the seventh letter-第7章
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it out for themselves。 As for the rest； it would fill some of them
quite illogically with a mistaken feeling of contempt； and others with
lofty and vain…glorious expectations； as though they had learnt
something high and mighty。
On this point I intend to speak a little more at length； for
perhaps； when I have done so； things will be clearer with regard to my
present subject。 There is an argument which holds good against the man
ventures to put anything whatever into writing on questions of this
nature； it has often before been stated by me； and it seems suitable
to the present occasion。
For everything that exists there are three instruments by which
the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted； fourth； there is the
knowledge itself； and； as fifth； we must count the thing itself
which is known and truly exists。 The first is the name； the； second
the definition； the third。 the image； and the fourth the knowledge。 If
you wish to learn what I mean； take these in the case of one instance；
and so understand them in the case of all。 A circle is a thing
spoken of； and its name is that very word which we have just
uttered。 The second thing belonging to it is its definition； made up
names and verbal forms。 For that which has the name 〃round；〃
〃annular；〃 or； 〃circle；〃 might be defined as that which has the
distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal。 Third；
comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again； or turned on a lathe
and broken up…none of which things can happen to the circle
itself…to which the other things； mentioned have reference； for it
is something of a different order from them。 Fourth； comes
knowledge； intelligence and right opinion about these things。 Under
this one head we must group everything which has its existence； not in
words nor in bodily shapes； but in souls…from which it is dear that it
is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from
the three things mentioned before。 Of these things intelligence
comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth； and the others are
farther distant。
The same applies to straight as well as to circular form； to
colours； to the good； the； beautiful； the just； to all bodies
whether manufactured or coming into being in the course of nature；
to fire； water； and all such things； to every living being； to
character in souls； and to all things done and suffered。 For in the
case of all these； no one； if he has not some how or other got hold of
the four things first mentioned； can ever be completely a partaker
of knowledge of the fifth。 Further； on account of the weakness of
language； these （i。e。； the four） attempt to show what each thing is
like； not less than what each thing is。 For this reason no man of
intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in
language； especially not in language that is unchangeable； which is
true of that which is set down in written characters。
Again you must learn the point which comes next。 Every circle； of
those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe；
is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing。 For everywhere
it has contact with the straight。 But the circle itself； we say； has
nothing in either smaller or greater； of that which is its opposite。
We say also that the name is not a thing of permanence for any of
them； and that nothing prevents the things now called round from being
called straight； and the straight things round； for those who make
changes and call things by opposite names； nothing will be less
permanent （than a name）。 Again with regard to the definition； if it is
made up of names and verbal forms； the same remark holds that there is
no sufficiently durable permanence in it。 And there is no end to the
instances of the ambiguity from which each of the four suffers； but
the greatest of them is that which we mentioned a little earlier；
that； whereas there are two things； that which has real being； and
that which is only a quality； when the soul is seeking to know； not
the quality； but the essence； each of the four； presenting to the soul
by word and in act that which it is not seeking （i。e。； the quality）； a
thing open to refutation by the senses； being merely the thing
presented to the soul in each particular case whether by statement
or the act of showing； fills； one may say； every man with puzzlement
and perplexity。
Now in subjects in which； by reason of our defective education； we
have not been accustomed even to search for the truth； but are
satisfied with whatever images are presented to us； we are not held up
to ridicule by one another； the questioned by questioners； who can
pull to pieces and criticise the four things。 But in subjects where we
try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth； any one of
those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of
us； and makes the man； who gives an exposition in speech or writing or
in replies to questions； appear to most of his hearers to know nothing
of the things on which he is attempting to write or speak； for they
are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or
speaker which is proved to be at fault； but the defective nature of
each of the four instruments。 The process however of dealing with
all of these； as the mind moves up and down to each in turn； does
after much effort give birth in a well…constituted mind to knowledge
of that which is well constituted。 But if a man is ill…constituted
by nature （as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority
both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral
character）…or it may have become so by deterioration…not even
Lynceus could endow such men with the power of sight。
In one word； the man who has no natural kinship with this matter
cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory； for it
cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it。
Therefore； if men are not by nature kinship allied to justice and
all other things that are honourable； though they may be good at
learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds…or if they
have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory…none of
all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice。
For both must be learnt together； and together also must be learnt； by
complete and long continued study； as I said at the beginning； the
true and the false about all that has real being。 After much effort；
as names； definitions； sights； and other data of sense； are brought
into contact and friction one with another； in the course of
scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and
answer without ill will； with a sudden flash there shines forth
understanding about every problem； and an intelligence whose efforts
reach the furthest limits of human powers。 Therefore every man of
worth； when dealing with matters of worth； will be far from exposing
them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing
them to writing。 In one word； then； it may be known from this that； if
one sees written treatises composed by anyone； either the laws of a
lawgiver； or in any other form whatever； these are not for that man
the things of most worth； if he is a man of worth； but that his
treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses。 But if
these things were worked at by him as things of real worth； and
committed to writing； then surely； not gods； but men 〃have
themselves bereft him of his wits。〃
Anyone who has followed this discourse and digression will know well
that； if Dionysios or anyone else； great or small； has written a
treatise on the highest matters and the first principles of things； he
has； so I say； neither heard nor learnt any sound teaching about the
subject of his treatise； otherwise； he would have had the same
reverence for it； which I have； and would have shrunk from putting
it forth into a world of discord and uncomelines
