the critique of judgement-第12章

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　gratifications…this　is　a　view　to　which　reason　will　never　let　itself　be　brought　round。　Only　by　what　a　man　does　heedless　of　enjoyment；　in　complete　freedom；　and　independently　of　what　he　can　procure　passively　from　the　hand　of　nature；　does　be　give　to　his　existence；　as　the　real　existence　of　a　person；　an　absolute　worth。　Happiness；　with　all　its　plethora　of　pleasures；　is　far　from　being　an　unconditioned　good。*

　　*An　obligation　to　enjoyment　is　a　patent　absurdity。　And　the　same；　then；　must　also　be　said　of　a　supposed　obligation　to　actions　that　have　merely　enjoyment　for　their　aim；　no　matter　how　spiritually　this　enjoyment　may　be　refined　in　thought　（or　embellished）；　and　even　if　it　be　a　mystical；　so…called　heavenly；　enjoyment。

　　But；　despite　all　this　difference　between　the　agreeable　and　the　good；　they　both　agree　in　being　invariably　coupled　with　an　interest　in　their　object。　This　is　true；　not　alone　of　the　agreeable；　SS　3；　and　of　the　mediately　good；　i；　e。；　the　useful；　which　pleases　as　a　means　to　some　pleasure；　but　also　of　that　which　is　good　absolutely　and　from　every　point　of　view；　namely　the　moral　good　which　carries　with　it　the　highest　interest。　For　the　good　is　the　object　of　will；　i。　e。；　of　a　rationally　determined　faculty　of　desire）。　But　to　will　something；　and　to　take　a　delight　in　its　existence；　i。e。；　to　take　an　interest　in　it；　are　identical。

　　　　　　SS　5。　Comparison　of　the　three　specifically　different　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　kinds　of　delight。

　　Both　the　agreeable　and　the　good　involve　a　reference　to　the　faculty　of　desire；　and　are　thus　attended；　the　former　with　a　delight　pathologically　conditioned　（by　stimuli）；　the　latter　with　a　pure　practical　delight。　Such　delight　is　determined　not　merely　by　the　representation　of　the　object；　but　also　by　the　represented　bond　of　connection　between　the　subject　and　the　real　existence　of　the　object。　It　is　not　merely　the　object；　but　also　its　real　existence；　that　pleases。　On　the　other　hand；　the　judgement　of　taste　is　simply　contemplative；　i。　e。；　it　is　a　judgement　which　is　indifferent　as　to　the　existence　of　an　object；　and　only　decides　how　its　character　stands　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　displeasure。　But　not　even　is　this　contemplation　itself　directed　to　concepts；　for　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement　（neither　a　theoretical　one　nor　a　practical）；　and　hence；　also；　is　not　grounded　on　concepts；　nor　yet　intentionally　directed　to　them。　　　The　agreeable；　the　beautiful；　and　the　good　thus　denote　three　different　relations　of　representations　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　displeasure；　as　a　feeling　in　respect　of　which　we　distinguish　different　objects　or　modes　of　representation。　Also；　the　corresponding　expressions　which　indicate　our　satisfaction　in　them　are　different　The　agreeable　is　what　GRATIFIES　a　man；　the　beautiful　what　simply　PLEASES　him；　the　good　what　is　ESTEEMED　（approved）；　i。e。；　that　on　which　he　sets　an　objective　worth。　Agreeableness　is　a　significant　factor　even　with　irrational　animals；　beauty　has　purport　and　significance　only　for　human　beings；　i。e。；　for　beings　at　once　animal　and　rational　（but　not　merely　for　them　as　rational…intelligent　beings…but　only　for　them　as　at　once　animal　and　rational）；　whereas　the　good　is　good　for　every　rational　being　in　general…a　proposition　which　can　only　receive　its　complete　justification　and　explanation　in　the　sequel。　Of　all　these　three　kinds　of　delight；　that　of　taste　in　the　beautiful　may　be　said　to　be　the　one　and　only　disinterested　and　free　delight；　for；　with　it；　no　interest；　whether　of　sense　or　reason；　extorts　approval。　And　so　we　may　say　that　delight；　in　the　three　cases　mentioned；　is　related　to　inclination；　to　favour；　or　to　respect。　For　FAVOUR　is　the　only　free　liking。　An　object　of　inclination；　and　one　which　a　law　of　reason　imposes　upon　our　desire；　leaves　us　no　freedom　to　turn　anything　into　an　object　of　pleasure。　All　interest　presupposes　a　want；　or　calls　one　forth；　and；　being　a　ground　determining　approval；　deprives　the　judgement　on　the　object　of　its　freedom。　　　So　far　as　the　interest　of　inclination　in　the　case　of　the　agreeable　goes；　every　one　says　〃Hunger　is　the　best　sauce；　and　people　with　a　healthy　appetite　relish　everything；　so　long　as　it　is　something　they　can　eat。〃　Such　delight；　consequently；　gives　no　indication　of　taste　having　anything　to　say　to　the　choice。　Only　when　men　have　got　all　they　want　can　we　tell　who　among　the　crowd　has　taste　or　not。　Similarly　there　may　be　correct　habits　（conduct）　without　virtue；　politeness　without　good…will；　propriety　without　honour；　etc。　For　where　the　moral　law　dictates；　there　is；　objectively；　no　room　left　for　free　choice　as　to　what　one　has　to　do；　and　to　show　taste　in　the　way　one　carries　out　these　dictates；　or　in　estimating　the　way　others　do　so；　is　a　totally　different　matter　from　displaying　the　moral　frame　of　one's　mind。　For　the　latter　involves　a　command　and　produces　a　need　of　something；　whereas　moral　taste　only　plays　with　the　objects　of　delight　without　devoting　itself　sincerely　to　any。

　　Definition　of　the　Beautiful　derived　from　the　First　Moment。

　　Taste　is　the　faculty　of　estimating　an　object　or　a　mode　of　representation　by　means　of　a　delight　or　aversion　apart　from　any　interest。　The　object　of　such　a　delight　is　called　beautiful。

　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　MOMENT。　Of　the　Judgement　of　Taste：　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Moment　of　Quantity。

　　　　　　　　SS　6。　The　beautiful　is　that　which；　apart　from　　　　　　　　　　　　　concepts；　is　represented　as　the　Object　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　a　universal　delight。

　　This　definition　of　the　beautiful　is　deducible　from　the　foregoing　definition　of　it　as　an　object　of　delight　apart　from　any　interest。　For　where　any　one　is　conscious　that　his　delight　in　an　object　is　with　him　independent　of　interest；　it　is　inevitable　that　he　should　look　on　the　object　as　one　containing　a　ground　of　delight　for　all　men。　For；　since　the　delight　is　not　based　on　any　inclination　of　the　subject　（or　on　any　other　deliberate　interest）；　but　the　subject　feels　himself　completely　free　in　respect　of　the　liking　which　he　accords　to　the　object；　he　can　find　as　reason　for　his　delight　no　personal　conditions　to　which　his　own　subjective　self　might　alone　be　party。　Hence　he　must　regard　it　as　resting　on　what　he　may　also　presuppose　in　every　other　person；　and　therefore　he　must　believe　that　he　has　reason　for　demanding　a　similar　delight　from　every　one。　Accordingly　he　will　speak　of　the　beautiful　as　if　beauty　were　a　quality　of　the　object　and　the　judgement　logical　（forming　a　cognition　of　the　object　by　concepts　of　it）；　although　it　is　only　aesthetic；　and　contains　merely　a　reference　of　the　representation　of　the　object　to　the　subject；　because　it　still　bears　this　resemblance　to　the　logical　judgement；　that　it　may　be　presupposed　to　be　valid　for　all　men。　But　this　universality　cannot　spring　from　concepts。　For　from　concepts　there　is　no　transition　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　（save　in　the　case　of　pure　practical　laws；　which；　however；　carry　an　interest　with　them；　and　such　an　interest　does　not　attach　to　the　pure　judgement　of　taste）。　The　result　is　that　the　judgement　of　taste；　with　its　attendant　consciousness　of　detachment　from　all　interest；　must　involve　a　claim　to　validity　for　all　men；　and　must　do　so　apart　from　universality　attached　to　objects；　i。e。；　there　must　be　coupled　with　it　a　claim　to　subjective　universality。

　　　　　　SS　7。　Comparison　of　the　beautiful　with　the　agreeable　　　　　　　　and　the　good　by　means　of　the　above　characteristic。

　　As　regards　the　agreeable；　every　one　concedes　that　his　judgement；　which　he　bases　on　a　private　feeling；　and　in　which　he　declares　that　an　object　pleases　him；　is　restricted　merely　to　himself　personally。　Thus　he　does　not　take　it　amiss　if；　when　he　says　that　Canary…wine　is　agreeable；　another　corrects　the　expression　and　reminds　him　that　he　ought　to　say：　〃It　is　agreeable　to　me。〃　This　applies　not　only　to　the　taste　of　the　tongue；　the　palate；　and　the　throat；　but　to　what　may　with　any　one　be　agreeable　to　eye　or　ear。　A　violet　colour　is　to　one　soft　and　lovely：　to　another　dull　and　faded。　One　man　likes　the　tone　of　wind　instruments；　another　prefers　that　of　string　instruments。　To　quarrel　over　such　points　with　the　idea　of　condemning　another's　judgement　as　incorrect　when　it　differs　from　our　own；　as　if　the　opposition　between　the　two　judgements　were　logical；　would　be　folly。　With　the　agre