　a　supersensible　attribute　of　the　subject；　namely　that　of　freedom。　But　even　there　it　was　not　this　feeling　exactly　that　we　deduced　from　the　idea　of　the　moral　as　cause；　but　from　this　was　derived　simply　the　determination　of　the　will。　But　the　mental　state　present　in　the　determination　of　the　will　by　any　means　is　at　once　in　itself　a　feeling　of　pleasure　and　identical　with　it；　and　so　does　not　issue　from　it　as　an　effect。　Such　an　effect　must　only　be　assumed　where　the　concept　of　the　moral　as　a　good　precedes　the　determination　of　the　will　by　the　law；　for　in　that　case　it　would　be　futile　to　derive　the　pleasure　combined　with　the　concept　from　this　concept　as　a　mere　cognition。　　　Now　the　pleasure　in　aesthetic　judgements　stands　on　a　similar　footing：　only　that　here　it　is　merely　contemplative　and　does　not　bring　about　an　interest　in　the　object；　whereas　in　the　moral　judgement　it　is　practical；　The　consciousness　of　mere　formal　finality　in　the　play　of　the　cognitive　faculties　of　the　subject　attending　a　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given；　is　the　pleasure　itself；　because　it　involves　a　determining　ground　of　the　subject's　activity　in　respect　of　the　quickening　of　its　cognitive　powers；　and　thus　an　internal　causality　（which　is　final）　in　respect　of　cognition　generally；　but　without　being　limited　to　a　definite　cognition；　and　consequently　a　mere　form　of　the　subjective　finality　of　a　representation　in　an　aesthetic　judgement。　This　pleasure　is　also　in　no　way　practical；　neither　resembling　that　form　the　pathological　ground　of　agreeableness　nor　that　from　the　intellectual　ground　of　the　represented　good。　But　still　it　involves　an　inherent　causality；　that；　namely；　of　preserving　a　continuance　of　the　state　of　the　representation　itself　and　the　active　engagement　of　the　cognitive　powers　without　ulterior　aim。　We　dwell　on　the　contemplation　of　the　beautiful　because　this　contemplation　strengthens　and　reproduces　itself。　The　case　is　analogous　（but　analogous　only）　to　the　way　we　linger　on　a　charm　in　the