a discourse on method-第7章

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　unwilling　to　be　esteemed　different　from　what　I　really　am；　I　thought　it　necessary　to　endeavor　by　all　means　to　render　myself　worthy　of　the　reputation　accorded　to　me；　and　it　is　now　exactly　eight　years　since　this　desire　constrained　me　to　remove　from　all　those　places　where　interruption　from　any　of　my　acquaintances　was　possible；　and　betake　myself　to　this　country；　in　which　the　long　duration　of　the　war　has　led　to　the　establishment　of　such　discipline；　that　the　armies　maintained　seem　to　be　of　use　only　in　enabling　the　inhabitants　to　enjoy　more　securely　the　blessings　of　peace　and　where；　in　the　midst　of　a　great　crowd　actively　engaged　in　business；　and　more　careful　of　their　own　affairs　than　curious　about　those　of　others；　I　have　been　enabled　to　live　without　being　deprived　of　any　of　the　conveniences　to　be　had　in　the　most　populous　cities；　and　yet　as　solitary　and　as　retired　as　in　the　midst　of　the　most　remote　deserts。



PART　IV

I　am　in　doubt　as　to　the　propriety　of　making　my　first　meditations　in　the　place　above　mentioned　matter　of　discourse；　for　these　are　so　metaphysical；　and　so　uncommon；　as　not；　perhaps；　to　be　acceptable　to　every　one。　　And　yet；　that　it　may　be　determined　whether　the　foundations　that　I　have　laid　are　sufficiently　secure；　I　find　myself　in　a　measure　constrained　to　advert　to　them。　　I　had　long　before　remarked　that；　in　relation　to　practice；　it　is　sometimes　necessary　to　adopt；　as　if　above　doubt；　opinions　which　we　discern　to　be　highly　uncertain；　as　has　been　already　said；　but　as　I　then　desired　to　give　my　attention　solely　to　the　search　after　truth；　I　thought　that　a　procedure　exactly　the　opposite　was　called　for；　and　that　I　ought　to　reject　as　absolutely　false　all　opinions　in　regard　to　which　I　could　suppose　the　least　ground　for　doubt；　in　order　to　ascertain　whether　after　that　there　remained　aught　in　my　belief　that　was　wholly　indubitable。　　Accordingly；　seeing　that　our　senses　sometimes　deceive　us；　I　was　willing　to　suppose　that　there　existed　nothing　really　such　as　they　presented　to　us；　and　because　some　men　err　in　reasoning；　and　fall　into　paralogisms；　even　on　the　simplest　matters　of　geometry；　I；　convinced　that　I　was　as　open　to　error　as　any　other；　rejected　as　false　all　the　reasonings　I　had　hitherto　taken　for　demonstrations；　and　finally；　when　I　considered　that　the　very　same　thoughts　（presentations）　which　we　experience　when　awake　may　also　be　experienced　when　we　are　asleep；　while　there　is　at　that　time　not　one　of　them　true；　I　supposed　that　all　the　objects　（presentations）　that　had　ever　entered　into　my　mind　when　awake；　had　in　them　no　more　truth　than　the　illusions　of　my　dreams。　　But　immediately　upon　this　I　observed　that；　whilst　I　thus　wished　to　think　that　all　was　false；　it　was　absolutely　necessary　that　I；　who　thus　thought；　should　be　somewhat；　and　as　I　observed　that　this　truth；　I　think；　therefore　I　am　（COGITO　ERGO　SUM）；　was　so　certain　and　of　such　evidence　that　no　ground　of　doubt；　however　extravagant；　could　be　alleged　by　the　sceptics　capable　of　shaking　it；　I　concluded　that　I　might；　without　scruple；　accept　it　as　the　first　principle　of　the　philosophy　of　which　I　was　in　search

In　the　next　place；　I　attentively　examined　what　I　was　and　as　I　observed　that　I　could　suppose　that　I　had　no　body；　and　that　there　was　no　world　nor　any　place　in　which　I　might　be；　but　that　I　could　not　therefore　suppose　that　I　was　not；　and　that；　on　the　contrary；　from　the　very　circumstance　that　I　thought　to　doubt　of　the　truth　of　other　things；　it　most　clearly　and　certainly　followed　that　I　was；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　if　I　had　only　ceased　to　think；　although　all　the　other　objects　which　I　had　ever　imagined　had　been　in　reality　existent；　I　would　have　had　no　reason　to　believe　that　I　existed；　I　thence　concluded　that　I　was　a　substance　whose　whole　essence　or　nature　consists　only　in　thinking；　and　which；　that　it　may　exist；　has　need　of　no　place；　nor　is　dependent　on　any　material　thing；　so　that　〃　I；〃　that　is　to　say；　the　mind　by　which　I　am　what　I　am；　is　wholly　distinct　from　the　body；　and　is　　even　more　easily　known　than　the　latter；　and　is　such；　that　although　the　latter　were　not；　it　would　still　continue　to　be　all　that　it　is。

After　this　I　inquired　in　general　into　what　is　essential　I　to　the　truth　and　certainty　of　a　proposition；　for　since　I　had　discovered　one　which　I　knew　to　be　true；　I　thought　that　I　must　likewise　be　able　to　discover　the　ground　of　this　certitude。　　And　as　I　observed　that　in　the　words　I　think；　therefore　I　am；　there　is　nothing　at　all　which　gives　me　assurance　of　their　truth　beyond　this；　that　I　see　very　clearly　that　in　order　to　think　it　is　necessary　to　exist；　I　concluded　that　I　might　take；　as　a　general　rule；　the　principle；　that　all　the　things　which　we　very　clearly　and　distinctly　conceive　are　true；　only　observing；　however；　that　there　is　some　difficulty　in　rightly　determining　the　objects　which　we　distinctly　conceive。

In　the　next　place；　from　reflecting　on　the　circumstance　that　I　doubted；　and　that　consequently　my　being　was　not　wholly　perfect　（for　I　clearly　saw　that　it　was　a　greater　perfection　to　know　than　to　doubt）；　I　was　led　to　inquire　whence　I　had　learned　to　think　of　something　more　perfect　than　myself；　and　I　clearly　recognized　that　I　must　hold　this　notion　from　some　nature　which　in　reality　was　more　perfect。　　As　for　the　thoughts　of　many　other　objects　external　to　me；　as　of　the　sky；　the　earth；　light；　heat；　and　a　thousand　more；　I　was　less　at　a　loss　to　know　whence　these　came；　for　since　I　remarked　in　them　nothing　which　seemed　to　render　them　superior　to　myself；　I　could　believe　that；　if　these　were　true；　they　were　dependencies　on　my　own　nature；　in　so　far　as　it　possessed　a　certain　perfection；　and；　if　they　were　false；　that　I　held　them　from　nothing；　that　is　to　say；　that　they　were　in　me　because　of　a　certain　imperfection　of　my　nature。　　But　this　could　not　be　the　case　with…the　idea　of　a　nature　more　perfect　than　myself；　for　to　receive　it　from　nothing　was　a　thing　manifestly　impossible；　and；　because　it　is　not　less　repugnant　that　the　more　perfect　should　be　an　effect　of；　and　dependence　on　the　less　perfect；　than　that　something　should　proceed　from　nothing；　it　was　equally　impossible　that　I　could　hold　it　from　myself：　accordingly；　it　but　remained　that　it　had　been　placed　in　me　by　a　nature　which　was　in　reality　more　perfect　than　mine；　and　which　even　possessed　within　itself　all　the　perfections　of　which　I　could　form　any　idea；　that　is　to　say；　in　a　single　word；　which　was　God。　　And　to　this　I　added　that；　since　I　knew　some　perfections　which　I　did　not　possess；　I　was　not　the　only　being　in　existence　（I　will　here；　with　your　permission；　freely　use　the　terms　of　the　schools）；　but；　on　the　contrary；　that　there　was　of　necessity　some　other　more　perfect　Being　upon　whom　I　was　dependent；　and　from　whom　I　had　received　all　that　I　possessed；　for　if　I　had　existed　alone；　and　independently　of　every　other　being；　so　as　to　have　had　from　myself　all　the　perfection；　however　little；　which　I　actually　possessed；　I　should　have　been　able；　for　the　same　reason；　to　have　had　from　myself　the　whole　remainder　of　perfection；　of　the　want　of　which　I　was　conscious；　and　thus　could　of　myself　have　become　infinite；　eternal；　immutable；　omniscient；　all…powerful；　and；　in　fine；　have　possessed　all　the　perfections　which　I　could　recognize　in　God。　　For　in　order　to　know　the　nature　of　God　（whose　existence　has　been　established　by　the　preceding　reasonings）；　as　far　as　my　own　nature　permitted；　I　had　only　to　consider　in　reference　to　all　the　properties　of　which　I　found　in　my　　mind　some　idea；　whether　their　possession　was　a　mark　of　perfection；　and　I　was　assured　that　no　one　which　indicated　any　imperfection　was　in　him；　and　that　none　of　the　rest　was　awanting。　　Thus　I　perceived　that　doubt；　inconstancy；　　sadness；　and　such　like；　could　not　be　found　in　God；　since　I　myself　would　have　been　happy　to　be　free　from　them。　Besides；　I　had　ideas　of　many　sensible　and　corporeal　things；　for　although　I　might　suppose　that　I　was　dreaming；　and　that　all　which　I　saw　or　imagined　was　false；　I　could　not；　nevertheless；　deny　that　the　ideas　were　in　reality　in　my　thoughts。　　But；　because　I　had　already　very　clearly　recognized　in　myself　that　the　intelligent　nature　is　distinct　from　the　corporeal；　and　as　I　observed　that　all　composition　is　an　evidence　of　dependency；　and　that　a　state　of　dependency　is　manifestly　a　state　of　imperfection；