a theologico-political treatise [part iv]-第4章
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consists in depriving a man； under the pretence of legality； of what the
laws； rightly interpreted； would allow him。 （74） These last are also called
equity and iniquity； because those who administer the laws are bound to show
no respect of persons； but to account all men equal； and to defend every
man's right equally； neither envying the rich nor despising the poor。
＇16：6＇（75） The men of two states become allies； when for the sake of
avoiding war； or for some other advantage； they covenant to do each other no
hurt； but on the contrary； to assist each other if necessity arises； each
retaining his independence。 （76） Such a covenant is valid so long as its
basis of danger or advantage is in force： no one enters into an engagement；
or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing
good； or the fear of some evil： if this basis be removed the compact thereby
becomes void： this has been abundantly shown by experience。 （77） For
although different states make treaties not to harm one another； they always
take every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the
stronger party； and do not rely on the compact； unless there is a
sufficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it。
（78） Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith； nor would there be any
wrong done thereby： for who in his proper senses； and aware of the right of
the sovereign power； would trust in the promises of one who has the will and
the power to do what he likes； and who aims solely at the safety and
advantage of his dominion？ （79） Moreover； if we consult loyalty and
religion； we shall see that no one in possession of power ought to abide by
his promises to the injury of his dominion； for he cannot keep such promises
without breaking the engagement he made with his subjects； by which both he
and they are most solemnly bound。 （80） An enemy is one who lives apart from
the state； and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or as an
ally。 It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy； but the rights of the
state。 （81） The rights of the state are the same in regard to him who
does not recognize by any compact the state authority； as they are against
him who has done the state an injury： it has the right to force him as best
it can； either to submit； or to contract an alliance。
＇16：7＇ （82） Lastly； treason can only be committed by subjects； who by
compact； either tacit or expressed； have transferred all their rights to the
state： a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has attempted；
for whatever reason； to seize the sovereign power； or to place it in
different hands。 （83） I say； has attempted； for if punishment were not to
overtake him till he had succeeded； it would often come too late； the
sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred already。
（16：84） I also say； has attempted； for whatever reason； to seize the
sovereign power； and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt
should be followed by public loss or public gain。 （85） Whatever be his
reason for acting； the crime is treason； and he is rightly condemned： in
war； everyone would admit the justice of his sentence。 （86） If a man does
not keep to his post； but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his
commander； whatever may be his motive； so long as he acts on his own motion；
even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy； he is rightly
put to death； because he has violated his oath； and infringed the rights of
his commander。 （87） That all citizens are equally bound by these rights in
time of peace； is not so generally recognized； but the reasons for obedience
are in both cases identical。 （88） The state must be preserved and directed
by the sole authority of the sovereign； and such authority and right have
been accorded by universal consent to him alone： if； therefore； anyone else
attempts； without his consent； to execute any public enterprise； even though
the state might （as we said） reap benefit therefrom； such person has none
the less infringed the sovereigns right； and would be rightly punished for
treason。
（16：89） In order that every scruple may be removed； we may now answer the
inquiry； whether our former assertion that everyone who has not the
practice of reason； may； in the state of nature； live by sovereign natural
right； according to the laws of his desires； is not in direct opposition to
the law and right of God as revealed。 （90） For as all men absolutely
（whether they be less endowed with reason or more） are equally bound by the
Divine command to love their neighbour as themselves； it may be said that
they cannot； without wrong； do injury to anyone； or live according to their
desires。
（16：91） This objection； so far as the state of nature is concerned； can be
easily answered； for the state of nature is； both in nature and in time；
prior to religion。 （92） No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to
God ＇Endnote 28＇； nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason；
but solely by revelation confirmed by signs。 （93） Therefore； previous to
revelation； no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is
necessarily in ignorance。 （94） The state of nature must by no means be
confounded with a state of religion； but must be conceived as without
either religion or law； and consequently without sin or wrong： this is how
we have described it； and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul。 （95） It
is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of nature as
prior to； and lacking the Divine revealed law and right； but in respect of
freedom also； wherewith all men are born endowed。
（16：96） If men were naturally bound by the Divine law and right； or if the
Divine law and right were a natural necessity； there would have been no need
for God to make a covenant with mankind； and to bind them thereto with an
oath and agreement。
（16：97） We must； then； fully grant that the Divine law and right originated
at the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey God in all things；
and ceded； as it were； their natural freedom； transferring their rights to
God in the manner described in speaking of the formation of a state。
（98） However； I will treat of these matters more at length presently。
＇16：8＇ （99） It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the
Divine law as subjects： whereas we have asserted that they retain their
natural rights； and may do whatever they like。
（16：100） In order to clear up the whole difficulty； which arises rather
concerning the natural right than the natural state； I maintain that
everyone is bound； in the state of nature； to live according to Divine law；
in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of sound
reason； namely； inasmuch as it is to his advantage； and necessary for his
salvation； but； if he will not so live； he may do otherwise at his own risk。
（101） He is thus bound to live according to his own laws； not according to
anyone else's； and to recognize no man as a judge； or as a superior in
religion。 （102） Such； in my opinion； is the position of a sovereign； for he
may take advice from his fellow…men； but he is not bound to recognize any as
a judge； nor anyone besides himself as an arbitrator on any question of
right； unless it be a prophet sent expressly by God and attesting his
mission by indisputable signs。 （103） Even then he does not recognize a man；
but God Himself as His judge。
＇16：9＇ （104） If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His law；
he does so at his own risk and loss； but without violating any civil or
natural right。 （105） For the civil right is dependent on his own decree； and
natural right is
